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ABSTRACT 
In the first half of the twenty-century, politics in 
South Carolina was dominated by the Democratic Party. Then, 
with the defection of then Governor Strom Thurmond in 1948, 
the state's political environment began a slow and gradual 
transformation to one of two-party politics. The role of the 
Republican Party within the state is a vital component to 
this transformation. Yet in order to understand this 
political alteration, one must look at the strategies and 
go~ls of those who worked in the South Carolina Republican 
Party. By researching the papers of James E. Duffy, this 
study attempts to show not only the strategy that Republicans 
undertook in South Carolina during the 1960s, but also the 
internal developments and evolution of a conservative-based 
political party and its success and failures in attempting to 
establish a two-party system in the state. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: SO WHAT? 
Throughout American political history, there have been 
three major periods where the body politic experienced a 
realignment, or a dramatic switch, of political loyalties by 
the voters. Many political scientists and historians believe 
the latest realignment of the political marketplace occurred 
in 1932 with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1 Under 
FDR's guidance, factions from across the spectrum of American 
politics formed the New Deal coalition, using the Solid 
Democratic South as its base. While this was, in some 
scholars' opinions, an uneasy alliance at best for both 
Roosevelt, blacks, and southerners, the coalition seemingly 
held together only as long as its leader was alive. When FDR 
died on April 12, 1945 and his successor Harry S. Truman 
assumed the role of party leader, the rifts within the New 
Deal coalition widen. The national election following FDR's 
death marked a watershed event in the politics of the 
American South. Under the 1948 "States' Rights- banner 
carried by South Carolina's governor J. Strom Thurmond, 
1some political scientists view the 1980 Republican presidential 
victory as a realignment election, striking the final death blow to the 
New Deal coalition; it is my belief that this election was only a 
dealignment in the American body politic (see William H. Flanigan & 
Nancy H. Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, 
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1991) and their argument as to 
the recent rise of the Independents as documented in Table 2-1, 36-37. 
2 
southerners diminished their automatic allegiance to the 
Democratic party, and with it the Democratic Party's 
preeminence at the national level. With this severance, 
Republicans, it seemed, would easily fill the political 
vacuum. Some scholars, like Donald Strong and George Brown 
Tindall, contend however that southerners did not actively 
pledge their allegiance to the Republicans; the Dixiecrat 
revolt 2 and the continued disruption within the Democratic 
Party 3 instead forced southerners into a mode of 
indecisiveness. Southerners transformed this indecisiveness 
into a political conversion during the 1950s and 1960s, 
culminating in the South eventually allying itself with the 
former party of Lincoln. 
This culmination of what Earl and Merle Black have 
described as the NSolid Republican South" has come at a price 
for the GOP, however. 4 Republican dominance at the 
presidential level has been extraordinary. Since 1968, the 
race for the White House in the South has Nbecome the 
Republicans' office to lose rather than the Democrats' office 
to win." 5 Only when two of the South's native Democrats have 
captured his party's nomination has the South offered any 
2Donald S. Strong, #The Presidential Election in the South, 1952,w 
The Journal of Politics, 27 (August, 1955): 366. 
3George Brown Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South, (Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 1972), 24. 
4Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: 
Elected, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
How Presidents Are 
1992), 27. 
5Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 260. 
3 
support for the Democratic party, and even then only half-
heartedly. Yet, at the same time, Republicans have not made 
the great inroads that their loyal following at the top of 
the ballot would suggest. It took nearly twenty years after 
Barry Goldwater swept the South that Republicans were able to 
achieve a "bedrock Republican vote" in the "range of genuine 
competition* in the region. 6 While such things as strong 
Democratic identification on the local level and the 
insulation of many state and local offices from the impact of 
presidential elections may have influenced the rise of state 
and local Republican officeholders, another explanation may 
also be offered: that Republicans conscientiously choose to 
focus their main attention on securing the South for victory 
on the national level, and thus conversely giving up their 
opportunities on the state and local level. 
Many historians and political scientists have traversed 
the national political impact of the South to great lengths. 
Such notables as V.O. Key, Donald Strong, and more recently 
Earl and Merle Black, have made the study of the once 
Democratic, now two-party, South the focus of their scholarly 
activities. Their insights and analyses of the rise of a 
modern two-party system on the presidential level have laid 
the foundation for the study of Southern politics in the 
United States. Key, in his masterpiece Southern Politics in 
State and Nation, described the need for an active two-party 
system in the South. The only way to bring such a system 
6Black and Black, Politics and Society in the South, 280. 
----~~-
4 
into the South, Key believed, depended on the forces of 
urbanism and industrialization to dissolve the sectionalism 
that held the South back in its political development. 7 
Strong, reflecting on the 1952 election, claimed that South 
Carolinians cast their votes for Eisenhower only in protest 
against the liberal ideology of Adlai Stevenson. 8 
While most of these researchers have dealt extensively 
with the national scene, some have also dared to delve into 
the state-wide political scene. Few, if any scholars, have 
made the great leap into the grass-roots arena and with good 
reason. Only a handful of historical sources have been made 
available for scholars to portray politics at the grass-roots 
level. Yet to completely understand the workings of a body 
politic, one should not only understand_ the motives of the 
political leaders, but also of those who gave the political 
leaders their power: local party activists and, most 
importantly, the voters. Most scholars would presumably ask, 
why study grass-roots politics? So what? It is my belief 
that only by combining both the study of national and grass-
roots politics can one fully comprehend the entire scope of 
the body politic. To ignore one is to view the political 
landscape with only one eye. One must include various 
studies of local trends and ideas that permeate the landscape 
and which eventually filter to the top of the electorate . 
7v .o. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, (University of 
Tennessee Press, 1991), 671-675. 
8strong, ·The President i al Election in the South, 1952,• 366. 
5 
All politics commence at the local level, with the fight for 
controlling the direction of the nation beginning at the 
local ballot box and precinct. As with any study of what 
some term "history from below," one of the great difficulties 
has been the availability of primary source material, those 
documents that make the researcher's adventure worthwhile and 
fascinating. 
Yet scholars who neglect these resources, when 
available, can not appreciate or realize the full scope and 
nature of the subjects they study. For historians who study 
a subject "from below," it should be their objective to 
"criticize, redefine and strengthen the historical 
mainstream." 9 This study has, as one of its main foci, this 
purpose in mind, of exploring the localized development and 
strategies of Palmetto Republicanism from 1960 to 1968. By 
examining this phenomenon from the trenches, one may be able 
to challenge and possibly refine the ideas that explain the 
dramatic transformation of the South. It is only then, when 
scholars have a complete view, that one can present a 
balanced and comprehensive analysis of the rise of a 
competitive modern two-party system. By studying the papers 
of an individual who played a key role in the development of 
a second major political party in the Palmetto State, it is 
not to merely to use untouched sources and materials for 
their own sake; 
9Peter Burke, New Perspectives on Historical Writing, (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 38. 
if he (the historian) visits the cellars, it is not 
for love of the dust, but to estimate the stability 
of the edifice, and because, to grasp the meaning 
of the cracks, he must know the quality of its 
foundation . 10 
6 
This approach to political history is one that requires 
important thought and research, yet few have undertaken the 
challenge to scrutinize the inner-workings of a relatively 
new phenomenon that has reshaped not only the regional, but 
the national political landscape as well. 
The study of "why" this Southern detachment from the 
Democratic Party came about has been investigated thoroughly, 
and to repeat such a · study would be pointless. But one 
important area that has been overlooked is "how" this 
detachment occurred, particularly in relationship to the 
basic foundation of all political activity. As the late 
Thomas P. O'Neill once remarked, "All politics is local." In 
looking at this new phenomenon, some key inquires can be 
framed: Who made up this new party of Republicanism in South 
Carolina? Was it just a party of disenchanted or "mad" 
Democratic segregationists? Where did the strength of this 
party come from? One of the most important questions posed 
would be how and why did Republicans formulate their strategy 
to overcome the obstacles? In a broad historical context, 
how does an opposition party not only develop, but eventually 
obtain preeminence in a previously one-party system? By 
understanding the local activities and struggles made by the 
lOR. H. Tawney, History and Society, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 978, 
55. Emphasis added. 
7 
Republican Party in the heart of a once Democratically solid 
state, one can work to understanding the rise of the national 
Republican majority, which, like the New Deal coalition 
nearly fifty years ago, now uses the South as its base of 
political dominance in presidential politics, but which has 
taken much longer to build a following at the state and local 
level. While the study of one state's political development 
may not necessarily show generalized trends for a region or 
country, it should contribute to the formulation of these 
generalized trends and historical interpretations. In 
studying political history by this approach, one should 
realize that politics means unot only the central 
institutions of the state, but also the assertion of 
authority over ordinary people# and who controls that 
assertion. Through this approach, upolitics is likely to be 
interpreted less as an enclosed arena than as the sphere in 
which conflicts between opposing interests in society are 
fought out . " 11 
Some political scientists and historians have viewed the 
capture of the South only at the presidential level by 
Republicans in the 1950s and early 1960s as a failure, a sign 
that a true two-party system did not exist. 1 2 Other 
11John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 
1991), 109 . 
12Richard Scher contemptuously argues that it was Eisenhower's 
fault for not realigning the South to the GOP, Politics in the New 
South: Republicanism, Race, and Leadership in the Twentieth Century 
(New York : Paragon House, 1992), 111. For reasons that will be explain 
further in Chapter II, I believe Scher's criticism is misplaced and 
wrong. 
8 
historians and political scientists have documented the 
influx of immigrants, the boom of economic development, and 
the pressing of constitutional rights by southern blacks as 
the contributing factors to the rise of the GOP in the South. 
But this study of the activities and strategies of 
Republicans at the grass-roots level suggests that GOP 
activists realized that they had to first capture the White 
House; then, and only then, they could work to secure the 
state house and court house. Yet even with their eventual 
dominance at the national level of the South, Republicans 
have only since recently come to active competition on the 
state and local level. To understand these localized efforts 
and the formulation of the strategy, the papers of James Evan 
Duffy proved to be invaluable in providing insight and 
understanding to this period. 
Al though his strict partisanship is evident in his 
papers, Duffy's materials nevertheless provide a vast 
untapped source of information and insight. A transplanted 
Yankee who came to the South in the mid-1950s, Duffy played 
an influential part in not only politics on the local level, 
but on the state and national level as well. Along with his 
correspondence and meticulous political analysis, Duffy 
authored an unpublished manuscript, entitled In G.O.P. We 
Trust. Although disorganized and subjective at times, this 
500 page recounting of his activities and observations 
provides a basis for investigating not only the rise of 
Palmetto Republicans, but for exploring what their struggle 
9 
entailed, both outside and inside the party ranks. Although 
he worked as a textile manager during the 1960s, Duffy had a 
surprisingly keen intuition and insight about the most 
essential techniques of waging the art of political warfare. 
It is primarily upon these two sources, along with 
newspaper articles and secondary sources, that this study is 
based. Of course, other outside influences and actions have 
a direct impact on this subject: economic development, 
migration and immigration, and, most importantly, the 
liberalizing of the national Democratic Party. Other 
historians have meticulously studied and presented their 
findings on these various influences, and this study will not 
attempt to duplicate their exacting efforts. Instead, this 
study will explore how, from 1948 to 1968, the political 
experience in South Carolina underwent what some scholars may 
define as a gradual realignment. Realignment, to some 
political scientists, means a sharp and radical change in the 
demarcation of voter loyalties. Yet as V.O. Key noted in 
what he termed #secular realignrnent,w the South, particularly 
South Carolina, experienced a gradual and drawn out shift in 
voter loyalties and preferences during the tumultuous 1960s. 
The debate over the term "realignment" and its causes and 
effects has inspired countless books, journal articles, and 
differing opinions. While the experts may disagree over the 
exact meaning and definition of political realignment, the 
study of how a state goes from solid political allegiance of 
one party to active two-party competition is important. It 
10 
does appear that over the course of twenty years, South 
Carolina's political environment went through a slow 
evolution, from its nearly century-long allegiance to the 
Democratic Party to Palmetto voters actively and publicly 
supporting Republican office-seekers. While 1968 may have 
marked the culmination of the Republicans' struggle to 
achieve domination of the White House, the contest for state 
and local offices in South Carolina has continued up to the 
1990s. How did Republicans, beginning with only minuscule 
support in the late 1940s, come to play an active role in the 
political landscape of the Palmetto state twenty years later? 
What were their strategies and goals, and how did early 
decisions shape the course of their struggle to bring two-
party competition to South Carolina? 
~-- ~-~-~- -~ -
CHAPTER II 
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK 
In order to lay the foundation for a competitive 
Republican Party in South Carolina politics during the 1960s, 
Republicans had to make some inroads into the Democratic 
citadel. A brief survey of the 1950s reveals some of the 
characteristics and strategies that Republicans later worked 
with during the following decade to build a two-party state. 
The politics of the modern South began in Philadelphia 
in 1948. The events at the Democratic National Convention, 
which led to the Dixiecrat revolt, set off a flare on the 
political horizon, signaling the end of blind Southern 
obedience to the Democratic Party. The strong national 
stance on civil rights, first taken by President Harry Truman 
and his 1947 Committee on Civil Rights and the party's 
subsequent adoption of a civil rights plank, 13 created a 
hemorrhage in the national Democratic Party. As Leslie 
Dunbar so aptly characterized it, no other "political act 
since the Compromise of 1877 has so profoundly influenced 
race relations; in a sense, it was the repeal of 1877." 14 
13ttubert Humphrey, then mayor of Minneapolis, authored the 
controversial plank. Twenty years later he would symbolize the epitome 
of liberalism that Southern Republicans disdained. 
14Leslie W. Dunbar, "The Changing Mind of the South: The Exposed 
Nerve," The Journal of Politics, 26 (February, 1964), 14. 
12 
Many believe that the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt within the 
Democratic Party resulted solely from the racial positions 
taken by the national party. In her study of the failed 
third-party movement, Emily Ader wrote in 1955 that three 
reasons precipitated the rise of the Dixiecrats. Along with 
their attempt to increase southern influence in the national 
party, the Dixiecrats felt an antagonism to the increasing 
federal government structure, in particular •the concept of 
the 'welfare state.'" Thirdly, conservative southerners felt 
irritated at the idea of "outsiders# telling Southerners how 
to change their practices related to the status of blacks. 15 
Alo_ng with those "more interested in tidelands oil than 
segregation# and guided by South Carolina's governor J. Strom 
Thurmond, the movement consisted of poor whites, businessmen, 
states' righters, and segregationists, all of whom had one 
main trait. They were 
all conservative in that they wished, for one 
reason or another, to preserve the status quo 
threatened by increasing centralization of 
governmental power and an administration committed 
to a civil rights program. 16 
Dixiecrats believed that if they could capture enough votes 
from the Democrats and prevent Truman from sweeping the 
electoral college, the election would be thrown into the 
House of Representatives, where southern Democrats held 
positions of domination within the seniority-based 
15Ernily B. Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement: Its Role in Third Party 
Politics, (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955}, 1-2. 
16Ader, 4-6. 
13 
Congressional system. Yet at the heart of this ufirst white 
revolt, .. as Merle and Earl Black have described it, uwas a 
reaction to the possibility of national civil rights 
legislation. "17 
While sweeping four Deep South states and 39 electoral 
votes, Strom Thurmond and the Dixiecrats failed in their 
attempt to force the 1948 presidential election into the 
House of Representatives. Thurmond also failed to sweep 
every county in his home state. Anderson County was one of 
two that did not vote for its native son; the county cast 
over 60 percent of its vote, the largest percentage of any 
county in the state, for the Democrat ticket, and only a 
little over 30 percent for the Dixiecrat presidential ticket. 
In stark contrast, the GOP garnered only 3 percent of the 
entire state vote, with Berkley County registering the 
highest Republican percentage of the 46 counties, 11. 9 
percent. 18 Thurmond's campaign for the White House not only 
had a profound impact on the national political landscape, 
but on the local level as well. This election seemingly 
unleashed the Palmetto Democrat from his obligatory 
allegiance to the national party in future elections. After 
17Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents Are 
Elected, 141. 
18Anderson County, in the 1948 Presidential election, cast the 
highest Democratic percentage in the state, 64 . 1 percent. Spartanburg, 
with 56 percent, and Dillon, with 45 percent, made up the remaining two 
counties which Democrats actually gave the Dixiecrats a fight. Richard 
Scammon, ed., America Votes, Vol. 1, {Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly, 1952): 330. 
14 
1948, it would be up to the GOP to garner those disenchanted 
voters. 
During the 1952 presidential election, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower sought to capture those disenchanted voters, 
bringing the Republican party from near obscurity to a 
competitive position in the South. In South Carolina, 
Eisenhower and his vice-presidential candidate Richard M. 
Nixon ran on two tickets on the November ballot. The State 
Republican Party had their nominee, but an independent slate 
of electors, supported by Democratic Governor James F. 
Byrnes, also listed Eisenhower on the ballot. Because of 
what many South Carolinians perceived as the national 
Democratic Party's continued liberal tendencies, Palmetto 
Democrats again bolted from the national party to support a 
non-Democratic candidate, albeit a Republican. However, they 
did not perceive Eisenhower as a member of the GOP, but as an 
independent candidate of Msouth Carolinians for Eisenhower." 19 
In their minds, they were not supporting a Republican, but 
someone they saw as congenial to their political way of 
thinking. Yet for South Carolinians to vote, let alone 
actively organize and campaign, for a man nominated by the 
national Republican Party signaled a political rethinking in 
the Palmetto state. In order to place Eisenhower's name on 
the ballot in South Carolina, supporters needed 10,000 
signatures. Within less than three weeks, workers had over 
55,300 names supporting the independent candidacy of 
19
•0oubtful State,• The State, November 1, 1952, 4-A. 
15 
Eisenhower. 20 Because of this quick developing movement, 
commentators described the atmosphere in South Carolina as 
udoubtful" for Adlai Stevenson, primarily because of the 
Democratic presidential nominee's stance on such issues as 
civil rights and the Fair Employment Practice Commission. 21 
Throughout the state, signs pointed to a heated campaign 
between the two major political parties in the 1952 contest. 
Straw polls around the state showed the Republicans beginning 
to show strength in the major metropolitan areas, places that 
later served as the foundation of the party's growth. In 
Charleston, straw polls had the Republican candidate winning 
the general election easily. 22 An interesting phenomenon, one 
that played a vital role in the eventual Republican rise, 
also began to make its appearance at this time. Mock 
elections and straw votes held at local high schools 
indicated a level of Eisenhower support by teen-agers. One 
local high school in the Charleston area gave the general a 3 
to 1 victory margin. 23 
But as the 1952 election soon proved, these straw polls 
also showed a sharp division between the GOP and the 
Independent slates, thus giving the Democratic nominee a 
20 •Ike Sentiment Strong In 5 Southern States,• The Charleston News 
and Courier, November 2, 1952, 13-B. 
2l •ooubtful State," The State, November 1, 1952, 4-A. 
22 MEisenhower Victor in Super Market Presidential Poll,• The News 
and Courier, November 1, 1952, 9-A. 
23 •students Favor Ike in Straw Vote Here,• The News and Courier, 
November 1, 1952, 16. 
16 
narrow victory on election day. Because South Carolina law 
did not allow the combining of votes for separate electors, 
Adlai Stevenson gained the state's eight electoral votes with 
173,004 votes, or what one political commentator described as 
"a flimsy 50.6 per cent of the total vote." 24 The idea of 
168,082 South Carolinians (49.3 percent) casting their 
ballots for a man who, no matter how Governor Byrnes or the 
petitioners viewed him, carried the official Republican 
banner was a remarkable accomplishment. In 1952 election, 
Eisenhower received his strongest support from two distinct 
areas in the state: one, the growing urban counties, and the 
other, from the black:....belt counties. 25 Strong prematurely 
described the metropolitan predominance of the Republican 
candidate as "not convincingly manifested· in the Palmetto 
state. 26 This segment, however, over time, served as the core 
of Republican strength in the state. One can see it in such 
urban areas as Charleston and Richland counties, along with 
such growing areas as Aiken, with its defense complex 
creating an economic boom. Much of what attracted Southern 
voters to Ike in 1952 has been credited to the "personality" 
of the Republican candidate. This was not the only reason 
24strong, MThe Presidential Election in the South, 1952,• 366. 
25The growing urban counties (cities) included Richland and 
Lexington (Columbia), Charleston and Berkley (Charleston), and 
Greenville and Pickens (Greenville). Each of these counties gave over 
53 percent of the vote to the Republican. The black-belt counties 
included Calhoun, Clarendon, Dorchester, Edgefield, and Orangeburg, 
which each gave over 62 percent of the vote to Eisenhower. Scammon, 
America Votes, 1: 330. 
26strong, *The Presidential Election in the South, 1952,• 366. 
17 
for the success of the Republican nominee, but it was an 
important factor. 
For the former Chief Justice of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court not to vote for a Democratic presidential 
nominee was astounding; for him to publicly declare himself 
supporting the 1952 Republican nominee was, to some, 
unbelievable. But like other southerners, former Chief 
Justice Eugene Elease saw it as a #legal and moral right, and 
I think even the duty" to vote for Eisenhower not as a 
Republican, but as the candidate to defeat what he viewed as 
the "Truman Party." 27 This sentiment stretched from the State 
Supreme Court to the local court house. Hampton County Clerk 
of the Court R. T. DeLoach and Laurens County Sheriff c. W. 
Wier received a letter from the Democratic National Chairman 
Steven A. Mitchell. Mitchell warned local Democrats that if 
the South should vote for Eisenhower, Republicans would find 
it much easier to run against local Democrats and win. 
DeLoach responded to Mitchell's prophesies by reassuring the 
national chairman of the state's election environment. 
Candidates for any public office "would be a fool" to run on 
a Republican ticket. Instead, DeLoach argued, they could run 
in the Democratic primary, and after winning it, be assured 
of a November victory. However, when "it comes to the 
presidency, it might be a wholesome thing," DeLoach replied, 
for South Carolina to have a strong GOP. 28 Even Strom 
27 "Eugene Elease Urges State Voters To Back Eisenhower,• The 
Greenville News, October 25, 1952, 10. 
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Thurmond, the presidential nominee of the 1948 Dixiecrat 
revolt, said he would vote for Eisenhower. 29 
With local officials abandoning their candidate for the 
GOP's nominee, state Democratic leaders realized the impact 
Eisenhower created on their campaign. They subsequently 
resorted to characterizing Republicans as people who didn't 
realize the #great things" Democrats had done for the state. 
Neville Bennett, the director of Stevenson's South Carolina 
campaign, acknowledged that a #new breed of Republicans" had 
arisen in the state, but this breed consisted of the typical 
ucountry club Republican, the station-wagon Republican. " 30 
Black leaders joined the Democrats' chorus of at tacks, 
describing an unsavory #alliance between Republicans, white 
supremacists, tidelands oil and other vested interests." The 
NAACP's executive secretary Walter White denounced the use of 
racist scare tactics by the South Carolinians for Eisenhower 
group. In attacking the proposed Democratic civil rights 
program, the independents placed an advertisement claiming 
that u20 per cent of the white workers in Greenville County 
can conceivably lose their jobs." 31 White assailed the ad as 
28•ttampton Clerk for Eisenhower,• The Greenville News, October 25, 
1952, 6. 
29 ·Thurmond Says He'll Follow Ike,• The State, November 3, 1952, 
1-A . 
30 •Bennett, Griffith Address Demo Rally At McCormick,• The 
Greenville News, October 27, 1952, 4. 
31Advertisement, The Greenville News, October 1, 1952, 7. 
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a ubraz zen (sic) appeal to race prejudice" and demanded 
Eisenhower rebuke the ad. 32 
Even with the two separate Eisenhower slates failing to 
capture the state's electoral delegates, the 1952 
presidential election did prove to be what one South Carolina 
newspaper editorialized as usignificant and history-making." 33 
Though the state Republican Party endorsed the independent 
slate, 34 the regular Republican slate did received over 9,000 
votes. Part of this turnout could be attributed to a 
recently adopted state election law. Signed in 1950 by then 
Governor Strom Thurmond, the law called for a single ballot, 
printed by the state, with all the parties and their 
candidates listed. Previously the voter had to ask for 
either a Democratic or a Republican ballot, which obviously 
included the stigma of asking for a GOP ballot and 
discouraged many from voting Republican. As part of an uall-
purpose act" recommended by a special election laws 
committee, the law was the first state-wide legislation 
dealing with elections since 1944, when the state repealed 
all election laws affecting political parties after the 
Supreme Court struck down white-primary laws. 3 5 Observers 
32
·NAACP Leader Attacks Ike; Quotes From Ad Placed Here,• The 
Greenville News, November 3, 1952. 
33
•Doubtful State," 4-A. 
34•Both Camps Foresee Victory in State Voting Tuesday,• The State, 
November 3, 1952, 1-A . 
35rn addition to providing a single, secret general-election 
ballot that was printed by the state, the measure prescribed punishment 
for election fraud and required voters in primaries to be registered for 
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portrayed this revision in the state's election law, as well 
as Eisenhower's charismatic personality, as important factors 
in the Republican showing. 36 
Following the 1952 election, the discord created by the 
two competing state factions clouded the Republican gains. 
Disagreement quickly arose after the election as to the 
effectiveness of two slates supporting the same candidate. 
Critics blasted the state party leadership, particularly 
national committeeman J. Bates Gerald, for not actively 
supporting the independent slate and withdrawing the 
Republican electors. 37 Gerald responded that if South 
Carolinians had loved Eisenhower so much, they should have 
been willing to vote for the general on the Republican 
ticket. 38 
This inter-party fight carried over to the next 
presidential election, with Gerald and the old guard being 
unseated at the 19 5 6 Republican National Convention. New 
state party chairman David Dows overhauled the organization, 
by establishing a state headquarters in Florence, opening a 
Charleston regional office, and working to organize thirty 
new precincts in the state. Dows optimistically predicted 
the general election. #Thurmond Signs Election Law Measures,• The 
State, April 21, 1950, 1-A. 
36 •sc Election Fever At Boiling Point,• The State, November 2, 
1952, 1-A. 
37•Morris Blasts 'Old Guard' GOP in State,• The State, November 5, 
1952, 1-A. 
38 •Gerald Replies To Statement By Morris,• The State, November 6, 
1952, 1-A. 
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that the incumbent president uwould draw about 20,000 votes" 
in the Palmetto state for his 1956 reelection bid. 39 Some 
political pundits questioned Dows' optimism, because not 
since the days of Reconstruction had Republicans polled as 
many 10,000 votes in South Carolina. 
Republicans also had to wonder what would be the effect 
of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1954-55 Brown v. Board of 
Education rulings on their 1956 election hopes. The South 
entered a campaign of massive resistance against the 
decision, with Democratic Governor James Byrnes declaring 
that South Carolina would close down its schools before 
desegregating its school system. Ironically, a Republican 
candidate for the U.S. Senate portrayed the incumbent, Olin 
Johnston, as failing to actively support States' Rights 
philosophy in the 1956 senatorial campaign. Leon P. 
Crawford, a self-described born and breed Republican, had 
been elected mayor of the college town of Clemson for five 
consecutive two-year terms. Careful not to over-sell the GOP 
banner he carried, Crawford campaigned on the premise that 
South Carolinians should vote for the best man and not for a 
candidate "just because he has a party label tied to his 
coattail." The Republican also challenged the voters not to 
re-elect Johnston, whom Crawford described as less than a 
"sincere advocate of states' rights." Crawford condemned 
Johnston's cooperation with "Northern senators in favor of 
39 *Republican Sees Proof '2-Party' System Trend,w The State, 
November 7, 1956, 1-A. 
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allowing 'labor' to set the wage scale for workers to the 
government's highway program." 40 The Clemson mayor also had a 
second goal in mind, that of bringing the state into "the 
political health that only a well-developed two-party system 
can bring." A strong advocate of the States' Rights 
philosophy, Crawford believed in preserving what he described 
as the "harmonious relations between the White and Colored 
races." 41 Even though Crawford conducted by all accounts a 
low-budget, low-key campaign, 49,695 South Carolinians (17.8 
percent) voted for the Clemson mayor in what must have been a 
shock to the incumbent senator, who capture 230,1550 votes 
(82: 8 percent). 42 
Another ·shock to Palmetto Democrats in 1956 came in the 
popular showing of Eisenhower's re-election bid. This time, 
contested not only by a Democratic candidate but also an 
independent slate of electors pledged to Virginia's U.S. 
Senator Harry Byrd on a segregationist platform, the 
Republican ticket garnered 75,700 votes (25.2 percent), a 
dramatic rise over the previous election. With Independents 
capturing 88,511 votes (29.4 percent), the 1956 election also 
marked a milestone for Democrats, who failed, for the first 
time since 1872, to secure a majority of votes cast in a 
40MLifelong GOP Devotee Seeks Olin Johnston's Senate Seat,• The 
News and Co urier, November 3, 1956, 1-B. 
41 MGOP Battle Is Carried To Pickens,• The News, November 2, 1956, 
3 8 . 
42 Msen . Johnston, Two Opposed Solons Win,• The State, November 7 , 
1956, 1-B; Scammon, America Votes, 2: 369. 
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South Carolina presidential election, garnering only 136,372 
votes (45.4 percent) . 43 
Eisenhower's 1956 support in South Carolina also marked 
another milestone for the GOP. As evidenced in the previous 
presidential election, young adults supported the Republican 
candidate more heavily this time around . In growing urban 
areas as Greenville County, Furman students voted nearly two 
to one in favor of Eisenhower in a straw poll, with the 
segregationist independents garnering only five percent of 
the vote. 44 In upper Greenville County, students at Blue 
Ridge High School gave the incumbent 44 percent of their 
straw poll votes. 45 Out of a group of 73 young professional 
men in Columbia, a straw vote gave the Republican 49 votes, 
while the Democratic ticket got only 3. 46 Although some may 
look at these straw votes as inconclusive, it does indicate a 
transformation of young adults willing to forego the past 
stigma of voting Republican. 
Another transformation that year came with the black 
community's support of the Republican candidate, surprising 
most political observers in South Carolina. Based on past 
showings and platform issues, blacks tended to support 
43•split Vote Saved Adlai,• The State, November 8, 1956, 4-A; 
Scammon, Amer·ica Votes, 2: 368. 
44 •Furman Students Favor GOP By Large Margin,• The Greenvi l l e 
News, November 6, 1956, 13. 
45 •Ike Tops Vote At Blue Ridge,• The Greenville News, November 6, 
1956, 10. 
46 •straw Vote In Columbia Gives Ike 2-1 Margin,• The Greenville 
News, November 2, 1956, 52 . 
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liberal national Democratic candidates. But 1956 
presidential election divided the more than 100,000 
registered blacks in South Carolina between the two major 
candidates. 47 Columbia's Ward Nine, the predominately black 
section of the capital city, suggested the division in the 
black vote. Compared to the 1952 election when Democrats 
secured ninety percent of the vote, Ward Nine in 1956 gave a 
slight plurality to the Democrats, 49 percent to 45 percent 
to the Republicans. Darlington's Ward Four and Five 
illustrated an even more pronounced surge in Republican 
voting. Ward Four cast four Eisenhower votes for every 
Stevenson vote, while Ward Five proved to be a closer 
contest, with Republicans edging out Democrats 53 percent to 
47 percent, respectively. 48 Observers also credited blacks 
with swinging Beaufort County to the GOP column. In Aiken 
County, the combination of what appeared as bloc voting by 
blacks and the influx of workers associated with the Savannah 
atomic plant helped carry the county for the Republicans as 
well. 49 The perception of a Supreme Court, led a Republican 
Chief Justice, denouncing the policy of #separate but equalH 
could likely explain this swing in black voting. 
47In South Carolina, there was little change in the number of 
blacks registered to vote from 1952. Blacks represented 34 percent of 
the state's voting age population and 16 percent of the total 
registration. *Negroes Registered To Vote In Southern States 
Increased,· The News and Courier, November 4, 1956, 3-A. 
48•s.c. Negro Vote Split First Time,• The Greenville News, 
November 8, 1956, 1. 
49*Post-Election Figures Indicate Big Shift In South Carolina 
Negro Vote To GOP Camp,• The News and Courier, November 8, 1956, 8-A. 
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There was also another important voting segment that had 
a later impact on the rise of the Republican Party in South 
Carolina. By capturing over 88,000 votes, the independents 
of the state, made up of and supporting primarily 
segregationists, proved to be a strong force within the 
state. Republican leaders during the late fifties realized 
that this segment could provide crucial support, and set 
about working with the leaders of this movement to combine 
forces and voting strength. As the state's committeeman to 
the Republican National Committee later acknowledged, there 
were private discussions in the late 1950s held between the 
two groups to solidify a partnership. The resulting deal was 
ensured by the adoption of a staunchly conservative platform 
at the 1960 Republican State Convention to show the 
segregationist independents that Republicans indeed wanted a 
marriage of political convenience between the two groups. 50 
During this decade of political transition, South 
Carolina also witnessed a growth in its population. From 
1950 to 1960, the state's white population grew from nearly 
1. 3 million to well over 1. 5 million, and in 1960 whites 
accounted for 65 percent of the state's population. The 
state's minority population rose slightly in this same time 
period, growing from 823,622 in 1950 to 831,572 in 1960, but 
50south Carolina 1964 Election Analysis, Section C, Presidential 
Race, written by W.W. Wannamaker, Jr., 4/29/65, Folder 44, James E. 
Duffy Papers, Mss 69, Special Collections, R. M. Cooper Library, Clemson 
University, Clemson, SC . Hereafter referred to as Duffy Papers. 
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dropped in the percentage of the total population, from 39 to 
35 percent. 51 
As the state's population grew, Democrats' fears about 
the emergence of a viable Republican opposition did not die 
with the 1956 election. The 1960 presidential contest in 
South Carolina again pitted disenchanted southern 
conservative Democrats against the liberal wing of the party 
nominating one of its own again, John F. Kennedy of 
Massachusetts. Albert Watson, the U.S. Representative for 
South Carolina's second congressional district and executive 
director of the S.C. Democrats for Nixon and Lodge, denounced 
his own party's uslavery cry of Kennedy Democrats.w Watson 
criticized JFK's support of the FEPC and opposition to state 
right-to-work laws. 52 Just days before the general election, 
Palmetto Democratic leaders privately felt that Vice 
President Richard M. Nixon would carry the state by a 3-2 
margin in the 1960 election. 53 With more than 35,000 people 
attending a State House rally where former Governor Byrnes 
introduced Nixon, Republicans did have high hopes of securing 
the Palmetto state in 1960. 54 
51
·Block Voting - Table II,• Section D, South Carolina 1964 
Election Analysis, W.W. Wannamaker, Jr., to Drake Edens, 5/17/65, 
Folder 45, Duffy Papers . 
52 •watson Hits Demo Party 'Slavery Cry',• The State, November 1, 
1960, 1-B . 
53•3-2 Nixon Win I s Seen In sc,• The State, November 4, 1960, B-1. 
54•Nixon Asks SC to Support Policies of Peace, Progress,• The 
State, November 4, 1960, A-1. 
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Like the 1956 senatorial contest, States' Rights 
rhetoric played a part in the 19 60 presidential race. The 
White Citizen's Councils espoused this philosophy in their 
support of Nixon's candidacy. They viewed the Democrats as 
calling for integration "'in all areas of community life,' 
which we take to include homes, churches, clubs, etc.," while 
the Republican platform held itself to "integration of public 
facilities. •55 But even the support of these white 
supremacists could not ensure the victory of Nixon over 
Kennedy in South Carolina. Kennedy and Johnson at tr acted 
198,129 votes (51.2 percent), while Nixon and Lodge garnered 
188,558 votes (48.8 percent) . 56 Despite their failure to 
capture the state for Nixon, Republicans believed that the 
188,000 votes cast for their man umarked 'the birth of a two-
party system'" in the Palmetto state, with the Democrats 
barely winning the state's electoral votes. 57 Part of this 
dramatic increase c ould be traced to the pact made between 
the Republicans and Independents to join forces leading up to 
the 19 60 campaign, when both groups "put on an all out 
campaign" and came within 9, 500 votes of capturing the 
state. 58 As a political observer later noted, the Palmetto 
55
.,Citi zens' Counc i l Li s ts Chief Points At Issue,• The State, 
November 7, 1960, A-1 . 
56scammon, America Vo tes, 3: 368 . 
57 .,Shorey Says GOP Wa s ' Outpromised' ," The State, November 9, 
1 9 60 , C-6. 
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state led the rest of the South in producing the largest 
Republican increase from the previous presidential election, 
jumping nearly 25.2 percent. 59 Believing they were 
noutpromisedw as the reason for their loss, state Republican 
Chairman Greg Shorey thanked the uhundreds of outstanding 
South Carolinians" who worked for the Republican ticket, 
believing that the benefits of a competitive two-party system 
would eventually come to the state. 60 It would be up to these 
volunteers to make the GOP grow into a viable alternative 
party for Carolinians to participate in. As one of the 
volunteers, James Duffy answered the call to help organize 
and guide this fledgling party, and at the same time, helped 
to bring the Palmetto State into the modern political era of 
two-party competition. 
58south Carolina 1964 Election Analysis, Section C, Presidential 
Race, written by W.W. Wannamaker, Jr., 4/29/65, Folder 44, Duffy 
Papers. 
59Bernard Cosman, "Presidential Republicanism in the South, 1960,• 
The Journal of Politics, 24 (February, 1962): 311. 
60 •shorey Says GOP Was 'Outpromised' ,* C-6. 
CHAPTER III 
EVERYTHING MUST HAVE A BEGINNING 
Today, many people take a two-party system in South 
Carolina for granted. Republicans actively vie with 
Democrats for national and state political seats in the 
1990s, and are now an integral part of the political debate 
in the Palmetto state. Yet less than thirty years ago, this 
environment did not exist on the local level in South 
Carolina. The intense animosity and revulsion against 
Republicans made potential Palmetto supporters in the 1960s 
wary of supporting the GOP. Early on, however, those willing 
to break new ground for a two-party system realized an 
important and vital lesson; not only would southern 
Republicans have to gain votes door-to-door, but they would 
have to work to change people's mind door-to-door as well. 
One of those individuals who worked to build the 
Palmetto GOP was James Evan Duffy. Unlike native South 
Carolinians born to question the practicality of being a 
Republican, Duffy was born and grew up outside the one-party 
South, in New York. After attending high school, he attended 
Clemson College in 1950 to study textile management. 
Graduating four years later, Duffy went to Anderson to work 
for the Central Manufacturing Division of M. Lowenstein & 
Sons, Inc. 
30 
As in the rest of the state, textiles dominated the 
industrial base of Anderson County. With more than 13 0 
companies/plants located in the county in 19 60, Anderson 
County was a growing area of the state, with 98,478 
residents. That year the City of Anderson had just 
consolidated surrounding areas and claimed 42, 000 people 
living within the city limits. The county had a non-white 
population of twenty percent, with fifty-four percent living 
in an urban area of the county. Anderson ranked higher in 
the number of persons living in an urban area than the state 
average of forty-one percent, while the county's non-white 
population was lower than the state average of thirty-five 
percent. 61 South Carolina had the second largest black 
population in the South, far higher than the national average 
of 10.5 percent. According to John C. Topping in his survey 
of southern Republicanism, the white voting age population in 
1960 was 895,147, with the non-white voting age population at 
371,104. 62 Out of those two groups combined, only 595,989, 
or about half, of the total voting age population was 
registered. 63 
61 The South Department of Agriculture's 1963 Handbook of South 
Carolina, (Columbia, S.C. : The State Department of Agriculture, 1963), 
1 02. 
62John C. Topping et al, Southern Republicanism and the New South, 
(Cambridge, MA: undated), Folder 200, Duffy Papers, 9. 
63For more information on the population of South Carolina and its 
counties in 1960, please s ee Table 1. Supplemental Report from the 
Secretary of State to the South Carolina General Assembly, Fiscal Year 
1967-1968, (Columbia, S.C . : State Budget and Control Board, 1968), 368. 
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In August 1960, Duffy joined thirty-five other 
volunteers to work for the Nixon presidential campaign in 
Anderson. The composition of this group ranged from textile 
managers to independent businessmen to local doctors. They 
all shared one thing in common: they were young and felt 
that they had nothing to lose in working for the Republican 
Party. 64 They readily admitted their naivete about political 
campaigning, but felt that the dominance of the Democratic 
Party had lasted far too long for the good of the state's 
political environment. 65 They also strongly agreed with the 
Republican philosophy of fiscal conservatism, free market 
economics, and that each individual was free to make his or 
her success in life. 66 The fledgling Republicans viewed 
Anderson's delegation to the state capital as "less than 
sparkling" and "narrow minded," but the GOP's supporters' 
first concern focused on electing Richard Nixon as 
president. 67 Early on, Republicans felt that they were "at 
war" with local Democrats, who had a deep interest in 
averting this conflict. Duffy and his fellow Republicans 
rightly viewed politics as a game of "power,w believing that 
whoever controlled and managed that power would not "play 
64 rnterview with James E . Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
65James Evan Duffy, In G.O .P . We Trust, unpublished manuscript, 
Mss 69, Special Collections, R. M. Cooper Library, Clemson University, 
Clemson, S.C., 2. Hereafter referred to as In G.O.P. We Trust. 
66 rnterview with James E. Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
67In G.O.P. We Trust, 1. 
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games* with it. 68 This became deeply apparent to the 
fledgling group when they dared to enter the heart of the 
Democratic citadel, the Anderson County Fair. Such events 
played crucial roles to the structure of "old politics* in 
the South; neighbors met each other and local officials came 
to shake hands with their constituents. When Republicans set 
up a booth at the Fair in 1960, with its red, white, and blue 
ribbons and pictures of elephants decorating the stand, the 
natives were horrified. Duffy felt the only thing locals 
noticed about the booth was "the word Republican in red 
letters fifty feet tall in their mind's eye... Those who 
dar~d to man the booth received the same treatment that Nixon 
would receive, ua steady stream of insults and an occasional 
spitter (sic) .•69 
If Anderson Republicans felt that having a booth at the 
County Fair was dangerous work, little did they realize what 
awaited them at the polls. Republicans wanted to make their 
presence known, and one way to accomplish this was by 
conducting a poll-watching campaign during the day of the 
election. Claiming that the Democrats should follow the 
election laws they enacted, Duffy and others went to 
different polling places to make sure the managers followed 
the proper procedures. For Democrats who had all but 
controlled the ballot box for more than half-a-century, the 
attempts by Republicans to ensure compliance with the 
68 In G.O.P. We Trust, 5. 
69In G.O.P. We Trust, 4. 
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election laws raised more than a few tempers. 7 0 Duffy and 
others observed poll managers uassisting voters without being 
requested to do so" and on occasion, u actually voting for 
them." One especially explosive incident occurred during the 
vote counting for the 1962 U.S. Senate seat in the town of 
Mt. Creek. Duffy encountered an older gentleman serving as 
poll manager who firmly believed that the uvotes cast for 
Bill Workman (the eventual Republican nominee) were a mistake 
and should not be counted." When Duffy and others protested, 
the poll manager's son threatened to uthrow (us) out if we 
did not stop 'interfering' in the count." Just short of 
fists being thrown, the manager agreed to count a few Workman 
votes. 71 From a Republican viewpoint, managers conducted the 
elections anyway they wanted. uFor this reason we need two 
parties," Duffy remarked. 7 2 
Even though Duffy may not have seen the trend in the 
Democratic bastion of Anderson County, the presidential 
election of 1960 demonstrated a continued, albeit gradual, 
development of a two - party system in South Carolina. Since 
1952, the votes garnered by the national Republican Party's 
presidential candidates steadily increased in the state, from 
just under ten thousand in 1952 to 75,000 in 1956 to well 
over 188,000 in 1960. The only other election that 
Republicans actively campaigned in, the 1956 U. s. Senate 
70In G.O.P. We Tru s t, 6. 
71 In G.O.P. We Tru s t, 166. 
72 In G.O . P. We Tru s t, 7 . 
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contest, demonstrated GOP strength at close to fifty thousand 
votes . 7 3 Republicans could thus count on receiving nearly 
one-quarter of the state's votes as their base of support. 
In Anderson, support for the GOP candidates rose only 
slightly, from 20 percent of the votes cast in the 1952 
presidential contest to 22 percent in 1960 presidential race, 
with the 1956 U.S. Senate campaign attracting only 12 percent 
of the votes cast. Republicans would have to build on that 
core support, and did so during the corning eight years. 
As the heat of the 1960 presidential campaign faded, 
Republicans faced the question of what to do next. Duffy 
felt that the Anderson County group should be transformed 
from a volunteer group into a permanent part of the State 
Republican Party. 7 4 Along with believing that the local 
officials could no longer go uncontested for their seats, 
Duffy viewed the formation of a local GOP organization as 
important to internal workings of the state party as well. 
To live in the state's fifth largest county and not be 
represented on the Republican State Executive Committee was 
unacceptable. 75 
The 1960 election taught Republicans the most important 
and basic political lesson, that of working on a precinct by 
precinct level. Not only would formal organization give the 
73scammon, America Votes, 2: 369. 
7 4Jarnes Duffy (hereafter referred to as JD) to John D. Attaway, 
January 17, 1961, Folder 1, Duffy Papers. 
75Draft issue of the uAnderson Republican• newsletter, Folder 1, 
Duffy Papers . 
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Republicans a basis for the next election, but Duffy and 
others saw it as an encouraging sign to other would-be 
Republicans. From the beginning, they targeted the precincts 
that would count the most, first focusing on five areas that 
represented one-fifth of the county's population. By taking 
action early on, Duffy thought that they could draw out those 
who were hesitant to join the party. 
To qualify for state Republican recognition, a county 
party had to have three precincts organized, with six people 
signing on and two serving as party officeholders in each 
precinct. 76 As Duffy and the others soon found out, this was 
easier said than done. The stigma of being a Republican 
proved to be intense in this Democratic bastion, and 
organizing five precincts took Duffy and his colleagues eight 
months. 77 The formation of the Belton Precinct demonstrated 
the difficulty Republicans faced. Several individuals in the 
community expressed interest in forming a precinct club, but 
when the meeting night came around, only five people showed 
up. One of the attendees, uMrs. Julius Blake then went to 
the home of Mrs. Rice and got this very fine lady out of bed 
and to the meeting" in order to have enough people to 
organize the precinct. It was not going to be uan overnight 
task.w 7B This was typical for the neophyte group. Those who 
wanted to support the group did so only with private 
76 rn G.O.P. We Tru s t, 10 . 
77JD to Bob Chapman, September 26, 1961, Folder 1, Duffy Papers. 
7 8 rn G.O.P. We Tru s t, 11. 
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endorsement and in public silence. But on the night of 
October 23, 1961, Republicans organized five of the seventy-
three precincts in Anderson County and began their long 
journey. During the year, however, Anderson was not alone in 
its journey; other urban areas in the state witnessed signs 
of increased activity late that summer. Nearly a hundred 
people participated in local Republican gatherings in 
Lexington County, while Republican Ladies' Groups grew in 
membership in Greenville and Columbia. 79 
Early on Republicans across the state received 
encouraging news. In the summer of 1961, a special election 
was held in Richland for a State House seat. Charles 
Boineau, a Republican candidate, defeated his Democratic 
opponent on August 8th, thus becoming the first Republican in 
the South Carolina General Assembly since the beginning of 
the century. 80 Because of what Duffy saw as Boineau's winning 
strategy, the key for success centered around the most basic 
approach to winning- - "knocking on doors and asking for 
support." Republicans viewed this election with not only 
enthusiasm for the victory, but as an indicator of what lay 
ahead for them against the majority party. 
Boineau's election was taken lightly by the 
opposition as well it could be from a political 
power point of view. However, what should not have 
79Bob Chapman, SC Republican State Chairman, to W.W. Wannamaker, 
SC Republican National Co mmitteeman, September 28, 1961, Folder 1, Duffy 
Papers. 
80George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900, 
(Columbia, s.c.: Univers ity of South Carolina Press, 1952), 61 . 
been taken lightly, and I believe it was, was that 
there was ... a stirring in the state for political 
expression that had been so long denied by a one-
party system. People were getting ready to be 
heard from, and by failing to observe this the 
Democratic Party permitted the young Republican 
effort to get the jump on them in attracting the 
youth of the state. 81 
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Elated over their first State House victory in more than 
sixty years, Republicans set their sights on their next 
target, Olin Johnston. Being the state's senior senator in 
Washington since 1950, Republicans thought they had a chance 
to unseat the Democrat by portraying Johnston, an old New 
Dealer, as a "Kennedy-Democrat." This attempt to unseat one 
of the state's political heavyweights marked an important 
shi.ft of emphasis for Duffy and his fellow Republicans. 
After focusing their attention on the White House in 1960, 
Duffy and others realized that they could not have "a party 
without candidates." 82 The 1961 Boineau victory signaled an 
expansion of Republican efforts in South Carolina, not only 
on the national level, but on the state and local level as 
well. Republicans knew that their bid to unseat a five-term 
Democratic incumbent of the U.S. Senate would be a Herculean 
endeavor. But before Republicans could take full aim at the 
senator, they first had to play out a battle within their own 
ranks. 
Beginning in November, 1961, Anderson Republicans heard 
from two men vying for the chance to carry the party banner 
81 Jn G.O.P. We Trust, 13. 
8 2 rn G.O.P . We Trust, 12-13. 
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into combat the next year. Both relative newcomers to the 
Republican Party, Bob Chapman, then State Party Chairman from 
Greenville, and Bill Workman, a newspaper reporter from 
Charleston, began to deluge the party faithful with letters, 
campaign brochures, and speaking requests. To secure the 
Republican nomination, the candidates' supporters had to turn 
out at the precinct meetings, which selected county 
delegates. The county conventions then elected delegates and 
alternates to the state convention, where the nominee would 
be picked. 83 Because of the convention nomination process, 
Republicans learned the value of targeting local individuals 
as early and as often as possible. 
Both men aimed their rhetoric at what they viewed as the 
Kennedy Administration's supposed great give-away programs. 
Chapman, who attacked Kennedy's upork-barrel policies," 
advocated returning to ubasic conservative constitutional 
ideas" to stop the slide of America towards what he described 
as usocialism." 84 workman also derided what he labeled as 
uThe Big Give Away in Washington," and both men played to a 
, I, 
Rey issue to South Carolinians: tex tiles. This industry 
played a vital role in the future of the campaign and how 
Republicans hoped to capture more voter support. In 1962, 
textiles played a dominant role in Palmetto industry. Both 
Republican candidates f o cused on the issue of cheap foreign 
83 In G. O.P. We Trust, 1 7. 
84 Press Release from the #C i ti zens for Chapman Committee,• 
undated, Folder 1, Duffy Pa pers. 
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imports being brought into the United States. Later on in 
the 1962 fall campaign, Anderson Republicans looked to the 
textile areas at first as "our biggest burden," with the 
textile workers voting overwhelmingly for Kennedy over Nixon 
just two years before. Predicting GOP support in the white 
collar precincts, Anderson Republicans wanted Workman to tour 
the mills, with machine operators giving the candidate the 
tour rather than the managers. 85 Obviously Republicans wanted 
to portray their man as one who supported the interests of 
the common workers, and did not want the plant workers turned 
away when managers showed a potential candidate around the 
plant. 
Throughout the contest between Republican hopefuls 
Chapman and Workman, Anderson Republicans attempted to stay 
"neutral," although Duffy and other leaders within the county 
delegation did lean toward Chapman. 86 The decision for 
Anderson Republicans, Duffy believed, came down to whether 
they should support Chapman, who had strong textile ties and 
could thus erode some of Johnston's textile strength, or 
support workman, who had strength elsewhere in the state and 
who had name-recognition because of his writings. Both 
candidates made active pitches to the growing Anderson group. 
Workman even traveled to the upstate county to address the 
group. After arranging to hold the gathering at a local 
B5Jack Coursey to Bill Workman, June 6, 1962, Folder 7, Duffy 
Papers. 
86 In G.O.P. We Trust, 18, 20. 
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school and putting what Duffy described as "tremendous 
effort" into getting people to attend, the group found itself 
locked out of school, after previously being assured the 
janitor would be there to open the doors. After one of them 
climbed through an unlocked window and opened the doors, 
Republicans held their first candidate forum in Anderson 
County. Stories later circulated among the group that 
"someone had paid the custodian five dollars to disappear." 
For their first formal candidate meeting, Duffy later 
expressed some disappointment with the showing of 12 8 
people. 8 7 Yet this forum was the only one held, because 
shortly thereafter, Chapman withdrew his bid for the 
nomination due to "health reasons. " 88 On March 17, 1962, 
Palmetto Republicans took a serious step toward modern 
political participation in South Carolina, nominating Bill 
Workman as their candidate for the United States Senate. 
Republicans had to face reality, however, in deciding 
how to develop their party. The recruitment of GOP 
candidates proved just as important as getting basic voter 
support on the precinct level. Republicans realized that 
they had to focus on the top of the ballot, particularly when 
the Democrats gave them an opening by selecting presidential, 
senatorial, or congressional candidates who were out of tune 
with the "Republican-Southern Conservative coalition." Even 
though they believed that in some communities they could win 
87 In G.O.P. We Tru s t, 19 - 20. 
88 In G.O.P. We Tru s t, 20. 
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such local offices as mayor and councilman, they understood 
that the Mfull 'bread and butter' jobs" at the Court House 
and City Halls would not be theirs for some time to come. 89 
This idea of opposing anyone who did not fit the 
"Republican-Southern Conservative coalition" is essential to 
understanding the rise of the GOP. Some scholars have argued 
that the early South Carolina GOP consisted of two important 
factions: the fiscally and economically conservative on the 
one hand, of which Duffy belonged to, and those dissatisfied 
with the national Democratic Party's growing support for 
civil rights, on the other. 90 
actively catered to both groups. 
It seemed that Republicans 
The 1962 State Republican 
Platform offered something to both groups, supporting such 
ideas as states' rights, free market economics, and the 
attack against communism. The issue of States' Rights--which 
had evolved into a code word for resistance to civil rights--
played an important part in the Republican's bid to attract 
former Dixiecrats. Party leaders claimed, Mthe hard truth is 
that the Republican Party, while not perfect, is the only 
party" protecting the individual against big government. 91 
Duffy echoed the sentiment that the Republicans may not be 
best avenue, but no other party offered a way to contest the 
89statement Entitled "Party Organi zation,• undated, Folder 1, 
Duffy Papers. 
90John C. Topping et al, Southern Republicanism and the New South, 
92. 
91Form letter from J a ck Coursey, April 9, 1962, Folder 5, Duffy 
Papers. 
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liberal policies of the Democratic Party. 92 The Republican 
senatorial candidate, Bill Workman, stumped for this 
principle throughout his candidacy, arguing, in classic 
States' Rights phraseology, that "we are fighting for the 
Constitution in general, we are fighting for the Tenth 
Amendment in particular." 93 Workman was attempting to appeal 
to both groups of potential Republican supporters. 
The party continued its steady growth during the 
senatorial campaign. In Greenville, the GOP grew from having 
organizations in fewer than 25 precincts in 1958 to having 
nearly 40 precincts organized in 1962, with those new 
pre_cincts being the best and largest organized. 94 Duffy felt 
that by the · time the 1962 campaign got underway, Anderson 
would have fourteen precincts, accounting for "about sixty-
five percent of the total County vote," organized. 95 Yet 
these conversions did not come from the key group that 
Republicans had hoped for. In writing to his county 
leadership, Duffy noted that Republicans gained votes at the 
expense of "the 'Other' category, " and not from voters who 
identified themselves as Democrats. Nevertheless, Duffy felt 
92JD to Mr. and Mrs . Fred R. Sanders, May 16, 1962, Folder 6, 
Duffy Papers. 
93Bob Chapman dropped out of the nomination race after believing 
that Workman had the nomination secured in the number of delegates' 
votes. Speech by Bill Workman at the State Republican Convention, May 
26, 1962, Folder 6, Duffy Papers. 
94#surging County GOP Challenges Demos; Workman Lead Apparent in 
Nearly 40 Precincts,• The Greenville Piedmont, February 26, 1962, Folder 
4, Duffy Papers. 
95JD to Bob Chapman, February 11, 1962, Folder 4, Duffy Papers. 
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these gains made up the conservative core of support 
Republicans could expect in the fall election. This core 
group of Republican supporters would not get their man 
elected alone, Duffy noted, and stressed that they needed to 
work on luring those Democrats who were not "dyed-in-the-
wool." Duffy felt encouraged because "dyed-in-the-wool" 
Democratic support had not grown from 1956 to 1960. 96 In 
addition to grass-roots conversion and expansion, Republicans 
also claimed another Democratic noteworthy in 19 62. In 
announcing his switch to the GOP, Floyd Spence, a former 
Democratic state senator, echoed what later became a familiar 
refrain of Democrats switching to the GOP. Spence felt that 
he did not leave the party, "it has left us." 97 Spence later 
ran against incumbent Democrat Albert Watson for the Second 
Congressional District House Seat in the fall, 1962 general 
election. Spence lost his race by only four thousand votes 
out of over 74,000 cast, indicating the growing Republican 
strength in the urban counties of Richland and Lexington. 98 
Two segments of the population played especially 
important roles in the party's growth at the grass roots. 
Republicans relied heavily on women and actively recruited 
them into the GOP ranks. In preparing for the 19 62 fall 
campaign, Duffy urged that precinct chairmen appoint women to 
96Jo to County Committeemen, Precinct Chairmen, and Campaign 
Chairmen, undated, Folder 5, Duffy Papers. 
97*Spence Tells Why He Quit Democrats For the GOP,* The State, 
April 15, 1962, Folder 5, Duffy Papers. 
98scammon, 5: 368. 
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head the precinct's telephone solicitation committee, with 
enough women comprising the committee to call on every 
precinct member. Duffy believed that women Mwin the 
elections. Get them in the Party and active.w 99 Because of 
the times, women were still expected to tend to the 
household. This, according to Duffy, gave them time to make 
calls, pay visits, and use social opportunities to attract 
new supporters for the party. 100 In May, 1962, Anderson women 
organized a local Federation of Republican Women's Club. 
Young people also came to play an important role in the 
party. That same month, Duffy had about twenty young adults 
express interest in forming a Young Republicans group in 
Anderson. 101 To most party leaders, this group was vital to 
continued party growth. Duffy told the Anderson county 
leadership to target for recruitment those between twenty-one 
and thirty-one years old. 102 To help set up this strategy, 
Duffy sought the advice of one of the fast-rising stars of 
the party, Arthur Ravenel, Jr. As President of the Young 
Republicans in Charleston, Ravenel told Duffy that at first 
there were only 32 members, but that now the Charleston group 
totaled 125. Ravenel encouraged Duffy to start an Anderson 
99J D to Precinct Chairmen and County Committeemen, undated, Folder 
3, Duffy Papers. 
lOO rnterview with Jame s E. Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
101The GOP Sheet, a newsletter of the Anderson County Republican 
Party, May, 1962, No. 2, Folder 6, Duffy Papers. 
l0 2J D to Committeemen and Chairmen, Third Congressional District, 
undated, Folder 5, Duffy Papers. 
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group with 15 to 20 members. 103 Duffy and other Republicans 
received warm and enthusiastic receptions by college 
students, who he described as waiting for a political 
organization to welcome their participation. 104 But just like 
trying to form precinct clubs, an active YR group took some 
time to develop in Anderson. 
This lack of support by young adults did not deter the 
1962 campaign for Republicans. The Anderson party 
established some key goals for the senatorial campaign: 
reduce the spread between Republican and Democratic votes; 
build a solid organization with adequate financing; solicit 
help from Independents; and "just plain ask for peoples' 
votes." 105 The organizational structure included going 
through the county registration list and copying all the 
names of individuals on index cards for future use in 
telephone solicitation and canvassing, or surveying for 
likely votes. 
The Workman campaign also set out some key objectives in 
the bid for the Senate. In an organizational plan 
distributed throughout the state, the campaign believed that 
Workman should try to lure disenchanted Democrats to his 
candidacy gradually, so as not to have them "gang up" on 
Republicans. Their primary campaign attack involved tying 
l03JD to Andrew Dawes, May 5, 1962, Folder 6, Duffy Papers. 
104rnterview with James E . Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
105JD to County Committeemen, Precinct Chairmen, and Campaign 
Chairman, undated, Folder 5, Duffy Papers. 
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Johnston to the Kennedy administration. Campaign organizers 
felt that it would benefit the party in the long run to 
convert Democrats to Independents and then into Republicans 
instead of bringing them straight from one party to 
another. 106 They established uworkman for Senate" campaign 
committees so as not to scare off reluctant Democrats and not 
to tie the campaign to the State Republican Party. Once the 
campaigning finished, leaders envisioned converting the 
county uworkman for Senate" groups into regular standing 
Republican committees. 
Another chance to convert Democrats came with uoperation 
Quick Switch," which sought to attract Democrats who 
supported former governor Ernest Hollings in the bloody 
battle for the Democratic Senate nomination . 107 However, a 
more important aspect of the divisive Democratic primary soon 
became apparent to Republican leaders. Drake Edens, state 
campaign manager for Workman, saw the size of the vote in the 
1962 Democratic primary as a significant piece of strategy 
planning. With predictions of nearly 400,000 primary votes 
being cast, Democrats fell nearly 150,000 votes short in 
their 1962 primary con test between Hollings and Johnston. 
Edens believed that one factor made this shortfall possible: 
106organi zational Outline for the Workman for Senate Campaign from 
the Committee to All Republ i can County Chairman and/or Workman for 
Senate Committee Campaign Cha i r ma n, April 5, 1962, Folder 12, Duffy 
Papers. 
l07Republican Leaders f r om J . Drake Edens, undated, Folder 12, 
Duffy Papers. 
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the South Carolina loyalty oath. 108 At the start of the 1962 
campaign, the subject o f the state's loyalty oath became a 
heated topic. By voting in the Democratic primary, state law 
bound the voter to vote Democratic in the general election. 
Even though some saw an advantage to fighting publicly the 
oath's constitutionality, Republicans determined to stay out 
of the fight, leaving it to disgruntled Democrats and the 
press to discredit it. GOP leaders foresaw a three-part 
scenario. The first held that the #dyed in the wool 
Democrat" would never s witch to vote for Republicans, so that 
it was pointless to try and convert him. A second scenario 
had someone utaking the oath with the mental reservation that 
they are doing so under duress," then vote in the primary and 
general election as they saw fit . The third, and what 
Republicans saw as most ideal, case would be if someone took 
the oath with a mental reservation, but did not cast a vote 
in the primary electio n contests that Republicans would 
contend in November. Edens believed this final scenario to 
be the most effective and legal one, even having a uprominent 
south Carolina judge" privately give his blessings to the 
plan. 109 
Even before the J ohnston-Hollings battle was over, 
Republicans formulat ed their campaign strategy and 
organization, with the public campaigning commencing as soon 
lOBcampaign Bulletin from Drake Edens to all Republican leaders, 
J une 14, 1962, Folder 12, Du f fy Papers . 
109Drake Edens to Henry E . Robinson, May 15, 1962, Folder 6, Duffy 
Papers . 
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as the Democrats decided on their nominee. Workman focused 
his attacks on Johnston's ties with the Kennedy 
administration, particularly on what Republicans viewed as 
the "Kennedy sponsored socialistic King-Anderson compulsory 
Medicare bill_,.110 Republicans attempted to recruit local 
doctors to join in opposing the Medicare proposal, with Duffy 
and others writing to doctors urging their support of the 
Republican candidate. 11 1 Republicans also made survey calls, 
asking what issues people were generally concerned with. 
Behind what many responded to as "Presidential power too 
great," the issue of segregation came in second. 112 Workman 
soon focused a great deal o f h is efforts on segregation and 
States' Rights, due to the desegregation crisis that fall at 
the University of Mississippi. Workman and his campaign 
strategists continually struck at this theme throughout the 
campaign. Workman denounced President Kennedy for sending 
more troops into "one sleepy college town", Oxford, 
Mississippi, than into Vietnam. 113 Republican strategists saw 
the combination of federal intervention and state sovereignty 
as being beneficial to Workman's "complete dedication to 
states rights,- 114 and even adapted a Kennedy slogan for their 
llODrak~ Edens to all Republ i c a n Wo r ke r s, July 30, 1962, Folder 
12, Duffy Papers . 
lllJD to Bill Hunter, May 29, 1962 , Fo l der 6, Duffy Papers. 
112Telephone Survey, u ndat ed, Folder 12, Duffy Papers. 
113 Mworkman Critical o f Kennedy," The State, October 9, 1962. 
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own use: uAsk not what the Senate can do for you; ask only 
what you can do for the Senate. 11115 
Yet this attempt at labeling Johnston as a "liberal 
Kennedy Democratw did not prove successful . On election day, 
Johnston captured 17 8, 712 votes ( 57 percent) to Workman's 
133,930 votes (42 percent) in the state. 116 In Anderson 
County, where only 29 percent of the county population was 
registered to vote, Workman garnered a little over twenty 
percent of the vote, below the 25 to 33 percent that Duffy 
had hoped to secure. 11 7 In explaining the defeat, Workman 
conceded that Republicans were amateurs compared to the 
Democratic organization, but not all Republicans felt that 
way. Duffy, albeit disappointed in the showing Anderson 
County gave his candidate, nevertheless blamed the defeat on 
"the most fantastic case of sheer ignorance, prejudice, hate, 
and old age I could ever imagine." To party leaders, 
Republicans forgot the basic rule of politics: 
"those complacent conservatives" out to vote. 
getting 
This could 
only be remedied by completely canvassing the district and 
getting "them to the polls on election day come hell, high 
114campaign Bulletin #15 from Drake Edens, October 11, 1962, 
Folder 12, Duffy Papers. 
115campaign Bulletin #18 from Drake Edens, October 30, 1962, 
Folder 12, Duffy Papers. 
116scammon, 5: 366 . 
117Anderson County Report on the 1962 General Election to the 
State Republican Party, undated, Folder 13, Duffy Papers; America Votes, 
Vol. 2, 369; JD to Cordes Seabrook and Jack Coursey, June 18, 1962, 
Folder 7, Duffy Papers. 
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water or Olin Johnston. u1 1s Concluding that Johnston would be 
the last Democrat able to play to the traditional heart 
strings of his constituents, Duffy felt that even though they 
dropped off from the 1960 election, Anderson County 
Republicans were building "the largest political machine of 
volunteers ever.H In addition to building on the fact that 
they saw the Southern youth, as well as the nation's, 
becoming more conservative, Republicans had to overcome the 
stigma of their label in South Carolinians' minds. Along 
with a word-of-mouth campaign, Republicans eventually had to 
run candidates to overcome that final hurdle--achieving 
victory--in order to gain respectability. Granted, Duffy 
conceded, they may lose the first few races, ubut everything 
must have a beg inning . "1 19 
For Republicans, this election showed continued strong 
GOP support in a previously all-Democratic state. In the 
1956 senate election, the rapidly growing urban counties such 
as Aiken, Charleston, Greenville, and Richland, gave 
Republican Leon Crawford over twenty-percent of the total 
vote. In these same counties in 19 62, Workman managed to 
capture a majority of the votes cast; in the case of 
Richland, Workman came within one-tenth of one percent of a 
majority. In addition, black-belt counties, such as Calhoun, 
Clarendon, Edgefield, and Orangeburg, gave their majority 
llBBill Hunter to Third District workers, November 14, 1962, 
Folder 11, Duffy Papers. 
1 1 9Jo to County Party Leadership, November 20, 1962, Folder 11, 
Duffy Papers. 
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support to Workman. Republicans also had to be hopeful at 
Floyd Spence's run for U.S. Congress in the Second District 
by garnering nearly 34,947 votes (47 percent) against the 
Democratic incumbent Albert Watson. 120 This strong showing by 
a G.O.P. candidate in South Carolina's Second Congressional 
District helped to reshape the district's future political 
representation to the Republicans' favor. 
Republicans knew that the battle to reshape South 
Carolina's political landscape would be a long, tough one. 
But they perceived the Democrats' lethargic organization and 
the voters' sense of wanting a new outlet for political 
expression as a chanc·e to build a foundation for future 
growth. This future growth would first depend on luring the 
nsouthern Conservative" away from his traditional home, as 
the Workman senatorial campaign had aimed to do. In addition 
to Nswitchovers,w Republicans realized the role that women 
and the youth could play in a growing party, and would 
actively court and use the energies these two groups provided 
in the future. Nevertheless, Republicans realized that they 
had to work from the top of the ticket down, that the first 
priority of the party had to be the capture of the state for 
their presidential nominee. After capturing the White House, 
Palmetto Republicans could then aim for the State House and 
courthouses. For Duffy and the 140 active GOP workers now in 
120 scammon, 5: 368. 
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Anderson County, this was their plan of attack for the next 
battle over the political control of the Palmetto state. 121 
121Anderson County Report on the 1962 General Election to the 
State Republican Party, undated, Folder 13, Duffy Papers. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEFEAT IN VICTORY 
The next two years witnessed an explosive growth of 
Republicanism in South Carolina. 
Goldwater within the national 
The ascendancy of Barry 
party, along with Strom 
Thurmond' s entry into the state party, created a wave of 
excitement for the fledgling organization. Yet the 1964 
election's outcome tapered this enthusiasm, leaving some 
Palmetto Republicans questioning their party's future in the 
state. 
As with any defeat at the polls, Republicans blamed each 
other for the loss in 1962. Duffy pictured the party as 
"blooded (sic) . . . without question." A movement to replace 
Bob Chapman as state chairman with Workman's main campaign 
strategist, Drake Edens, began the internal fighting. Many 
in the party saw Edens as a strong organizer of both the 
campaign and personnel, while believing that Chapman had not 
fully contributed to the senatorial campaign. Others also 
saw Chapman as part of a "Greenville-Spartanburg axis," which 
had gained control of the party in the early 1950s, and now 
hoped to control the developing Goldwater movement. Some 
believed that replacing Chapman was a "mistake" and that 
"extreme caution" should be taken in making a change in party 
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leadership. 122 After being presented with an ultimatum to 
either revitalize the party or step aside, Chapman resigned 
in early February 1963. Later that month, after some 
internal jousting for the state chairmanship between the 
"Greenville-Spartanburg axis" and the young turks, state 
Republicans selected Edens as the new party chairman. Even 
though he had earlier supported Chapman for the senate 
nomination, Duffy was asked to nominate Edens for the 
chairmanship. This, Duffy felt, helped to place him 11 0n the 
team of those that were now directing the party.# 123 Yet even 
though Edens' opposition withdrew and the vote for Edens was 
unanimous, Duffy determined if a vote was taken, it would 
have been much closer, with 16 out of 26 voting for Edens. 12 4 
This sharp division represented the beginnings of continued 
internal fighting between the two factions for control of the 
party. 
Two other internal battles focused on the Republican's 
stance on civil rights within the state. At the January 1963 
state meeting, Arthur Ravenel moved that the party 11 indicted 
the state for its pacifist stand in the entry of a Negro to 
Clemson University." Lacking support, Ravenel retracted his 
resolution. 12 5 The other battle centered on the situation in 
122Jack B. Coursey to JD, January 23, 1963, Folder 14, Duffy 
Papers. 
123 In G.O.P. We Trust, 65-69. 
12 4JD to John Tucker, John Attaway, Cordes Seabrook, February 1 7 , 
1965, Folder 42, Duffy Papers. 
12 5In G.O.P. We Trust, 67. 
55 
Orangeburg County, not only the home of historical l y black 
S.C. State College, but also of W. W. unuck" Wannamaker, the 
state's national Republican committeeman. Again, the 
Charleston delegation, apparently under Ravenel's influence, 
supported Wannamaker's attempts to gain the party's 
endorsement of a state #tuition aid bill." Designed to aid 
students who wanted to switch from desegregated public 
schools to private, and segregated, schools, the measure 
failed to gain the support of all but one of the state 
committee members, because of its "racially inspired# motive 
of circumventing desegregation at tempts in the state. 126 
While most Palmetto Republicans disapproved of using the 
tuition-grant scheme to circumvent the desegregation of 
public schools, Republicans did seek to umaintain our 
traditional education system," and were always #ready to 
explore every possibility# in keeping South Carolina public 
schools segregated. 12 7 
This rejection of extreme racist policies by a majority 
of Republican leaders demonstrates that hard-core 
segregationists did not necessarily dominate the GOP. Yet 
Republicans recognized they had a perception problem in 
winning the black vote in South Carolina. Believing that 
there were at least 150,000 blacks registered in 1964, a 
Young Republican newsletter stated that blacks would "bloc-
126rn G.O.P . We Trust, 75. 
127Document entitled *Firs t Draft - April 4, 1963,* Folder 14, 
Duffy Papers. 
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voteN for President Johnson in the upcoming general election 
and that Republicans had to find some way to offset this 
vote. 12 a 
Republicans, however, put this attempt to lure blacks to 
the GOP on the back burner as they prepared for the 1964 
Presidential election. For Palmetto Republicans there was no 
debate over who their favored candidate for the White House 
would be. Duffy remarked that South Carolina had been 
Goldwater country since 1959. In 1960 the South Carolina 
delegation to the Republican National Convention forced the 
nomination of the Arizona senator on the floor. Even though 
they did not have their way, Palmetto Republicans continued 
to support Goldwater through the intervening years, believing 
that the Senator's message of conservatism was needed more 
than ever in 19 64 . 12 9 
To understand the appeal of Barry Goldwater one must 
understand the appeal of his message to South Carolina 
Republicans. This appeal focused on their concept of 
uconstitutional government, N by returning to what they 
believed were the basic ideals of the Founding Fathers. 
These ideals, according to Duffy, involved 
the principle of private property, private power, 
less centralized government and national control, a 
sane fiscal policy, less giving away of tax dollars 
12BNewsletter from SC Young Republica ns, August 24, 1964, Folder 
32, Duffy Papers. 
129 rn G. O.P. We Trust, 14 0 . 
in an attempt to buy friends, a stronger position 
vis a vis Communism, and other like points. 13 0 
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Duffy credits the *unyielding" nature of Goldwater 
Republicans to the reorientation of the Republican Party away 
from the *Eastern Establishment,# the Rockefeller liberal and 
moderates of the party. As Theodore White described in his 
analysis of the 1964 presidential campaign, the Republican's 
were divided nationally between the *primitives,# the 
conservative Congressional Republicans, and the 
#Establishment# Republicans, who chose the executive 
candidate. 131 Goldwater Republicans not only wanted to grasp 
the ideological foundation of the party away from the 
Roqkefellers and the *liberal wing," they wanted to become 
uThe Establishment# in controlling the party's mechanics and 
operations. 132 Goldwater Republicans argued that since 1928 
Rockefeller Republicans had done nothing with the power of 
the party that they controlled. Some conservatives also 
believed that any candidate they nominated would be defeated, 
because of Kennedy's assassination and the widespread feeling 
that Johnson should be given a chance on his own. However, 
Goldwater Republicans believed that they could capture 
control of the party and direct its course in the future. 13 3 
130rn G.O.P. We Trust, 141. 
l31Theodore H. White, The Making of the President - 1964, (New 
York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965), 66. 
132JD to Robert E. Smylie, May 15, 1963, Folder 15, Duffy Papers. 
133 rn G.O.P. We Trust, 142. 
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This attraction to Goldwater stemmed from the Arizona 
senator's conservative stances. In his 1960 book, The 
Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater set forth his belief 
that the government's functions were limited in its powers by 
the Constitution, and that all men are uresponsible for his 
own development." 134 The Constitution, as he envisioned it, 
had fallen into a state of disrepair. Politics, according to 
Goldwater, was the act of securing the greatest amount of 
individual freedom without disturbing the social order. 13 5 In 
order to return the constitutional balance to its proper 
formula, both parties had to pay more than lip-service to the 
principle of States' Rights. To Goldwater, the principle of 
States' Rights meant that -states have a right to act or not 
to act, as they see fit, in the areas reserved to them. " 13 6 
Goldwater addressed the issue of Southerners linking States' 
Rights to "the South's position on racial integration," and 
believed that the two were not necessarily incompatible. 
Goldwater contended that the right of Negro children to 
attend white schools may be specifically addressed in a law 
or constitutional amendment, but that -they do not have a 
civil right to do so which is protected by the federal 
constitution, or which is enforceable by the federal 
134Barry Goldwater, 
(Shepardsville, Kentucky: 
Goldwater's emphasis. 
135Goldwater, 13 . 
The Conscience of a Conservative, 
Victor Publi s hing Company, Inc . , 
136Goldwater, 28. Goldwater's emphas is. 
1960), 12. 
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government." 137 While he agreed with the objectives of the 
Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision and 
felt that the separation of children based on race did carry 
with it "strong implications of inferiority," the Arizona 
senator could not impose his convictions on the South, 
because the federal constitution did not "permit any 
interference whatsoever by the federal government in the 
field of education. ,.13 9 
This feeling of being overtaken by the federal 
government in matters relating to race became a central point 
of condemnation for Carolina Republicans in 1963. Just as 
Goldwater publicly decried the Kennedy administration, the 
state GOP executive committee unanimously accepted a 
resolution "condemning the Administration for their handling 
of the racial question and the Civil Rights legislation." 139 
Carolina Republicans believed that the Kennedy administration 
used a "pseudo moral justification" for usurping 
constitutional guarantees, and that Carolina congressmen 
should avoid the "pitfalls of compromise" in civil rights 
legislation. 140 One year later, before the Goldwater victory 
at the cow Palace, Palmetto Republicans asserted that the 
racial problems of the nation were better "handled in the 
137Goldwater, 33-34. 
13 8Goldwater, 34-37. 
139JD to Precinct and County Officers, July 29, 1963, Folder 16, 
Duffy Papers. 
14 0south Carolina Republican Party Bulletin lt6, August, 1963, 
Folder 18, Duffy Papers. 
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quiet deliberation of people at the County and State level,• 
without violence_ 141 
Besides the Arizona senator's stance on States' Rights 
and civil rights, conservative South Carolinians also 
appreciated Goldwater's belief in state right-to-work laws, 
Mwhich forbid contracts that make union membership a 
condition of employment,• even though the Arizona senator 
believed that unions could be used as a positive tool for 
righting economic injustices_ 1 4 2 Goldwater also contended 
that the federal government had to Mwithdraw# from the series 
of program he viewed as outside the national government 
purview, such as welfare, public housing, agricultural 
subsidies, and urban renewal. 143 Unless conservatives could 
show the country the difference between conservative' s 
concern for these issues and the Democrats' belief that the 
issues could be solved by the federal government, Goldwater 
felt "certain that Conservatism is through." 144 These issues, 
plus a hard-line stance against the U.S.S.R. and the spread 
of communism, played directly to conservative Carolina 
Republicans, who shared many of Goldwater's ideals. 
Goldwater also indirectly appealed to the 
segregationists of the state, who falsely believed he was 
141First Draft of Statement of Principles of South Carolina 
Republican Convention, 1964, Folder 22, Duffy Papers. 
142Goldwater, 46-49. 
143Goldwater, 66. Goldwater's emphasis. 
144Goldwater, 71. 
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their champion in halting and reversing school desegregation. 
Segregationists manipulated Goldwater's vote against cloture 
and the against final passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as 
a vote for their cause. 14s 
credo 
They also redefined Goldwater's 
that the individual must be free to do and build as 
he will, free to organize his life without the 
interference of government or suffer without the 
mercy of government ... , 1 46 
which White described as usincere, heartfelt and unblemished 
by any compromise of instinct and thought." Segregationist 
Southerners twisted Goldwater's creed to their own suiting, 
that the federal government, particularly the Supreme Court 
and the Justice Department, should allow southern states to 
institute their own racial policies. Yet in order for these 
segregationists and Goldwater conservatives to attempt to 
reverse the country's course, they had to first capture the 
party they saw as the best potential vehicle for their 
values. 
To accomplish this revolution within the Republican 
Party, Goldwater Republicans on both the national and state 
levels had planned to assume power years before 1964. This 
145Thurmond's office compiled a list of Goldwater's votes on the 
1964 Civil Rights Bill and said that Mthe significant votes are the ones 
against cloture, to delete Title II, to delete Title VII, and against 
the final passage ... * Memorandum from HHS to (Harry} Dent, Subject: 
Senator Goldwater's votes on Civil Rights Bill, undated, in Folder 
Campaigns, 1964 Campaign, Dent, Harry, Sept. 9 - Oct. 3, 1964, n.d., 
Campaigns Series, Strom Thurmond Collection, Special Collections, Robert 
M. Cooper Library, Clemson University, S.C. Hereafter referred to as 
the Thurmond Collection. 
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is particularly evident in the South Carolina Party, with its 
undying support of Goldwater going back to 1959, long before 
conservatives began to dominate other state parties. 147 Duffy 
felt this was achieved because "we were the youth of the 
Party, the young generation that had moved into the Party and 
stirred it up, the group that had molded an effective 
organization where none had been for one hundred years. "148 
Then, in the summer of 1963, the ascension of Goldwater 
supporters, both within the state and national organization, 
became more visible. In May 1963, the S.C. Republican State 
Executive Committee unanimously endorsed Goldwater for 
President. 149 Then, one month later, at a national meeting, 
Goldwater Republicans succeeded in dominating the working 
organization of the national party. As Duffy, now chairman 
of the Third Congressional District for the s.c. Republican 
Party, related to his local leaders, few of them were ready 
for such an early and easy victory. As a demonstration of 
their successful coup, a strong civil rights resolution did 
not receive any support other than from the Washington, D.C. 
delegates, while resolutions condemning the Supreme Court's 
decisions on prayer and favoring non-sectarian religion in 
schools passed the meeting with a unanimous vote. Duffy also 
reported that the Arrangements Committee, "which control(s) 
l47rn G.O.P. We Trust, 144. 
148rn G.O.P. We Trust, 143. 
149JD to County and Precinct Officers, May 27, 1963, Folder 15, 
Duffy Papers. 
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the Convention, is completely in the hands of the Goldwater 
group. ,,15 0 
By the time the opening gavel of the Republican National 
Convention came down in July 1964 in San Francisco, Goldwater 
supporters had succeeded in taking over the party. As most 
Republican conventions went, Duffy admitted, the convention 
at the Cow Palace bored most of the delegates. Nonetheless, 
sparks of controversy arose over the Republican platform. 
The liberal-moderate faction of the party sought to test 
Goldwater's strength and attempted to amend the platform on 
the floor. The amendment attacked such right-wing groups as 
the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society, as well as the 
Communists. After the conservative delegates defeated this 
amendment, moderates offered another amendment denouncing 
"extremism" but without specifying any particular groups. 
This amendment also met defeat, with New York's Governor 
Nelson D. Rockefeller, one of the amendment's key supporters, 
being drowned out by the conservative delegates' boos when he 
tried to address the convention. Another defeated amendment 
concerned a stronger civil rights plank. Voted down 897 to 
409, Duffy saw this vote against the plank not as an issue 
concerning civil rights, but as "an effort to embarrass 
Goldwater. " 151 Goldwater supporters believed that the 
convention was theirs, and they would control it as they saw 
lSOJD to County and Precinct Officers, June 30, 1963, Folder 16, 
Duffy Papers. 
151In G.O.P. We Trust, 147-148. 
64 
fit. Republican Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania confirmed 
this sentiment, claiming "that some of the delegates would 
have voted against motherhood if the right people made the 
motions." 152 When all was said and done and the roll call of 
states was taken on the nomination of the Republican 
Presidential candidate, it was a fitting end to the 
conservatives' complete takeover as Drake Edens, South 
Carolina Republican Chairman, proudly announced on the 
convention floor that his state was "humbly grateful that we 
can do this for America." With the six teen Palmetto votes, 
Barry Goldwater captured the presidential n omination of the 
Republican Party. 1s3 
The lasting impression that came out of San Francisco, 
however, revolved around Barry Goldwater's acceptance of his 
party's nomination. The candidate's assertion that 
"extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice" and that 
"moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue" had 
repercussions the moment Goldwater uttered them. Moderate 
Republicans and those outside the party condemned the 
statement as radical. Rockefeller denounced the statement 
the following day, believing that to extol extremism "is 
dangerous, irresponsible and frightening." When former 
Republican Vice President Richard M. Nixon , concerned ov er 
the statement's impact, wrote to Goldwater asking for some 
clarification, Goldwater responded by saying that 
152 In G. O.P . We Trust, 1 4 9 . 
153White, 215 . 
If I were to paraphrase the two sentences in 
question in the context in which I uttered them I 
would do it by saying that whole-hearted devotion 
to liberty is unassailable and that half-hearted 
devotion to justice is indefensible. 15 4 
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Yet reaction in the Palmetto state proved favorable to the 
Arizona senator's performance in San Francisco. Duffy 
believed that the statement spoke directly to the South, by 
expressing the philosophy that southerners were wanting to 
hear. ·rt spoke to the ideals and beliefs that conservative 
southerners were wanting out of a presidential candidate,• 
Duffy said. uThis state was so easy for Goldwater that it 
required very little campaigning. The party lines were 
obscured. Goldwater was talking like the Democrats wanted 
him to talk, and yet he was a Republican." 15 5 Along with the 
withdrawal of George Wallac-e' s presidential bid which Duffy 
predicted would bring votes to Goldwater, the reaction across 
the state, according to Duffy, was uremarkable. • 156 
Democrats could not believe their luck and used the 
•extremism" statement to its fullest political advantage. In 
what is still believed by most political observers as the 
most effective attack commercial ever produced, the Johnson 
campaign produced a commercial depicting a little girl 
picking a daisy's petals off and counting to ten. When she 
154william Safire, Satire's Political Dict i onary, (New York: 
Random Hous e, 1978), 215 . 
155personal interview with James E. Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
156JD to County and Precinct Officers, July 20, 1964, Folder 30, 
Duffy Papers. 
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reached ten, a voice counted back down to zero, and a 
mushroom cloud from a nuclear detonation shrouded the little 
girl, with an ominous voice warning that "these are the 
stakes." Johnson's voice then forebodingly declared two 
options for the voters in November: "to make a world in 
which all of God's children can live, or go into the dark. 
We must love each other, or we must die." 157 Democrats took 
advantage of the fear many had that Goldwater would use 
nuclear weapons in fighting for conservative principles. 
Even as the end of the campaign neared, Johnson continued to 
pound at his opponent's position, saying that Goldwater's 
extremism in seeking · the White House "is an unpardonable 
vice. Moderation in the affairs of the nation is the highest 
virtue." 158 
For South Carolina Republicans, however, the "extremist" 
statement proved to be the climax of their six-year effort 
for domination of the party. Goldwater supporters, such as 
Duffy, believed the reference to extremism as being something 
"perfect and correct." "It was a defense of this country's 
principles," Duffy later said, "that the Goldwater supporters 
would simply not acquiesce in 'anything goes, ' that we do 
have principles and that we would fight for our country . We 
would take care of the honest treatment of people based on 
themselves. The South bought off on it as a patriotic 
157New York Times Maga z ine, October 2 5, 1964, VI-3 0 . 
158safire, 215. 
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gesture." 159 Yet even Duffy admitted the negative impact the 
statement had at the time. Duffy conceded that he saw 
"nothing wrong" with accepting the convention amendment 
denouncing extremism, which he pictured as "harmless enough 
and would have helped the campaign." 160 At the time, however, 
Goldwater Republicans would not accept it and the political 
fallout made by the "extremist" statement still reverberates 
to this day. The "daisy-girl" commercial had a powerful 
impact on the American political psyche. Even though the 
uproar from Goldwater supporters and Democrats alike caused 
it to be pulled shortly after airing, Republicans admitted 
the damage had been done. Duffy likened it to a lawyer's 
improper remark made to a jury before a judge strikes it from 
the record. "Who can ever erase a comment from his mind? 
There was no effective way to counter this assault. " 161 
Even though most saw little hope in refuting the charge 
of extremism, local Republicans did express discontent at 
Goldwater's handling of the situation. Duffy agreed that a 
policy of burying "our head in the sand on progressive 
policies" did not help anyone. Even with Republican campaign 
ads charging that the liberal Democratic vice-president 
Hubert Humphrey was "a heartbeat away" from the Oval Office 
and that Johnson would hold a "Brand-Name Clearance Sale" of 
government benefit programs to win the election, Palmetto 
159personal interview with James E. Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
160in G.O.P. We Trust, 150. 
161 I n G.O.P. We Trust, 184. 
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Republicans expressed the belief, nearly three months before 
the election, that Goldwater and the party would close the 
campaign nwith a tremendous crash." 162 
These private predictions did not deter the party from 
seeking to expand its ranks. Republican state leaders 
continued to attract the talent and enthusiasm for 
campaigning from both women and the youth. In a new national 
program, Republicans worked to include more women in the 
party. The Grass-Roots Organization of Women, or GROW, 
reflected the party's need to capitalize on the expanding 
involvement and influence of women in political campaigns. 
In the state, GOP Chairman Drake Edens felt that no one thing 
could better Republican chances of victory rhan organizing 
strong GOP Women's Clubs throughout the state. 163 He also 
named the state's Republican committeewoman, Ann Morris, to 
serve as not only as the State Canvass Coordinator but also 
to set an example throughout the organization. Since women 
nrecruit most of the workers and do most of the work," Edens 
urged that each county's vice chairwoman serve as the canvass 
chair as well.1 64 Republican leaders viewed the job of 
canvassing as an important part of the campaign process, 
162Dolly Hamby to Republican State Leaders, October 7, 1964, 
Folder 34, Duffy Papers; Letter to JD from F.W. Mohney, August 29, 
1964, Folder 32, Duffy Papers. 
163Drake Edens to Clare A. Nel son, January 14, 1964, Folder 22, 
Duffy Papers. 
164Drake Edens to Mrs. Edgar L. Morris, Bart Cox, Mrs. Dorothy 
Jones, September 3, 1964, Folder 33, Duffy Papers. 
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because canvassers made the local contacts with supporters to 
get them out to vote on election day . 
Republicans also saw the youth of the state as hard 
workers who needed to be cultivated. With such colleges as 
Erskine voting nearly two-to-one for Goldwater in straw-
polls, party leaders saw the conservative leaning youth as 
ideal building blocks for the party . 16 5 With Young Republican 
clubs becoming active throughout the state, party leaders 
made sure that they kept the youths' interest by involving 
them in the campaign, even though it included little more 
than manning the phones and distributing literature. Party 
leaders included even those not old enough to vote, because 
the leaders knew that one day they would vote. 166 These two 
groups, in Duffy's opinion, provided uthe great single force 
available" in future campaigns . 167 
But this ugreat single force" did not prove strong 
enough to overcome basic deficiencies in the Goldwater 
campaign. The private predictions of doom most Republicans 
felt became reality on election day, with Johnson securing a 
nation-wide landslide victory, in terms of popular vote, 43 
million (61 percent) to Goldwater's 27 million (38 percent ) . 
Yet, just as in the 1948 Presidential election, the Deep 
South rebuked the rest of the nation and supported Goldwater . 
165JD to Ray Wilson, October 9, 1964, Folder 34, Duffy Papers. 
166Dolly Hamby to All Republica n Leaders, November 2, 1964, Folde r 
36, Duffy Papers. 
167JD to Third District Party Leaders, November 24, 1964, Folder 
36, Duffy Papers. 
70 
Goldwater carried the Deep South states with a minimum 
plurality of 93,000 votes . 168 In South Carolina, Goldwater 
attracted 309, 048 votes ( 58 percent) compared to Johnson's 
215 , 723 (41 percent). Yet in Duffy's Anderson County, the 
percentage of votes were exactly opposite to the state's 
totals, with Goldwater securing 8,398 votes (41 percent) to 
Johnson's 11,780 votes (58 percent) . 169 
Yet even in this national defeat, Palmetto Republicans 
saw victory for themselves and the state . With 42 of the 
state's 46 counties officially organized before the 
campaigning began, all the hard work of the previous years 
finally began to pay off. In writing to Roger Milliken, 
Duffy expressed relief that Republicans finally had made it 
uover the hill. " 170 .With all but two counties meeting t heir 
voting quota, Republicans achieved 127% of their established 
goal in attracting votes. Duffy did admit that some of the 
party's supporters viewed themselves as either uThurmond" or 
uGoldwater" people, but Republicans accepted them into the 
party with no reservations; "all the support we could get 
from any sources was what we had to be after in order to 
win . ,, 171 
16Bscammon, 6: 1. 
169scammon, 6: 3 75 . 
170JD to Roger Milliken, Nov ember 4, 1964, Folder 36, Duffy 
Papers. 
171In G. O.P. We Trust, 200 . 
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Goldwater Republicans reflected on their defeat at the 
polls as signaling a victory for their cause in the party. 
Even though they imagined having the issues on their side, 
ranging from what Duffy called a ureckless fiscal policy• to 
ua lack of determination to conduct a winning war in Viet 
Nam," Goldwater supporters fought to retain control of the 
party after the devastating defeat. 172 Moderate Republicans 
labeled the election defeat a ucatastrophe." Like the South 
Carolina 1962 senatorial campaign, the factions within the 
national party began to blame each other. Moderates accused 
the 833 Goldwater delegates of foisting a conservative 
candidate on the party. 17 3 Conservatives accused the liberal 
and moderate wings of the party of disgracefully abandoning 
their own party's candidate during the campaign. Duffy, in 
writing to Newsweek, said most observers missed the real 
reason why Southern conservatives supported Goldwater. 
Unlike those who feared the Republican presidential candidate 
for things uhe either said or did, or was said to have said 
or done," Southern Republicans feared what Johnson had 
already done. Republicans believed that other issues, such 
as a balanced budget and a strong policy toward communist 
expansion in Viet Nam, attracted Southern voters to the 
Republican ticket. 1 74 Conservative Republicans credited two 
172In G.O.P. We Trust, 208. 
173walter s. Mack, Chairman of the National Committee of 
Republicans and Independents for Johnson, to all 1964 Republican 
Convention delegates, undated, Folder 36, Duffy Papers. 
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factors to the nation-wide defeat: a badly managed campaign, 
exemplified by local workers failing to receive campaign 
material from the national headquarters as late as mid-
August, 175 and what Republicans saw as the "vehemence of the 
liberal news media# aimed against Goldwater. 17 6 
However, even with the defeat, Goldwater conservatives 
in South Carolina vowed not to give up control of the party 
machinery. Even with an organization Mfar superior to that 
of the atrophying Democrat machine# and the dedication of its 
volunteers, Duffy believed Republicans faced a two-fold 
problem. 177 On the local level, they faced formidable and 
entrenched Democratic adversaries. Republicans had to 
compete loc_ally with Democrats who would call on their 
neighbor's support, even if their neighbors voted for the GOP 
presidential candidate. Republicans faced not only a strong 
challenge at the ballot box, but also in the courtroom as 
well. 
State law required that each voter had to cast a fully 
marked ballot to have it be counted as valid . In an election 
for three seats on the Georgetown city council, Republican 
candidate Dewey Sullivan lost his bid, even though he 
received 53 percent of the votes cast. While the Democratic 
Party had offered candidates for all three seats, Sullivan 
174JD to Lew L. Callaway, November 14, 1964, Folder 36, Duffy 
Papers. 
175JD to C.A. Able, August 19, 1964, Folder 32, Duffy Papers. 
176rn G.O.P. We Trus t, 208 . 
177 r n G. O.P. We Trust, 2 09. 
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was the sole Republican on the ballot. Republicans saw this 
law as detrimental to them, because every Republican had to 
cast two votes for Democrats or else have their ballot 
invalidated. Prior to another special election in Richland 
County, the Republicans brought suit asking for an injunction 
against the law, prompting the Democratic State Attorney 
General to comment that "the Republican suit is an effort to 
seek a shortcut to victory after their failure at the polls." 
A three-judge circuit court dismissed the Republicans' claims 
of vote dilution, and when the Republicans' sought a Supreme 
Court review of the case, the high Court upheld the decision. 
Republicans saw the defeat as perpetuating the "exclusion of 
minorities and all others" who did not .share the same 
philosophy as Democrats. 178 Democrats also controlled the 
powerful leverage Df patronage, a key tool to keeping their 
positions. Duffy also identified another area that proved 
costly to Republicans in 1964: the black vote. 179 Even though 
the GOP would make some inroads in the black community in 
the coming years, the legacy of the Goldwater attacks on 
civil rights, both real and supposed, proved to be a 
hindrance to any attempts at rapprochement between the two 
groups. 
Yet before breaking the Democrat's hold over the 
courthouses and the black community, the conservative faction 
178The high Court upheld the d e c is ion on Oct. 19, 1964 in Boineau 
et al. v. Thorton, Secretary of S ta te of South Carolina, et al. (235 
F . Supp. 175). In G. O.P. We Trus t, 1 07 -110 . 
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of the Palmetto Republican Party had to address key problems. 
One problem was, at first, masked with great optimism and 
joy. For years, one of the key Democratic players in the 
state had refused to openly campaign or support his party's 
presidential nominees. Finally, on September 16, 1964, the 
state's senior U.S. senator, Strom Thurmond, announced that 
he was leaving the Democratic Party and joining the 
Republican Party. With the pledge of support and advice from 
Goldwater, Thurmond addressed his constituents on the 
reasoning behind leaving the Democratic Party. 180 Believing 
that the national Democratic Party was leading South Carolina 
Democrats down a path to Mserfdom,w Thurmond declared that 
the vehicle which he viewed as best for the people of South 
Carolina was the Republican Party of Barry Goldwater. Yet 
Thurmond also made an important promise that has been at the 
center of his political universe: "I shall always maintain 
my independent judgment and action and put the people of 
south Carolina first. 11 18 1 Even though many, including his two 
young aides, Harry Dent and J. Fred Buzhardt, had urged him 
not to switch parties, Thurmond accepted the political risk 
of losing his reelection bid. Like so many of his precedent-
setting acts, Thurmond believed he could uonly follow the 
course which, in my heart and conscience, I believe to be in 
180Nadine Cohodas, Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern 
Change, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 358. 
181·Thurmond Confirms Switch, To Aid Goldwater Campaign,* The 
State, September 17, 1964, 1-A. 
r, 
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the best interest of our State, country and freedom of our 
people." 18 2 
When Thurmond announced his switch to the GOP in 1964, 
Republicans saw it as a ured-letter day," and knew that now, 
with a U.S. Senator leading their party, victory could not be 
far from their grasp in November 1964. But Thurmond looked 
ahead, and wanted the party to start preparing for his re-
election bid in 1966. During the 1964 campaign, one of the 
senator's proteges, Harry Dent, was named assistant state 
campaign chairman. Following the November election, Thurmond 
urged GOP leaders to name Dent to the newly created position 
of executive director of the party. Thurmond felt that he 
should be represented in some leadership authority in the 
party to begin his re-election planning. If he met 
resistance to this plan, Thurmond threatened to operate his 
re-election campaign uas a Republican through some other type 
setup. " 18 3 Thurmond believed that Drake Edens could simply 
appoint Dent as executive director. In meetings and 
correspondence between Thurmond, Dent, and Edens, the 
proposal received favorable support from the chairman. Even 
Ann Morris, the state's national committeewoman, seemed very 
interested in working this matter out . 184 Instead, party 
182
·Thurmond Confirms Switch, To Aid Goldwater Campaign,• 1-A. 
183strom Thurmond to Robert Knight, December 1, 1964, Folder 41, 
Duffy Papers . 
184strom Thurmond to Drake Edens, November 25, 1964, Campaign 
Series, Strom Thurmond Collection, Mss 100, Special Collections, R. M. 
Cooper Library, Clemson University, Clemson, SC. Hereafter referred to 
as Thurmond Campaign Papers. 
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leaders saw Thurmond' s move as an ultimatum that insulted 
their efforts over the past years to build up a credible 
opposition party. Many of Duffy's contemporaries felt that 
the leadership of the party belonged to those who had worked 
to build up the party, and not to those who arrived fresh off 
the train. Those who had worked to build up the party were 
simply not going to hand over the reins of power to Thurmond, 
no matter what his demand implied.18s Opponents, Duffy 
included, felt that before Thurmond publicly announced his 
switch, the senator 
had requested, if. not demanded, certain provisions 
for switching. They were that he would be the 
spokesman for the Party and the only candidate for 
any office in the State until he had been re-
elected. He would then get out of the leadership 
and turn it back . 106 
The reason Duffy felt that the Senator made such demands was 
the political background the Senator had been raised in. For 
South Carolina Democrats, the candidates were not an 
extension of the party, th~ party was an extension of the 
candidates. The more senior a person became in terms of 
political longevity, the more senior he became in the party 
standing. Duffy believed that Thurmond could automatically 
transfer his political seniority and, as in his old party, 
assume an automatic leadership position. 187 The state 
185c. A. Nelson to Hal C . Byrd, February 12, 1965, Folder 42, 
Duffy Papers . JD to Hal C. Byrd, February 14, 1965, Folder 42, Duffy 
Papers. 
1B6JD to John Tucker, John Attaway, and Cordes Seabrook, February 
17, 1965, Folder 42, Duffy Papers. 
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committee rejected Thurmond's offer, which some viewed as the 
opening shots between the Edens faction and the Thurmond 
faction of party. 188 Thurmond, seemingly angry that he could 
not have a share of the party's leadership, let the issue 
die. However, this conflict between what was now "the old 
guard," consisting of Edens, Duffy, and the moderates of the 
party, and the Thurmond faction would rise again, this time 
with the Thurmond faction winning total control of the party 
away from the Edens faction. 
The other area of debate within the party centered on 
the strategy of running local candidates. Early in 1964, 
Edens and the top state GOP leaders believed that being a 
"presidential party" was simply not enough. In order to 
solidify South Carolina as a two-party state, the GOP had to 
plan and actually run Republican candidates, not only on the 
state-wide level, but on the local level as well. Edens 
believed that the party was Mgrappling with the very life" of 
the group. Yet Republicans saw two major obstacles in their 
path of running candidates. One was generated by the 
Democratically-controlled General Assembly. Two separate 
pieces of legislation, both dealing with election practices 
in the state, raised the ire of Republicans. One bill dealt 
with the filing deadline for prospective candidates . Senate 
Bill #412 required Republicans to nominate their candidates 
by the filing date for Democrats entering the primary. Since 
187rnterview with J a me s E. Du f fy, March 24, 1994. 
188 In G. O. P. We Trus t, 216-217. 
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the Democrats then had ninety days before actually selecting 
their candidate through primary vote, Republicans felt it put 
them at a disadvantage, since enthusiasm for running on the 
Republican ticket still took a great amount of cultivation. 
The other act, Senate Bill #414, at first would seem to have 
garnered Republican support. But the GOP envisioned the 
Loyalty Oath Repeal Bill as #dangerous and unfair," because 
the state's loyalty oath was being replaced with an oath that 
forced any one who attended »any kind of Republican meeting 
-- Precinct Meeting, County Convention, State convention or 
what have you " from participating in the Democratic 
primary. While Edens supported a bill prohibiting delegates 
to a Republican nominating convention from al.so participating 
in the Democratic primary, he did not believe that 
Republicans, particularly those who still wished to vote for 
their Democratic friends, should be disallowed from 
participating in the opposition party's primary. 189 The 
overriding feeling of Republicans was that these two bills 
could hurt their chances of attracting the uncommitted to the 
G.O.P. Both bills passed the General Assembly and became 
law, over Republican objections. 190 
The other major obstacle revolved around the issue of 
actually getting a person to run as a Republican. Party 
l89state Chairman's Bulletin, #10 , February 11, 1964, Fo l der 23, 
Duffy Papers. 
190Journal of the Senate of the Second Session of the 95th General 
Assembly of the State of South Carolina, (Columbia, S.C. : State Budget 
and Control Board, 1964), 17 09. 
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leaders were still having trouble getting supporters to run 
for elected off ice. By the summer of 1964, Edens' main 
objective and concern was the fielding of udecent and 
respectable candidates." In Oconee County, where local 
Republicans were fielding Ed Simpson to run for the s. C. 
House of Representatives, Edens strongly urged them to field 
a second candidate, even usomeone who has no desire to serve 
and does not even expect to be elected." The main objective 
was to give Republicans a place to cast their second ballot 
•without giving it to the Democrats out of necessity." Edens 
even recommended asking a woman for to run for the second 
seat , if it was necessary . 1 9 1 Many of the Republican 
candidates were running in •safe" counties, those with either 
urban areas and established Republican tendencies such as 
Richland, Charleston, and Greenville, or those that were 
historically ·black-belt,# such as Aiken, Edgefield, 
Colleton, and Chesterfield, where segregationists strains ran 
deep in the political landscape . 192 In Greenville County, a 
complete slate of candidates for the eleven seat county 
delegation to the State House was offered. This was only the 
second time in the state's history that a candidate-for-
candidate basis contest was made. 193 When the November 1964 
191 Drake Edens to Howard G. Pettit, May 6, 1964, Folder 24, Duffy 
Papers . 
192state Chairman's Bulletin ij l3, May 14, 1964, Folder 27, Duffy 
Papers. 
193The Greenville County delegation was the largest in the state . 
The first such candidate-for-candidate race was for the 10-seat Richland 
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general election finally rolled around, Republicans on the 
local level were running for a variety of offices in fourteen 
counties. For the State House, Republicans were contesting 
28 seats out of 128, and four candidates were campaigning for 
23 seats in the state Senate. 1 94 Yet the only taste of 
victory for Palmetto Republicans was Goldwater's and Fred 
Worsham of Charleston, who won a seat to the South Carolina 
General Assembly. 195 
Duffy looked back after the heat of the 1964 battle died 
down and felt that, with continued work, South Carolina would 
see an active two-party system on the state and local level. 
Duffy saw strong support coming from the "farm bloc and 
better than normal support from the labor force--primarily 
textile employees.n In looking towards the next presidential 
battle, Duffy began to hint that Nixon might be able to win 
the state, but the "usefulness of a defeated candidate 
running againn did not lend itself to victory. 196 In a letter 
to Nixon, however, Duffy predicted the need for Republicans 
to capture the South in order to capture the White House. 197 
In reviewing the party's philosophy, Duffy admitted that the 
County delegation during the 1962 election. "G.O.P. Hopes Rise in 
Carolina Race,• The New York Ti mes, October 25, 1964, 57. 
194
·GOP Offers Candidates in 14 S.C . Counties,• The State, 
November 2, 1964, 3-A. 
l 95 "Many Lose Here Despite Barry,• The State, November 4, 1964, 3-
A. 
196JD to Stephen Shadegg, December 17, 1964, Folder 37, Duffy 
Papers . 
197JD to Richard Nixon, December 26, 1964, Folder 37, Duffy 
Papers. 
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GOP needed to "move away in slight degree from the right," 
but that this movement meant only a clarification of the 
basic ideas they support, without all the #hue and cry of 
extremism and trigger" happiness. 198 1964 saw the Republican 
Party in South Carolina finally come to political age, and 
for supporters like Duffy, it was a victory worth the 
devastating national defeat. But before they could turn 
their attention to the next race for the White House, 
Palmetto Republicans had an opportunity to convert the 
state's local political scene to a true two-party system. 
19BJD to Drake Edens, December 25, 1964, Folder 37, Duffy Papers. 
: 
1 
CHAPTER V 
GROWING PAINS 
The 1964 presidential election marked an important 
milestone in the development of the Republican party in South 
Carolina. In addition to attracting a large number of 
previously Democratic votes, the conservative wing of the 
Republican Party solidified its hold on the national party, 
years after the conservatives had captured the GOP leadership 
in South Carolina. Now, Palmetto Republicans had to transfer 
that strength from the 1964 election into credible power on 
the state-wide level. The years following the 1964 election 
held the promise of growing support and interest in the 
Republican Party; yet internal feuding and personality 
conflicts would, at times, beset the party. 
Following the disaster of the Goldwater candidacy, 
conservatives tried to retain control over the Republican 
Party, both on the national and state level. While some 
expressed doubts about the Goldwater-appointed national 
chairman, Duffy felt that the tenor of the party in the state 
still ran conservative, although he felt that the GOP should 
move Min slight degree" from the arch-conservatism of 
Goldwater. Along with this movement toward the center should 
come a clarification of the basic principles that 
t 
' 
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conservatives advocated, Duffy believed, without the uhue and 
cry of extremism and trigger happy# mentality.199 
Yet even with this reaffirmation of conservative 
strength, many within the Republican Party came out of the 
19 6 4 national disaster unsure of what direction the party 
should pursue in the off-election year of 1965. Something 
had to give the GOP supporters a rallying cry in which they 
could center their energies around. Albert Watson, the U.S. 
Representative from South Carolina's second district who 
abandoned the Democratic Party for the GOP in early 1965, 
provided that rallying point. Watson had supported Goldwater 
in his bid for the White House, and House Democrats had 
retaliated by depriving Watson of his commit·tee assignments. 
On January 13, 1965, Watson announced he was switching 
political parties, and had to resign his House seat and stand 
for re-election as a Republican. With fellow Republican 
Strom Thurmond by his side, Watson declared that the 
Democratic Party had not only stripped him of his seniority 
on House committees, they had also disciplined the people of 
South Carolina's Second Congressional District. Watson used 
the issue of the House leadership rescinding his seniority on 
committees to his advantage, and returned to his home state 
to campaign against what he described as the Northern liberal 
leadership in the House of Representatives. 200 As Duffy 
described it, the preparation for Watson's 1965 special 
199JD to Drake Edens, December 2 5, 1964, Folder 37, Duffy Papers . 
200 *Watson to Quit Congress Seat And Run as a G.O.P. Candidate,• 
The New York Times, January 13, 1965, 38 . 
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election gave Republicans usomething to do and changed the 
entire tempo of the off-election year.w 201 
Watson received support not only from state Republicans 
but also from around the country. State party leaders saw 
the election not just a chance to send a southern Republican 
to Congress, but, as Duffy characterized it, uan absolute 
necessity to maintain the force and drive of the Party# in 
the state after the presidential election. 202 Some may have 
questioned the wisdom of switching political affiliations, 
but South Carolina's Second Congressional District proved to 
be fertile ground for the Republican insurgency in the state. 
In the 1962 congressional election, the district had cast 
34,947 (47 percent) votes for Floyd Spence, Watson's 
Republican challenger. 203 Three years later, with the 
Democrats nominating Preston Callison, a lackluster candidate 
at best, as Watson"s challenger in the 1965 special election, 
Palmetto Republicans envisioned the race as a test of the 
grass-roots based organization they had developed over the 
years. Outsiders also intensely watched the second 
congressional race unfold. The Republican Congressional 
campaign Committee contributed $20,000 to their man's bid, 
partly to help pay for the first professional public opinion 
surveys ever used in a political campaign. 204 
201Jn G.O.P. We Trust, 225. 
202 Jn G.O.P. We Trust, 225. 
20 3scammon, 5: 368. 
204 MA 'Test Operation,,. The New York Times, July 16, 1965, 23. 
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Watson centered his campaign around the need for *an 
independent Congress" to stand up to a *liberal President." 
For campaign workers, the race centered around getting their 
vote out. When only 13,000 voted in the Democratic primary, 
party leaders perceived this as a sign people wanted to 
reserve their vote for the November election. 205 When Watson 
campaigners set up a *boiler room operationw with a battery 
of fifteen telephones and a round-the-clock operation of 
women manning the phones, workers placed over 55,000 calls. 20 6 
Campaign workers provided baby sitters and rides to the 
polling places for voters who expressed an interest. The 
work and investment paid off. On June 15, 1965, Watson 
easily defeated Callison by a two-to-one margin, with nearly 
80,000 people casting votes in the special election. 20 7 As a 
result, the 1965 special election had not only given South 
Carolina its first Republican congressman since 1896, it 
demonstrated the true signs of a two-party system on the 
local level. 
After the special election, Republicans secured other 
victories on the local level throughout the state. In March 
1966, North Augusta voters elected three GOP candidates to 
city council in landslide victories. In the Democratic 
citadel of the state, a relative unknown Republican 
20SGOP leaders supported this reasoning because the state's 
loyalty oath was still in effect. In G.O.P. We Trust, 229. 
206In G.O.P. We Trust, 228. 
207
•watson's Triumph in Carolina Attributed to Revamped G.O.P.,· 
The New York Times, June 17, 1965, 20 . 
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candidate, Rich Otter, came uwithin an eyelash# of unseating 
incumbent Anderson mayor William Johnston, the brother of the 
state's senior U.S. senator, Olin Johnston. 2° a GOP 
campaigners continued to encounter some strange voting 
procedures, particularly in Anderson elections. Even though 
a candidate had to live in the ward he represented, the 
entire city of Anderson voted for all the city council seats. 
In a 1965 Anderson special election, Republican David Hooper 
broke the Democratic grip on Anderson local politics and won 
a council seat, provoking Drake Edens to declare that the 
victory u should conf irrn to everyone there is a genuine 
Republican Party in South Carolina# and an active two-party 
sys tern. 209 
It appeared that Republicans had finally come of 
political age, on all election levels, in the Palmetto State. 
Yet factional infighting demonstrated a party still 
undergoing intense growing pains. The most severe infighting 
resulted between Strom Thurmond and the Mold-line# 
leadership, led by then party chairman Drake Edens. An 
example of the tone between the two competing factions 
occurred during the nomination convention for Watson in March 
1965. The battle centered on two competing philosophies: 
Edens' orthodox, precinct-driven organization versus 
Thurrnond's loosely structured, candidate-driven organization. 
208·A View Of The South Carolina Senate Race,• The News and 
Courier, July 27, 1966. 
209 In G.O.P. We Trust, 219-220 . 
87 
During the second of three state conventions held in 1965, 
Thurmond addressed the delegates concerning the party's 
strategies in upcoming elections . Stating that he believed 
in #principle over party,# Thurmond urged Republicans not to 
oppose the re-election of conservative Democrats in state-
wide elections. This ran counter to the growing belief of 
the GOP's faithful that they had to contest seats in order to 
continue the party's growth. Thurmond recognized this 
philosophy, but urged that if Republicans were #building a 
party for the sake of party, what I call partyitis, then I 
say do not build the party.# 210 Thurmond advanced this theory 
in order to advance his own re-election bid, fearing that the 
more Republican candidates on the ballot running against 
local Democrats, the more irritated Democratic-leaning voters 
would become. This idea of sacrificing local Republicans for 
the top of the ticket had already occurred in the 1964 
general election. Several Thurmond men had #suggested" to 
some Republican candidates in Greenwood County that they drop 
out of the local contests, for fear of detracting from the 
party's main goal--electing Goldwater. 211 For the sake of 
public harmony, Drake Edens conceded that running Republican 
candidates on what he termed #selective basis# could be a 
foreseeable technique. But Republican leaders privately 
admitted that the structure they had built so far would be in 
210 *G.O . P. In Dilemma Over Thurmond,• The New York Times, March 
28, 1965, 50 . 
21 1In G.O.P. We Trust, 181-182. 
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danger of rusting if the GOP did not actively use it to field 
local candidates. 212 
This philosophical skirmish amounted to only a prelude 
to a full-scale battle between the two camps for 
organizational control of the South Carolina Republican 
Party. The reverberations were still being felt in 1965 from 
what some saw as Thurmond' s effort to force his protege, 
Harry Dent, into the executive director's position the year 
before. Even though Thurmond was unsuccessful, some in the 
party questioned where Dent's loyalty would lie; Duffy, for 
example, did not believe that Dent could be impartial to both 
Thurmond and other Republican candidates. 213 When talks of 
reconciliation between the two factions came about in early 
1965 and a peace offering of appointing Dent as executive 
director was presented, Thurmond cast it aside, saying that 
his opponents had "objected, primarily because of Harry's 
loyalty to me and your concern that the label of Strom 
Thurmond not be implanted on the Republican Party of South 
Carolina. You also questioned his qualification for the 
job.w 214 Because of these accusations, Thurmond decided not 
to resubmit Dent's name, but announced he would keep Dent in 
Washington. Only later, when the top position of the Party 
212"G.O.P. In Dilemma Over Thurmond,• The New York Times, March 
28, 1965, 50. 
213JD to Hal c. Byrd, February 14, 1956, Folder 42, Duffy Papers. 
214strom Thurmond to Drake Edens, February 25, 1965, Folder 42, 
Duffy Papers. 
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was vacated, would Thurmond make a grab for total control of 
the South Carolina Republican Party. 
During the summer of 1965, questions concerning Drake 
Edens' capacity to govern the party arose. Edens was 
eventually hospitalized and worried supporters, fearing a 
take-over of the party by Thurmond, urged that fellow 
supporters #not let him (Edens) resign.w 2 15 Duffy felt that 
Ma real Republican w should be selected as the next party 
chairman, and not just some #newcomers (who) might want to 
assume control of the organization with the aid and comfort 
of others who would like to get to the top also.w Duffy felt 
that if Edens made a bid for the national committeeman spot, 
that the next state chairman should be Arthur Ravenel, Jr . 
At the time, Duffy felt that there would be #some oppositionw 
to Ravenel, but that nit would not be a factor.w 216 Confident 
that a long-time member of the party could easily secure the 
state chairman's position, Duffy and the Edens faction d i d 
not fully realize the extent of Thurmond's growing influence 
and power in the state party. 
Although previously unsuccessful in gaining a leadership 
post under his control, Strom Thurmond felt that his 
organization had to be represented in the party leadership 
before his 19 66 re-election campaign began. 21 7 When Drake 
215c . A. Nelson to JD, June 1 6, 1965, Folder 46, Duffy Papers . 
Nel s on' s emphas i s. 
216JD to Arthur Ra v enel, J une 1 7 , 1965 , Folder 46, Duffy Papers . 
21 7see footnote 17 7. 
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Edens decided to step down as party chairman, the battle 
between the two factions arose again. With Thurmond again 
promoting Harry Dent, the old guard supported Arthur Ravenel, 
Jr., of Charleston, for the position of state chairman. 
Duffy described some of the concerns that old-line leaders 
had about Dent. Dent's appointment not only made it appear 
that Thurmond was about to take over the party, but rumors 
circulated that a "mysterious third party," with alleged 
segregationist ties, had offered to pay for Dent's salary as 
chairman. Sore feelings still prevailed from the previous 
battle over the executive director's position, especially 
because of Thurmond's threat to leave the party. All along 
Thurmond denied the power-grabbing rumors, calling them uhog-
wash." Yet some s til 1 questioned the senator's motives, 
declaring that the party should not ube in any politician's 
pocket. " 218 However, the old-line faction was caught off-
guard by Thurmond' s forces, who had captured the county 
leadership positions and thus controlled the state executive 
committee. The old-line leaders did feel that they lost 
control of the party when Ravenel, after seeing that the 
executive committee had moved to back Dent, bowed out of the 
race on September 21, 1965. 219 
21 8c. A. Nelson to Albert Watson, September 17, 1965, Folder 49, 
Duffy Papers. 
219 rn their study of the state's political scene, Topping, 
Lazarek, and Linder described the 'old-line guard' faction Min control 
of the party machine," with 11 of the 13 top members and the two 
national committeeman belonging to the Edens faction, while #the 
Thurmond faction controlled the grass-roots support of the county 
-----
91 
Looking back on the battle, Duffy remarked that "we 
never had a chance. This became painfully apparent as our 
effort progressed .... There is no question that we were the 
victims of a well-planned program to assume the control of 
the Party Chairmanship." 220 With the "old-line" members 
moving into different jobs, Duffy believed that the new party 
members, primarily from the Thurmond camp and who "rarely 
attend meetings ... and were put in the job as a reward," had 
captured the grass-roots level of the party and thus the 
control of the state executive committee, which consisted of 
a representative from each of the individual counties. 2 21 
When they went to contact various county representatives, 
Duffy "could not get a single firm commitment · of support" for 
Ravenel. 222 After Dent's ascension to party chairman, Duffy 
had several newspaper reporters privately remark that their 
impression of the now Thurmond-dominated party was of a 
"racists Party." 223 Party members also reflected this 
disliking of the new leadership by claiming that "disgust is 
chairman.• John C. Topping, Jr., John R. Lazarek, and William H. 
Linder, Southern Republicanism and the New South, (Cambridge, MA: 
undated), 94, Folder 200, Duffy Papers. In G.O.P . We Trust, 247-253. 
220JD t6 C. A. Nelson, September 26, 1965, Folder 49, Duffy 
Papers. 
221Jo to Charles W. Sidbury, Se ptember 26, 1965, Folder 49, Duffy 
Papers. 
222JD to Jim Huneycutt, October 1, 1965, Folder 50, Duffy Papers. 
223JD tow. W. Wannamaker, September 26, 1965, Folder 49, Duffy 
Papers. 
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rampant# and that memberships and financial support had also 
been affected. 22 4 
Other controversies developed within the GOP. By the 
simple fact of the party's growth and more organized 
precincts and counties being accepted, the issue of the State 
headquarter' s control over county organizations came into 
discussion. With an increased emphasis on local elections, 
Duffy expressed his desire to lessen the importance of the 
Columbia office in the affairs of the counties, particularly 
during election campaigns. But under the control of the new 
party chairman Harry Dent, the state organization sought to 
increase its role in even the most local of campaigns. In 
establishing the organization for the 1966 election, Dent 
recommended that counties appoint a GO-Party County Campaign 
Chairman. Instead of the county or district chairman, this 
new position reported directly to the state campaign 
headquarters. In addition, all uimportant decisions relating 
to the campaign must be brought to his attention and cleared 
through him." 225 This new philosophy reinforced the idea that 
22 4Duffy had one Republican s upporter write to him that #I have 
just had a rude awakening to the fact that those principles which would 
further the cause of good government in South Carolina are no longer 
embodied in the Republican Party,w and that she was canceling her 
monthly pledge of $50 to the party. Martha Helms to JD, September 21, 
1965, Folder 49, Duffy Papers. C . A. Nelson to Henry Z. Duffie, Jr . , 
September 18, 1965, Folder 49, Duffy Papers. 
225Dent devised the term *GO-Partyw to combine the traditional GOP 
for those *Republican purists# within the state party and to satisfy 
other South Carolinians as to what the goal is. GO-Party County 
Campaign Organi zation for Victory '66, June 25, 1966, Folder 65, Duffy 
Papers. Dent's emphasis. 
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the Thurmond faction was out to control every action of the 
state organization. 
Some counties resented this new approach to controlling 
the party's activities by the Thurmond faction. Duffy, 
serving now as the Second Congressional District's Chairman, 
and his county leadership opposed Dent's suggestion and 
committed themselves to running the local party organization 
their own way, which included the fielding of candidates. 
Because of the perceived lack of genuine Republican office-
seekers, Duffy saw the Republican ballots filled with 
uswitchover Democrats," and this, in Duffy's opinion, could 
only stifle the growth of the GOP. In a 1965 survey of 
political attitudes of South Carolinians, the respondents 
wished that more Republicans would run in elections. While 
the survey' s authors acknowledged that "there are no long 
lines of eager prospects," the respondents to the survey gave 
high recognition rates to many of the GOP leaders. The poll 
also encouraged Republican hopefuls because of the 77 percent 
approval rating of a two-party system in the state. The main 
comment that came from the poll for Republicans was ukeep on 
going like they're going," and that more ground work should 
be done at the local level. 226 The survey authors believed 
that the potential GOP voting audience was at 66 percent, an 
226The poll, taken by personal interviews by members of John H. 
Friend, Inc., was taken between December 16 and December 24, 1965, and 
had 1,205 white respondents and 334 non-white respondents. State of 
South Carolina Political Opinion Survey, December, 1965, Box 15, 
Campaign Series, Strom Thurmond Collection, 8-12. 
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incredibly high rate for the Republicans to work with. 22 7 
This market of potential supporters needed continuing 
cultivation on the local level, according to Duffy. To do 
this adequately, "independence of control and freedom of 
action is desired and demanded," Duffy lamented to Arthur 
Ravenel. Duffy hoped that the trend towards a stronger state 
operation would be reversed in favor of a confederation when 
the various county organizations become more mature. 228 Of 
course, this philosophy of running many local candidates 
presented its own problems, from demands on financial 
assistance to coordinating effective public relations 
techniques. 229 
The state organization, now seemingly under the Thurmond 
influence, 
philosophy. 
ironically did not follow the senator's 
From candidacies for the U.S. House and Senate 
to the Governor and Lieutenant Governor and State 
Superintendent of Education to General Assembly seats, 
Republicans launched a full scale attack on incumbent 
Democrats throughout the state in 19 66. With plans for 
state-wide races beginning in early 1965, Republicans 
22 7This market included an estimated 10 percent of the Democrats 
who •are switchable and probably are already comfortably resting in 
Thurmond's camp.* State of South Carolina Political Opinion Survey, 
December 1965, 17. 
22 8JD to Arthur (Ravenel), August 3, 1966, Folder 66, Duffy 
Papers. 
229Duffy wrote that "I think we are all are rece1v1ng a lesson 
this year in the management of a multi-candidate campaign being 
conducted at all levels. Apparently it has been something of a surprise 
in its complexity at an efficient level.* JD to Roger Milliken, August 
31, 1966, Folder 66, Duffy Papers . 
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believed in Thurmond's concerns that local candidates might 
dilute the effort and #deprive candidates at a higher level 
of workers and funds." Even if the deprivation amounted to a 
few votes for a state-wide candidate, the defeat was 
important enough to reconsider a local candidate's options. 230 
According to a committee established by Drake Edens and 
chaired by w. W. Wannamaker, solid Republican candidates at 
the local level would #not affect adversely candidates at the 
same or another level," if the local candidates could 
demonstrate strong support for his candidacy. Along with 
having a well-qualified candidate, staff, and fund-rais i ng 
campaign, party leaders believed that unless a county had 
leaned Republican in the past, a serious attempt should not 
be made. Those counties that had cast 40 percent or less of 
their votes for a Republican presidential candidate could not 
be counted on to support loc al Republicans, the committee 
believed. Yet in those counties which did of fer some 
opportunity and that had cast 40 percent or more of their 
votes in the past, party leaders believed that a local race 
could provide not only an #optimistic future for victories" 
but supply the training required for running a successful 
campaign. The committee did conclude that a local race's 
most important asset however is probably in the 
recruitment, training, and win-nowing (sic) of 
candidate for future races at all levels. We 
dQ. concur with the vast majority of our Party 
members that we should not bite off more than we 
230Report on Counties entitled #Local Races,• January 15, 1965, 
Folder 41, Duffy Papers. 
can chew at any time, and should never run a 
candidate just to have a name on the ballot. 23 1 
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Believing that a Republican presidential candidate's 
coattails were vi tally important on the state and local 
level, Republicans believed they faced an uphill battle in 
the off-presidential election of 1966. Yet the lasting 
influence of the 1964 Goldwater candidacy proved to be an 
important and positive factor in the Republican's bids during 
the 1966 state and local contests. 
As Thurmond's Dixiecrat candidacy had seemingly 
unleashed Palmetto Democrats from their automatic allegiance 
to the national party, the Goldwater candidacy had the effect 
of not only attracting, but also retaining, new Republican 
supporters for the party. The 1966 election brought forth a 
flood of new Republican supporters, who were willing not only 
to work for banner-carrying candidates, but also were willing 
to carry the GOP banner themselves. While they continued to 
publicly display an organized effort, Duffy commented that 
the flood of prospective candidates overwhelmed the party 
system. Cracks between the state and county organizations 
soon developed, with the counties demanding more manpower and 
money from an already over-burdened state headquarters. 232 
Yet this was not apparent to most outside political 
observers, as they noticed the GOP pushing harder for 
231w. W. Wannamaker, Jr., to Dr a ke Edens, March 22, 1965, Folder 
43, Duffy Papers. 
232 In G.O.P . We Trust, 311-3 12. 
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straight party ticket votes, while the Democrats were 
operating on a "each man on his own" system. 233 
Democrats also failed to see the changing tide of South 
Carolina politics, which consisted of two important 
tendencies. First, the Palmetto voter's concerns began to 
shift in priority. The top issues of national concern that 
South Carolinians expressed were over the Vietnam conflict, 
the evolving movement towards civil rights for blacks 
following passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Voting 
Rights Act of 19 65, the fiscal and economic status of the 
country, the spread of communism, the expanding role of 
government, and the education of the state's children. Out 
of the 1,539 respondents, over 61 percent of the state's 
residents interviewed said that the Asian conflict "should be 
stepped up," while only 12.8 percent said that the American 
troops should be returned home. 23 4 
The second area of national significance expressed by 
South Carolinians revolved around the issue of race. The 
influence of racist organizations, notably the Klu Klux Klan, 
began to wane by 1965. According to the survey, the Klan had 
a disapproval rating of 72.6 percent in the state. While a 
plurality (46 percent) of the white respondents felt that the 
state should continue to resist integration policies of the 
federal government, 3 6. 5 percent felt that South Carolina 
233 •scratchpad Political Notes,• The State, October 2, 1966, D-3 . 
234state of South Carolina Political Opinion Survey, December 
1965, 1-2 . 
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should accept 
integration. 23s 
the federal government's policies on 
According to the respondents, education 
ranked first in what should be the priority in the state, 
followed by civil rights and opportunities for economic 
improvement. 236 Regarding education and civil rights, 46 
percent felt that an integrated educational system would have 
a detrimental effect on the state's school system, with a 
majority of those who responded negatively (29 percent) 
saying that it uwill hurt education." On the opposite side 
of the scale, while a plurality (13 percent) said it would 
have no effect, 11 percent said that integration uwill 
improve education in the long run" and 6 percent felt that it 
would have a ugood effect. " 23 7 In a survey conducted in 
August 1966, 42 percent of the white respondents felt that 
state officials should "support (a) moderate compromise" when 
it came to integration, while 26 percent said state officials 
should resist such attempts. 238 
The growing shift in racial attitudes by whites to one 
of either tolerance or acceptance of civil rights for 
23 5state of South Carolina Political Opinion Survey, December 
1965, 3. 
236state of South Carolina Political Opinion Survey, December 
1965, 4. 
23 7 State of South Carolina Political Opinion Survey, December 
1965, 13. 
2381000 whites and 1000 blacks were asked #In your opinion, should 
South Carolina public officials resist integration of the races, should 
they cooperate with the integration policies of the national government, 
or should they support a moderate compromist policy on integration?# 
1966 Political Survey of South Carolina, August, 1966, Box 16, Campaign 
Series, Strom Thurmond Collection, Table 37. 
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minorities, particularly blacks, was characteristic of the 
mid-1960s. With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, an increasing number of southern 
blacks became involved and active in seeking their basic 
civil rights and freedoms. As of June 1, 1965, the number of 
registered black voters in South Carolina stood at 142,780, 
17 percent of the total registered voters. 239 With the number 
of black registered voters set to increase to over 200,000 by 
1968, both political parties had to recognizing and accept 
this growing voter population. 
Yet Republicans would not fully realize the impact that 
blacks would make until it was too late. This stemmed, in 
part, from a lack of historical understanding of the 
political oppression which blacks in South Carolina had 
endured. In writing a report to the state party, W. W. 
Wannamaker ignorantly characterized the political stifling of 
the southern blacks after the civil war: 
As far as is known, since the abolition of 
slavery, Negroes have never been hampered or 
prevented from registering and voting in South 
Carolina. The State Democratic Party was 
organized later as a private club open only to 
whites fill.d. those Negroes who had voted for the 
party ticket in 1876. The Negroes who did not 
vote Democratic in 1876 were not prevented from 
registering and voting in general elections later 
239with 16,956 registered, Richland County had the largest number 
of blacks registered in the state, followed by Charleston with 14,060 
and Aiken with 8,010. Greenville had the largest number of whites 
registered {66,028), with Spartanburg {56,620) and Richland {52,661) 
second and third in the state . Please see Appendix B for the complete 
figures on the number of registered voters in the state. Report of the 
Secretary of State to the General Assembly for Fiscal Year 1965-1966, 
{Columbia, S.C.: State Budget and Control Board, 1966), 333. 
but were effectively disenfranchised from any 
meaningful choice by exclusion from the primary as 
the Democrats had a majority in general elections. 
This was of course not only perfect legal but quite 
right and proper. Literacy tests excluded 
some Negroes but also some whites too. Undoubtedly 
there were exceptions to the general rule and maybe 
if the need had been greater there would have been 
coercion, but by and large there were no real 
impediment. 240 
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With such institutions as the "eight-box ballot" and the 
indiscriminate use of literacy tests, Wannamaker, without any 
objections by party leaders, neglected the state-sponsored 
means of denying black citizens their opportunities to 
political expression. 
The main motive, however, for the Republicans' failure 
to court black support stemmed from their own opposition to 
the attack on segregation. This was due to the Republicans' 
desire to court the votes of white Democrats who were 
alienated by their party's increasing support for civil 
rights. This catering to white segregationists began, 
Wannamaker wrote, following the 1956 presidential election. 
When 35 percent of South Carolinians cast their votes for an 
openly segregationists u. s. Senator, Republicans realized 
that they had an opportunity to court white segregationists 
who, at the time, held a third of the state's potential 
votes. Even though it was "not initiated by" the party's 
leadership, the exclusion of blacks from the Republican Party 
was "to some extent ... welcomed." State party leaders felt 
that if blacks remained in the G.O.P., conservative Democrats 
240w. W. Wannamaker to Drake Edens, May 17, 1965, Folder 45, Duffy 
Papers. Wannamaker's underlying; author's italics.-
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would exploit this acceptance and ucost the Republican Party 
many marginal votes" of those pro-segregationist voters. 
While party leaders agreed that the GOP should not do 
anything uto hurt the Negro in any way," they were also not 
going to help blacks either. 241 This, according to Duffy, was 
due to the perception that southern Republicans had of blacks 
during the 1960s. Duffy explained that while northerners 
looked at the black community as a group and not as 
individuals, southerners ulooked at them as individuals and 
not as groups . " Along with the 1964 entrance of Strom 
Thurmond, a political figure so closely linked with 
segregation, the chasm only widened between blacks and 
Palmetto Republicans. 2 4 2 This courtship of white 
segregationists, made by party leaders in the mid-1950s and 
reinforced by the state's most recognized defender of 
u States' Rights," hurt the GOP in the late 19 60s. This 
alliance between Republicans and white segregationist forced 
those moderate party leaders to reevaluate their decision to 
abstain from soliciting black support. Even though state 
Republican leaders agreed that some work had to be done to 
attract minority votes, 19 66 would not be the year to 
initiate such plans, because Republicans felt that there was 
uno way we can out promise the opposition. "243 
241w. w. Wannamaker to Drake Edens, May 17, 1965, Folder 45, Duffy 
Papers. 
242rnterview with James E. Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
243JD to Second District County Chairmen, State Committeemen, and 
Campaign Chairmen, October 10, 1966, Folder 67, Duffy Papers. 
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With or without black support, Republicans were 
determined to make 1966 a historic year in South Carolina 
politics. For the first time in over one hundred years, 
Republicans contested both seats for the U.S. Senate in South 
Carolina. In Thurmond's bid for re-election, Duffy described 
the senator as "running his usual race--scared and hard." 
While Thurmond took every election very seriously, the public 
overwhelmingly favored his continued service to the state. 
According to a 1965 survey of South Carolinian's political 
attitudes, Thurmond had an astounding 92 percent recognition 
rate with the public, with 66 percent expressing approval of 
his performance. Even with this towering approval rating, 
Thurmond fought for his re-election like a neophyte 
candidate. The senator's main plat form centered on his 
continued opposition to the growing influence of the federal 
government, which he personified in President Lyndon B. 
Johnson as a symbol of racial violence and federal 
domination. Throughout the campaign, Thurmond attacked 
school desegregation, riots, civil rights legislation, 
socialism, inflation, and the "no-win" Vietnam policy of the 
Johnson administration. 244 While he supported such federal 
programs as subsidies to agriculture and soil and water 
conservation, Thurmond believed that a share of the federal 
tax collected should be returned to the states, where he 
continued to stress that local problems are best solved by 
244
•G.O.P. Drive Jolts South Carolina,• The New York Times, 
October 8, 1966, A-17. 
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local solutions. His opponent, P. Bradley Morrah, differed 
with Thurmond in that Morrah believed that the federal 
government had a ukey role" in aiding the urban areas of all 
the states. Morrah suggested a program similar to the 
Appalachian Program to solve the urban areas' dilemmas, yet 
he looked uwith reservation" on the Welfare program and 
contended that local control should prevail over use of 
federal aid for education. 245 
The other U.S. Senate seat, vacated due to the death of 
Olin Johnston on April 19, 1965, sparked as much interest as 
Thurmond' s bid to return to Washington as a Republican. 
After Senator Johnston died, then Governor Donald S. Russell 
resigned from his office and had Lt. Governor Robert E. 
McNair appoint Russell to the vacated senate seat. South 
Carolinians responded with fury at what they saw as a purely 
personal move on Russell's part. Former Governor Ernest 
"Fritz" Hollings took advantage of the ground swell of 
discontent over Russell's uself-appointment," and captured 
the Democratic nomination. Hollings, like Thurmond, 
campaigned on the idea that a percentage of the federal 
income tax collected be returned to the state for its 
discretionary spending. Hollings also echoed other 
Republican · sentiments, in that when the states "failed to 
respond to the needs of the people," the federal government 
felt obligated to institute a new program. 246 His Republican 
245•The Candidates Give Views On Key Issues,• The State, November 
6, 1966. 
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opponent, Marshall Parker, repeated these same concerns, that 
the federal government's control must be reduced to #restore 
to the people their maximum freedom and ability.w A former 
Democratic state senator from Oconee County who served on the 
Gressette School segregation committee of 1954-55, Parker 
switched political allegiance in 1966. During the campaign, 
Parker derided the Johnson administration for its civil 
rights legislation and the anti-poverty program and attempted 
to link Hollings with the President's liberalism. 247 
In addition to the state's two u. s. Senate seats, 
Republicans ran for three of the six congressional seats. 
Incumbent House Republican Albert Watson faced a candidate 
who attempted to label the Republican as the Palmetto State's 
own version of Adam Clayton Powell. 248 While they were not 
expected to do well, John K. Grisso and Archie Odom (who 
Thurmond hand-picked for the race 249 ) gave the incumbent 
Democrats in the Third and Sixth Congressional Districts a 
well-developed run for the House seats. In the sixth 
district, incumbent Democrat John L. McMillian was #running 
scared" for the first time in twenty-eight years against 
Odom. 2so In addition to these challengers, South Carolina 
246
•The Candidates Give Views On Key Issues,• The State, November 
6, 1966. 
247
•Marshall Parker,• The State, October 9, 1966, D-3. 
248rn G.O.P. We Trust, 316-317. 
249•Race is Key Issue in South Carolina,• The New York Times, 
November 6, 1966, A-67. 
250•Race is Key Issue in South Carolina,• The New York Times, 
November 6, 1966, A-67. 
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Republicans also adopted a new strategy by releasing 
Mposition papers# on a host of key issues. From education to 
legislative reform to aid to the elderly and country 
government reform, the Republicans advanced their ideas for 
what they entitled MA New Day." As part of the State 
Platform, Palmetto Republicans advocated the key conservative 
ideas that characterized their party: Mminimum government 
interference and maximum individual liberty," which centered 
on returning of federal tax dollars to the states and support 
of the state's Right - to-Work laws, to name a few. 251 
Republicans also promoted a technical educational system and 
expansion of graduate programs in the scientific and 
technical a:reas along with adult educational programs Mto 
meet the needs of industry. N2s2 
Even with some advanced thinking on certain areas, 
Republicans characterized their chances of securing the 
governor and lieutenant governor's position as slim to nil, 
yet recognized that Democrats took these assaults seriously 
this time around. While the Republican candidate for 
governor, former Democratic state senator Joseph O. Rogers of 
Claredon, did advance some programs for the Mbetterment of 
the State" (i.e. , motor vehicle inspection and mandatory 
driver's education courses, expanding the technical education 
system, and establishment of a State-wide election 
251Final Draft of the S. C. Republican Party Platform, 1966, 
Folder 68, Duffy Papers. 
252position paper on Education, released August 31, 1966, Folder 
66, Duffy Papers. 
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commission), he was characterized primarily as a •switchover" 
Democrat, who was also hostile to continued desegregation in 
public school system. 253 In addition to commending Governor 
George Wallace for standing up to Federal school 
desegregation guidelines, he also believed that attempts 
should be made to remove South Carolina from the federal 
supervision under the 1965 Voting Rights Act and that 
literacy qualifications should be restored for voting. 254 His 
opponent, then incumbent Governor Robert E. McNair, did not 
advance such an openly segregationist plan as Rogers; 
perceiving the economic expansion that the state was 
undergoing, he campaigned on the idea of changing the 
educational and special training to meet the challenges of 
economic development. 255 The Republican candidate for 
lieutenant governor, Marshall Mays, originally had no plans 
to run for state office, but he did anyway because *the GOP 
needed candidates." Running on a strong states' rights 
platform, Mays, who's great-great-great-uncle was John C. 
Calhoun, believed that "states' rights and states' 
responsibilities are correlated," and that the states should 
solve their own problems without looking towards Washington 
253Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker, The 
1984 Presidential Election in the South: Patterns of Southern Party 
Politics, (Praeger: New York, 1986), 129. 
254 #Negro Vote Held Vital In Key Contests,• The New York Times, 
November 27, 1966, A-74. #The Candidates Give Views On Key Issues,• The 
State, November 6, 1966. 
255 MThe Candidates Give Views On Key Issues,• The State, November 
6, 1966. 
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for solutions. 256 Republicans also ran their first female 
candidate, Dr. Inez C. Eddings, for the state-wide position 
of Superintendent of Education. 
All the state-wide Republican candidates received 
encouraging news earlier in the year. In addition to the 
victory of three Republicans in North Augusta in March, the 
mayors of three small towns, four former state legislators, 
two city councilmen, and a court clerk, along with two 
incumbent state Representatives from Orangeburg, all switched 
their political allegiance to the GOP. 25 7 State Party 
Chairman Dent reflected on the North Augusta election that 
the two-to-one margin proves that a majority of the 
people of the state are going to be with us in 
November. It contradicts the often repeated 
statement that the Goldwater sweep in 1964 was just 
a flash in the pan and an emotional protest vote. 258 
With these early victories and an abundance of 
candidates, Republicans scored their first election 
breakthroughs on the local level in South Carolina in the 
twentieth century. The candidates most likely to secure 
their seats, Thurmond and Watson, easily defeated their 
Democratic opponents. Thurmond captured 271,297 votes (62 
percent) , while Watson garnered 48,742 votes ( 64 percent ) . 
Republicans also scored victories on the local level as well 
256 • c andidates for Lt. Governor,• The State, October 2, 1966, D-3 . 
257press Release, March 1, 1966, Folder 63, Duffy Papers. *New 
Recruits Aid G.O.P. In Carolina,• The New York Times, March 11, 1966, A-
18 . 
258 Press Release, March 28, 1966, Folder 63, Duffy Papers. 
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in 1966. Out of the 22 Senate and 70 House candidates 
running for the General Assembly, the GOP secured six senate 
seats, and 17 house seats. All these seats came from the 
metropolitan counties that Republicans used as their base of 
state support. 259 The first Republican candidate for governor 
in the twentieth century captured 184,088 votes (41 percent) 
and four of the 46 counties (Aiken, Barnwell, Clarendon, and 
Lexington) in the state in his losing effort. In the other 
state-wide race for the u. S. Senate, Marshall Parker came 
within 9,000 votes of defeating Ernest Hollings, 212,032 (48 
percent) to Hollings' 223,790 (51 percent). Republicans also 
lost the two other state-wide elections they _were vying for, 
the lieutenant governor and state superintendent of 
education. Both Republican candidates for the third and 
sixth congressional districts also lost, with Grisso 
collecting 31,331 (42 percent) in the third district and 
Archie Odom securing 26,702 (38 percent) in the sixth 
district. 260 
In trying to place blame for the defeat in the key 
state-wide races, Republicans charged that the 'bloc-vote,' 
or the black minority vote, had been Mtaken care of" by the 
Democrats and that blacks were a permanent wing of the 
259of the six senate seats, Charleston elected three Republicans, 
with Lexington, Newberry, and Aiken sending GOP Senators. Of the 17 
House seats, Aiken elected four representatives, Charleston and 
Greenville seven each, Lexington three, and Orangeburg two House seats. 
GOP Newsletter, December 1, 1966, Folder 68, Duffy Papers. 
26Dscamrnon, 7: 359-361. 
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Democratic base of support. 261 Yet not all blacks were 
suggesting an automatic allegiance to the Democratic Party. 
With an estimate of nearly 105, 000 blacks casting ballots, 
the executive director of the Voter Education Project, 
Richard Miles, strongly urged the Democrats to revitalize the 
Mmoribund Democratic Party• and begin serious reorganization 
and discussion with blacks. Regarding the GOP, Miles chided 
the party for disregarding a potential support group. 
did not want the Negro vote and you did not get it," Miles 
charged, but added that the GOP had Mmuch to offer the Negro 
if it will return to its 'great tradition' of concern for 
individual dignity." 262 An example of the black support that 
Republicans lost was evident in Columbia's predominately 
black Ward Nine, which cast 1,409 votes for Hollings and only 
46 for Parker. 263 Yet Republicans, immediately after the 
election, did not want to heed Miles' advice. State party 
leaders believed the reason they had lost the black vote was 
because they were 'outplayed' by supposed Democratic promises 
and that Republicans allowed the Democrats to portray the GOP 
as racist. Duffy felt that the racial question was Mnot the 
261JD to Second District State and County Committeemen, November 
14, 1966, Folder 68, Duffy Papers. 
262 *Negroes Saved Democrats, Director of VEP Declares,• The News 
and Courier, November 24, 1966, B-1 . 
263 *Negro Vote Held Vital In Key Contests,• The New York Times, 
November 27, 1966, A-74. 
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issue but only a smokescreen to hide the real issue of 
socialism and liberalism. " 26 4 
Many political observers in the state wondered if the 
Goldwater influence would carry over into the 1966 elections. 
As Duffy remarked, Goldwater's victory in the state was no 
ufreakw accident, but a realigning election in the political 
history of South Carolina. 26 5 With the overwhelming victories 
of Albert Watson in 1965 and 1966 and the numerous 
candidacies of Republicans during the 1966 state-wide 
elections, Republicans had made the inroads they were seeking 
to establish a true two-party political system in South 
Carolina. The ultimate contributor to this success had to be 
related to · the success and attractiveness of Goldwater 
Republicanism. Without the appeals, twisted at times, to the 
basic conservative values that many South Carolinians shared, 
it is doubtful that the GOP would have achieved the 
accomplishments it did in 1966. The effects are still being 
felt in the 1990s in the state, with a conservative 
Republican Party constantly challenging the Democratic Party 
in nearly every election. 
Yet this lasting influence of Goldwaterism did not come 
without a price. The battle for organizational control of 
the party resulted in Republicans losing some support among 
its key target groups. One of them was the youth of the 
264JD to Second District State and County Committeemen, November 
14, 1966, Folder 68, Duffy Papers . 
265In G.O.P. We Trust, 321. 
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state. With Thurmond's switching in 1964 and his subsequent 
domination of the party in 1965, many young adults felt that 
the party had been manipulated by the racist tendencies 
Thurmond represented. 266 While Thurmond may have brought in 
new supporters into the Republican camp, the political 
attitudes of South Carolinians were already markedly swinging 
towards the GOP; A 1965 survey of political attitudes showed 
a clear majority supporting the Republican Party in the 
state; yet this majority was primarily made up of non-
native, young, conservative, white professionals living in 
the growing urban and industrialized sections of the state. 
Another growing area that Republicans failed to make 
inroads with was the black community. Due to the influence 
of Goldwater Republicanism and its association with "States' 
Rights,w relations . between the G.O.P. and blacks could never 
reach the level of support that Democrats had with blacks. 
Because of Goldwater's actual and misinterpreted opposition 
to such items as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Republicans 
alienated the black community, forcing blacks to look to the 
Democratic Party for assistance. While Duffy claimed that 
southerners looked to blacks as "individuals and not as a 
group,• 267 the continued legacy of racism, whether represented 
by the ugly dogmatism of the KKK or the growing indifference 
shown by many white Republicans in the mid-1960s towards 
266Duffy said that recruiting on college campus declined sharply 
after Thurmond's 1964 conversion and the ascension of Harry Dent as 
state party chairman. Interview with James E. Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
267 rnterview with James E. Duffy, March 24, 1994. 
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civil rights for blacks, continued to haunt the attempts by 
Republicans to attract black support to their party during 
the coming years. With the addition of Strom Thurmond and 
his successful coup of the party leadership, Republicans had 
another strike against them in the eyes of the black 
community. In the coming years, Republicans such as Duffy, 
attempted to mend the fences between the GOP and the black 
community. However, the continuing influence of Thurmond and 
the upcoming fight for the White House would stand as 
roadblocks to this reconciliation between blacks and 
Republicans. 
VI 
REVERSAL OF FORTUNE 
South Carolina state politics now entered a new era. 
With a uminority" party actually present in both chambers of 
the General Assembly, Republicans set out to make their mark 
within the Democratically-dominated legislature. Yet in 
their bid to win both the White House and more state-wide 
offices in 1968, Republicans were able to capitalize on only 
one of their goals. With continued internal bickering 
between the party's factions, the South Carolina Republican 
Party lost valuable ground in its bid to make the state a 
viable two-party system. 
various items of business attracted the Republicans 
attention during the 1967 session of the South Carolina 
General Assembly, two of them being of vital importance to 
the new legislators. Because of the Supreme Court's 
declaration of *one man, one vote" in Baker v. Carr (1962) 
and Gray v. Sanders (1963), the state senate had to undergo 
reapportionment. The upper house of the General Assembly had 
to reconcile two contradictory demands: the U. s. Supreme 
Court's uone man, one vote" principle and the 1895 South 
Carolina Constitution, which stated that every county shall 
have one senator to represent it. After submitting two plans 
and having a three-judge federal court temporarily approved a 
50-member body on March 1, 1967, the Senate was still forced 
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to sacrifice four seats after the state Supreme Court ruled, 
on March 26, that the chamber must have only 46 senators. 268 
Several plans were drawn up, some dividing the state into 
senate districts. Republican Senator Marion H. Smoak of 
Aiken feared the combining of counties to form districts by 
saying that Mwe have far too many people in the county for 
adequate representation by one senator and not quite enough 
to justify two.w 269 The Democratic majority attempted to make 
Republicans the victims, with Republican State Senator Gene 
Griffith's Lexington-Newberry-Saluda district being almost 
gerrymandered out of existence. With the forces of rural 
counties aligned against the growing urban areas, the debate 
over redistricting reached the point that the House refused 
to concur with the Senate's plan, and a conference committee 
reported a compromise plan. 270 The plan, which would keep the 
current 50 member body until after the 1968 election, created 
20 districts within the state with 46 senators being elected 
from the districts. The plan also finally broke the hold of 
the rural counties over the chamber, with the urban county of 
Charleston receiving five senators and Greenville and 
Richland Counties each having four senators. 271 
268*Reapport i onment Develo pment s Told,• The State, March 28, 1967 , 
B- 4. 
269 •senators Fearful After Decision,• The State, March 28, 1 9 67, 
B-4. 
270In G.O.P. We Trust, 33 8 -339. 
27l •Remap Plan Okay ed; Adjournment Today,• The State, July 6, 
1967, A-1. •senate' s Session Fruitful,• The State, July 7, 1967, A-1. 
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Republicans managed to kill a bill seen as another 
Democratic attempt to continue their reign of power in the 
state. Under the state constitution, every ten years the 
voter registration rolls must be purged, and with the next 
purge set to occur in 1968, Democrats wanted to delay the re-
registration until after the presidential election. 
Republicans, such as Senator Smoak, argued that Democrats 
wanted to delay re-registration to protect their vote Mwhich 
may be reduced as a result of problems the Democrats will 
have in re-registering some of their members." Smoak also 
sought to supposedly protect blacks from this plan as well, 
saying that blacks needed Mself-respect and that this 
deprives him of self-respect, by herding him to the polls.# 272 
When a compromise could not be reached, Republican senators, 
along with rural-county Democrats, threatened to filibuster. 
The bill died on the senate floor, and the state went ahead 
with its scheduled purge of the voter registration books 
later that year and re-registration of voters began in 
September. 273 
This seemingly cooperative spirit within the ranks of 
Republican legislators belied a continuing battle within the 
party between the Thurmond and uold-guardw forces. Since the 
inception of the modern Republican party, the party used the 
272Whether Smoak was indeed looking out for blacks or whether he 
believed they would not take the t i me to re-register it is hard to say. 
#The State of Southern States,• New South, 22 (Fall, 1967): 102-103 . 
273Please see Appendix C for a complete listing of the number of 
r egistered voters in 1968. In G. O. P. We Trust, 338-339. 
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convention method for selecting potential candidates for 
various races. With the growth of the party, however, the 
call for a primary system within the Republican Party became 
louder. Duffy came to serve as an important and dedicated 
leader regarding this movement. In 1966, Greenwood, Aiken, 
and Charleston counties used the primary method to select 
their candidates for local offices, and all were successful. 
This indicated to Duffy and others the primary's viabil i ty 
and that the party should adopt a primary system before the 
1970 election, particularly because of the race for the 
governor's seat. These progressives envisioned the 1968 
election as a chance to experiment with the system. Along 
with Arthur Ravenel, Duffy set about getting the party to 
adopt the system by organizing an independent ucommittee For 
A Republican Primary- during the summer of 1967. As evidence 
by the 1965 poll, South Carolinians voters favored seeing 
Republicans in primaries; over 65 percent of the respondents 
favored a primary as the best means for nominating Republican 
candidates. 274 With the goal of allowing Mthe fullest 
possible voice in the affairs of (the) Party,- Duffy and four 
other Palmetto Republicans felt that the time had come not 
only for a state primary system, but also a Presidential 
Preference Primary as well. 275 With the success of a primary 
held in Charleston in August 1967, Duffy felt that even if a 
21 4state of South Carolina Political Survey, December 1965, 9-10. 
275Press Release, July 28, 1967, Folder 92, Duffy Papers. 
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primary had a small voter turnout, the benefits from the 
primary would outweigh the public response.276 
As with the other controversies, Duffy met resistance to 
the process, with excuses ranging from #we're not ready yet" 
to Mi t would be too expensive." Democrats chided the 
Republicans' convention method and claimed South Carolina 
Democrats were #Elected Not Selected." 277 With Dent believing 
that there was Mno more important decision made this year," 
Duffy and Ravenel tried to persuade the district chairmen of 
the benefits of the primary system. Duffy felt that the main 
resistance came from Mthe lack of willingness" of Republicans 
to #extend themselves to the point where the responsibility 
is on them." 278 Duffy believed that the GOP could not expand 
its ranks, due to the fact that the present system of 
nominating by conventions was Ma rough place to operate 
within. They breed lasting animosity and do not have the 
privilege of anything but drawing a line down the middle of 
the room and choosing up sides. "279 Supposedly with both 
Thurmond's and Watson's blessing, all but one of the district 
chairmen endorsed the concept. When the matter came up at a 
state meeting in February 1968 however, one of the original 
276JD to Messrs. Hunter, Ravenel, Richardson, and Young, August 
24, 1967, Folder 93, Duffy Papers. 
277JD to Albert Watson, January 31, 1968, Folder 102, Duffy 
Papers. 
278JD to Gene Griffith, Jerry Hughes, Floyd Spence, Harry Dent, 
and J. Drake Edens, February 3, 1968, Folder 103, Duffy Papers. 
279JD to Charles Bradshaw, February 7, 1968, Folder 103, Duffy 
Papers. 
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sponsors reversed himself and voted against the proposal, 
sending the concept down to defeat. Duffy believed that one 
of Thurmond's men, J. Fred Buzhardt, influenced Bill Hunter 
of Clemson to reverse his support of the primary system. 
Ultimately, the small rural counties, which outnumbered the 
larger counties on the executive committee, defeated the 
measure. Primary supporters thought of taking the proposal 
to the convention floor, but decided against it. Distressed 
over the defeat, Duffy and other supports agreed to submit 
the primary system again for consideration after the 1968 
election. 28 0 
With the primary discussion behind them, Palmetto 
Republicans prepared for the ensuing presidential election. 
Unlike the previous selection of a Republican presidential 
nominee, Palmetto Republicans, at first, wavered in choosing 
between the two men seeking the nomination. As early as 
19 6 6, state party leaders divided their support between 
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan: of the 4 6 GOP county 
chairmen, 27 favored the former vice president, 13 supported 
the California governor, and six were undecided. 281 At the 
beginning of 1967, the prevailing sentiment remained behind 
Nixon. Duffy commented that Reagan Mis very popular,w but 
questioned whether he would leave his first term as 
280Greenville, Richland, Charleston, Aiken, Florence, Lancaster, 
Dorchester, and Beaufort voted in favor of the primary. JD to Ed Smith, 
February 15, 1968, Folder 103, Duffy Papers. 
28 lrn G.O.P. We Trust, 348. 
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California's governor for a national run. 282 This attraction 
to Reagan was more evident in a February 1967 survey of 150 
GOP leaders in the state, which ranked Reagan with Thurmond 
as the most popular political figures at the time. Yet when 
asked their personal choice for the Republican presidential 
nomination, the survey respondents rated Nixon, then Reagan, 
as their choice. 203 Out of the survey, the results of a 
three-way presidential race gave Nixon 34 percent, Johnson 29 
percent, and Wallace a respectable 24 percent. 284 Palmetto 
Republicans believed that fellow southern Republicans should 
use their increasing influence at the Miami convention and 
therefore did not favor going to the national gathering 
committed to any particular candidate. 28 5 Dent felt that the 
entrance of Alabama's Governor George Wallace would force the 
national party to look closely at the South. If the party 
felt that the South would be neutralized with a Wallace 
campaign, Dent contended, then a moderate candidate, such as 
New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller or Michigan's Governor 
George Romney, would receive the nomination, much to southern 
Republicans' intense dislike. 286 
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It would be up to South Carolina's new political arbiter 
to see that the Southern power base would deny a liberal or 
even moderate Republican the presidential nomination. On 
June 1, 1968, Strom Thurmond and other conservative southern 
Republicans met with former Vice President Richard Nixon in 
Atlanta. While some observers cast the leadership spotlight 
on the Texas Republican State Chairman, the position and 
later role that South Carolina's senior U.S. Senator played 
was critical. The Atlanta meeting centered on two items of 
extreme importance to southern Republicans: "first, the 
convention votes of Southern delegates at Miami, and second, 
the philosophy of a Nixon administration.w 28 7 With a pledge 
that the Supreme Court needed to be re-centered from its 
liberal warren decisions and that flagrant school segregation 
could not be tolerated but compulsory bussing to achieve 
racial balance was also wrong, Nixon affirmed the basic 
conservative philosophies that southerners, such as Thurmond, 
were looking for in a presidential nominee. With what White 
described as nThurmond's harsh disciplinew in keeping 
southern delegates behind Nixon, Palmetto Republicans 
believed that the opportunity to elect someone, who at least 
played to the Goldwater tunes of conservatism, had finally 
arrived . 
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Even with the southern states pledging to supposedly 
"hang Loose but hang together" and the behind-the-scenes 
movement of Thurmond to garner Dixie support for Nixon, the 
Palmetto delegation arrived in Miami still divided over the 
prospective Republican nominees. 28 8 At the national 
convention, Dr. James Edwards of Charleston unsuccessfully 
at tempted to swing the delegation to Reagan's camp. 289 The 
influence of Thurmond, nevertheless, kept the delegation in 
line. When alerted earlier to the idea of swinging the 
delegation's support at the convention, Duffy, while not 
denying support for Reagan, questioned the wisdom of the 
move. "You say there are about ten of twenty-two votes that 
would support Reagan. Is this before or after Thurmond and 
Watson have called them? We have been through that before 
and know how tough it is to prevail--we never have." Short 
of having signed petitions, Duffy recommended the group keep 
quiet. 290 
After the Miami convention nominated Nixon, with the 
help of Thurmond's orchestration of the southern delegates, 
the delegates returned to the state ready to battle for the 
top political prize in the country. With Hubert H. Humphrey, 
the arch-nemesis of southern Democrats, leading that party's 
ticket, Republicans saw their opponents in the "really wierd 
(sic) position of supporting ... (their) extremely unpopular 
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whipping boy." The campaign of 1968 proved to be part of a 
memorable year. Not only did the divisiveness of the 
election campaign tear the country apart, the deaths of both 
Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy forced both 
Democrats and Republicans to rethink the strength of their 
political convictions. #Any thinking person must be 
appalled, " Duffy wrote that year, Mand overcome with the 
thought that political philosophies can be debated by 
killing." 29 1 
With these ominous events overshadowing the 1968 
campaign, many thought the fall election could not get any 
more polarized: enter George Wallace, governor of Alabama. 
With his American Independent's Party, Wallace attempted to 
relive the 1948 Thurmond presidential bid, by appealing not 
only to southern segregationists but to the growing 
disenchantment of blue-collar workers in the rest of the 
nation. But twenty years had passed, and now the former 
Dixiecrat presidential aspirant held control of one of the 
two major political parties in his home state. Thurmond, in 
Duffy's opinion, sought to undermine the Wallace campaign by 
supporting Nixon, not only in South Carolina but throughout 
the South. 29 2 Ironically, many of Wallace's most ardent 
supporters . would continue to support Thurmond. Although 
never officially recognized by the Alabama governor, Maurice 
Bessinger, a Columbia restaurateur, wrote to Thurmond saying 
291 In G.O.P. We Trust, 436. 
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that Republican State Chairman Dent had ended the 
relationship between the Republicans and Independents, and 
that Independents would continue to support the senator, but 
they would field their own slate of candidates . 2 93 
Republicans recognized that Wallace cut into their support in 
Dixie, and had to face such a threat. For years, state 
Republicans had viewed third party movements as the bane of 
their existence . Usually conservative in nature, these 
outside campaigns consisted of individuals Mwho were 
generally Republican-minded but unwilling to join the 
Party,w as Duffy described them. 29 4 In April 1967, Duffy felt 
that the only way to out-poll Wallace, who Duffy felt could 
receive more votes than the GOP nominee, would be if Wallace 
uspeaks out obviously racist.w 29 5 
Early in the campaign season, Palmetto Republicans 
predicted the Wallace movement would self-cornbust, thanks to 
the South Carolina Independent's Party. Appearing in 1952 
when South Carolinians wanted to support Eisenhower but found 
his party label distasteful, the South Carolina Independents 
found support in 1956 with Eisenhower's supposed failure to 
uphold his States' Rights promises. When Bessinger 
attempted, however, to place a slate of electors for Wallace 
on the 1968 November ballot, the Wallace Forum renounced 
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Bessinger's attempt, and threatened to take the Independents 
to court. With a renegade Republican, Torn Turnipseed of 
Richland, at the helm, the Wallace Forum successful forced 
the Independents off the ballot. 296 
No matter which label the Wallace campaign used in south 
Carolina, Republicans knew that the Alabama governor 
severely damaged Nixon's chances in the state. Arthur 
Ravenel suggested that Palmetto Republicans handle Wallace's 
supporters "very cordially and deftly." 
If indeed Wallace is going to be in the race, we 
want all those Wallace tickets to have (Marshall) 
Parker (Republican candidate for U.S. Senate) on 
them and local candidates in some instances. It is 
therefore to our distinct advantage to 'help' the 
Wallace movement have good, solid, sensible and 
reliable leadership. We must do everything in 
our power to secure all the thousands of votes 
Wallace will bring out for our S . C . Republican 
candidates. 297 
However, not every Republican supported this conciliatory 
approach to the independents. Duffy, while believing that 
"cordial relations" should be pursued with the Wallace 
movement, felt that Republicans could not "soft pedal" the 
eventual GOP presidential nominee in return for Wallace 
supporters. 29 8 Yet it seemed that the general party 
leadership believed that beyond the presidential election, 
the Wallace supporters would work for the GOP candidates, and 
296 In G.O.P. We Trust, 439-44 0 . 
297Arthur Ravenel, Jr., to Harry s. Dent, May 22, 1967, Folder 9 0 , 
Duffy Papers . 
298JD to Arthur (Ravenel), May 24, 1967, Folder 90, Folder 90, 
Duffy Papers . 
125 
the Republican leadership encouraged the cultivation of the 
independents. 299 
As early as January 1968, reports from Bamberg indicated 
that if the GOP nominated a liberal or moderate, the county 
would swing behind Wallace. 300 In July, Republican leaders 
warned that southern Democrats would "do everything but 
endorse George in order to help HHH (Hubert H. Humphrey). 
They know George takes .fm.u:. votes from Nixon for every~ he 
takes from HHH. "3 0 1 When the South Carolina delegates 
returned from the convention, one GOP leader expressed the 
belief that if a poll was taken then, it would show Wallace 
the leader, primarily because neither of the two major 
parties had begun their campaigning. Republicans also 
realized their two main banner carriers, Thurmond and Watson, 
took huge risks every time they actively campaigned for Nixon 
in the state. Observations from across the state confirmed 
this fear. In Abbeville, party leaders reported that if the 
senator does not make an effective case for Nixon, Wallace 
would capture the state. 302 In Hampton County, "there was 
much Wallace talk," and in Williamsburg predictions held that 
the GOP candidate would "run a poor third in the county." 303 
299JD to County Chairmen and State Committeemen, Second District, 
May 31, 1967, .Folder 90, Duffy Papers. 
300Report On County Organi zation, Second Congressional District, 
by Ken Powell, January 23, 1968 , Folder 1 02 , Duffy Papers. 
301co-Party Leader-Gram, July 1 0 , 1968, Folder 108, Duffy Papers. 
Dent's emphasis . 
302JD to Harry Dent, September 12, 1968, Folder 110, Duffy Papers . 
126 
Dent, with the campaign nearing an end, sent a memo out to 
all Republican candidates. In it, he appealed to them to 
visit those most likely to support Wallace. 
Don't overlook low income white areas. A personal 
visit and a handshake means more to these people 
than in the highest income areas. You have a 
better chance to change them over, too. Don't 
overlook Wallace voters, forget about Nixon with 
them and talk anti-Humphrey. 304 
Even with this attempt at splitting the votes between Wallace 
and Humphrey, Republicans remained unsure of the election's 
outcome. Upon returning from a meeting with John Mitchell in 
New York, Dent reported that Wallace was not leading in the 
Palmetto State, but that the contest was a very close three-
way tie, with Republican national headquarters predicting 
Humphrey taking the state's eight electoral votes. Even 
though it was not what they wanted to hear, state Republicans 
expressed little surprise over the prediction, based on the 
fact that a solid Democratic vote, with a large black 
turnout, could put the Democrat ahead of a Wallace-Nixon 
split of the white vote. 305 
The ubloc-votingw by blacks, which Republicans claimed 
was aiding the Democrats but not the blacks in return, was a 
carefully orchestrated movement on the part of black leaders 
to politically organize their community. In August 1967 , a 
statewide voter registration drive was started, with an 
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unusual system to handle the registration. For the first 
time in the United States, South Carolina established a 
centralized computer system to handle the re-registration of 
voters in the state. Using prison convicts as key-punch 
operators, the central computer compiled alphabetized voting 
lists for the more than 1,600 precincts in the state. Also, 
voters could mail in their registration forms. In the past, 
registration days in the state lasted only three days during 
a month, resulting in long lines and frustrated individuals. 
Yet with this new technology, blacks sought to capitalize not 
only on the easier methods, but the anger they felt towards 
one of the state's top Democratic solons. 306 
Black leaders, including Vernon Jordon, director of the 
Southern Voter Education Project for the Southern Regional 
Council, denounced U.S. Senator Ernest #Fritz* Hollings for 
his vote against confirmation of Thurgood Marshall for a seat 
on the U.S. Supreme Court. In the 1966 campaign, Hollings 
received an estimated 98 percent of the 80,000 black votes 
cast. Now, in 19 68, Hollings had to run for a complete 
Senate term, and Jordan warned Hollings that #the Negro vote 
giveth and it taketh away.* Hollings had won the seat by 
less than 12,000 votes over his Republican challenger 
Marshall Parker in 1966, and now black leaders pledged to re-
register the 190,000 blacks on the rolls and add 60,000 more. 
According to the Southern Regional Council, blacks made up 30 
306 •voter Drive Near In South Carolina,• The New York Times, 
August 27, 1967, A-57. 
128 
percent of the voting-age population of the state and 20 
percent of the registered voters. 307 For both parties, this 
group was of vital important in determining the outcome of 
all the state's elections. 
For Duffy and the uold-guard" faction, the recognition 
of black political power in the state started to come about 
in 1967. Even though he recognized the affinity between 
Democrats and blacks, particularly if Johnson headed the 
national Democratic ticket, Duffy felt that for the M long 
term growth of the Party" blacks to be appealed to for 
support. 308 While many Republicans sought black support 
uquietly," the Party's policy remained not to seek black 
votes in the open. 309 This private u quiet" policy also 
reflect the concerns of the national party. With estimates 
of nearly 3 million registered black voters in eleven 
southern states by 19 68, party leaders instructed local 
Republicans to pursue the same policy as they had in the 
past: u It must be a year round activity with the same 
methods as with white voters." With the belief that younger 
blacks were rebelling against the traditional black 
leadership, Republicans had to talk #issues, needs of today. 
Jobs, education, housing, urban renewal." Republicans felt 
that the umajority of negroes will be under 30 years old in 
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1968 and have no built in loyalty to (the) Democrat Party." 
GOP leaders urged them to use the tried and true formula of 
uwoman to woman basis" to attract black support. In the 
meantime, Republican leaders expressed little optimism for 
building bridges between the GOP and blacks, in that the 
process "will not be easy" for sometime. 310 
Palmetto Republicans began the uneasy process of 
establishing ties to the South Carolina black community in 
Charleston. There, in September 1967, the city's Republican 
Executive Committee voted uunanimously to try to encourage 
responsible Negroes to join the Party." After much work, 
Republicans were able to get seventeen local blacks to pledge 
their support and join the party. But then, the night before 
the entire city Republican group had to reorganize, some 
Charleston Republicans refused to accept the blacks into the 
group. Even with Arthur Ravenel claiming it was »legally, 
politically, and morally wrong to take such a position now," 
Charleston Republicans voted 16 to 1 against allowing the 
blacks to join the group. 311 Duffy's reflection on the matter 
was that »a small number of racists (were) creating a big 
problem," and that the uextremist movement is making itself 
felt and I believe has increased its power within the 
Party." 312 Even with this negative reaction, Duffy felt that 
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in his local area of Richland County that a "legitimate 
effort to attract individual Negroes" was available for the 
party to pursue. 313 
Duffy represented the more moderate wing of the party in 
this area, realizing that the dreams of state victories could 
never be realized until the GOP actively sought and accepted 
black political support. Yet as he talked with other party 
leaders around the state, they expressed a growing fear of a 
small, but very vocal, group of extremists taking over the 
party. In such areas as Saluda, Richland, and Greenwood, 
Duffy found party leaders concerned over the growing rift 
between the right-wing and the moderate-wing of the party. 
In Duffy's mind, whenever someone disagreed with the right-
wing it became a "divisive act," yet it seemed "perfectly 
acceptable for the right wing to push all their programs 
regardless of what others might think. The point is that 
there is a legitimate difference of philosophy within the 
Party and the moderates and rightists are going to have to 
settle it. "314 This rift between moderates, represented by 
Duffy and Ravenel, and the rightists, the Thurmond and Watson 
faction, was never resolved. In fact, the battle only 
intensified throughout 1968, with the moderates claiming that 
members of the John Birch Society, a noted right-wing and 
arch - conservative group, had began to "give us some 
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problemsw 315 and that Thurmond was continuing his drive for 
complete control over the party. 316 While moderates were 
plotting to unseat Harry Dent as state chairman, they also 
felt increasing pressure that Thurmond wanted to place Fred 
Buzhardt, another of the senator's close aids, in the 
chairman's seat. 317 Some members of the party's right - wing 
followers suggested that Palmetto Republicans should go on 
their own way and have "nothing to do with the National 
Party. w3la 
Ironically, Republicans viewed the Democrats as 
divorcing themselves from the national party during the 1968 
campaign. This perception played an important role in the 
ultimate outcome of the 1968 general election. With signs in 
1967 indicating continued Republican strength in elections, 
the GOP looked favorably on 1968 as a chance to increase the 
number of elected state Republicans officials. With 
Charleston County sending two more Republican senators to the 
General Assembly and Newberry electing Republican city 
council members in November 1967, party leaders had every 
reason to celebrate a growing two-party system in South 
Carolina. Then came the truest sign of an active second 
party: the city of Anderson, long recognized as the bastion 
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of Democratic strength in the state, elected not only seven 
out of eight Republicans to the city council, but also a 
Republican mayor in April 1968. The state's fifth largest 
city now had a Republican-majority government firmly in 
control. Seven- term Democratic Mayor William C. Johnston, 
brother of former U.S. Senator Olin Johnston, was defeated by 
33-year old Republican Richard Otter. While Democratic State 
Executive Director Donald Fowler blamed the defeat on a 
"backlash to racial disturbances'" in the city following 
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s death, Otter felt that race was not 
an issue, since he claimed that blacks had supported his 
candidacy. He termed his election a party victory Min that 
people were willing to vote Republican who have never done so 
before.'" 319 Duffy later reported that the black support Otter 
claimed amounted to about 200 votes out of 4,200 votes cast 
and resulted from a pledge of placing more blacks on the 
police force. 
Just two days after Otter's victory, a reconvened 
Republican State Convention repudiated the Anderson pledge of 
increased black involvement in local affairs when it 
"resolved without dissent'" to instruct its delegation to the 
Miami convention to present a resolution seeking Mcontrol of 
the public schools to the local school boards'" and supporting 
the presidential aspirant »who is in favor of local school 
control," all code words for continued resistance to federal 
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intervention in integrating schools. 320 This on-going 
insurgency against the federal government was a central theme 
in the state party's 1968 platform. Among the various 
conservative positions the platform advocated were limiting 
the United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, 
particularly in school desegregation and integration cases; 
creating explicit guidelines on the qualifications of 
prospective justices to the U.S. Supreme Court; and the 
termination of Nthe requirement imposed by the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965" that all changes to South Carolina elections 
must be cleared by the U.S. District Court in washington. 321 
This continuation of a staunchly conservative philosophy 
by Palmetto Republicans carried over into the 1968 
presidential election and would aid their cause. Yet this 
was not to be a successful year for South Carolina 
Republicans on the state and local level. Even though 
Republicans secured the White House for the first time in 
eight years, local Palmetto Republicans lost heavily in 
state-wide races. Nixon managed to secure the Palmetto state 
with 254,062 votes (38 percent), compared to Wallace's 
American Independent Party receiving 215,430 votes (32 
percent) and Humphrey garnering only 197,486 votes (29 
percent) . 32 2 On the state and local level, however, 1968 was 
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a complete disaster for Palmetto Republicans. Some party 
leaders placed the blame on the abundance of candidates which 
placed a strain on both manpower and campaign funding. 
Republican candidates contested 77 of the 124 House seats and 
18 of the reapportioned 50 Senate seats in the General 
Assembly alone, not to mention the plethora of other local 
candidates. 323 Yet when election day had passed, only eight 
Republicans, three in the 50 member Senate and five in the 
12 4 member House, were returned to Columbia. 324 Marshall 
Parker, running against U.S. Senator Fritz Hollings again, 
lost by a landslide, being defeated by over 150,000 votes, 
compared to his 1966 lose of fewer than 12,000. 325 In the 
state's congressional races, only Republican incumbent Albert 
Watson of the second district defeated his Democratic 
challenger Frank K. Sloan. In the Third Congressional 
District, William Jennings Bryan Dorn secured 67 percent of 
the votes cast and soundly defeated his Republican opponent 
John Grisso, who ran against Dorn in 19 66 and garnered a 
closer 42 percent of the vote in that race. The only open 
congressional seat, the fourth congressional district, saw 
Democrat James R. Mann defeat Republican Charles Bradshaw. 326 
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In trying to place blame for the election def eats, 
Duffy, believed that both Thurmond's and Watson's strong 
support of the GOP national candidate cost local Republicans 
votes. Usual Thurmond and Watson supporters resented their 
men supporting Nixon and showed their discontent by voting 
for Wallace. Wallace appealed to the working class's outrage 
at the Johnson administration's support for civil rights and 
the growing racial unrest and tension that was linked to the 
movement. 327 Ultimately, the Republicans' emphasis on the 
White House cost them votes for the court house. At first, 
GOP campaign workers felt that they would lose the 
presidential race, but win on the local level. As election 
day drew closer though, state party workers reversed their 
forecast predicting that they would indeed recapture the 
White House, but the local candidates uwere in trouble." 
Duffy admitted that a presidential election year again proved 
"disastrous to our effort in building a two-party system" for 
that year. 328 
Another key factor that contributed to the 1968 state-
wide disaster for Republicans was the lack of support from 
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the black community. Palmetto blacks overwhelmingly 
supported the Democratic ticket on all levels. In Columbia's 
Ward Nine, Humphrey received 1,226 votes, while Nixon got 
only 18 and Wallace actually received six. The same was true 
for the other two predominately black wards in Columbia. In 
the U.S. Senate race, Ward Nine cast 1,261 votes for 
Democratic incumbent Hollings and only 29 for Republican 
challenger Parker. 329 Even though Hollings established a 
conservative record in Washington, Palmetto blacks could not 
envision themselves voting for Parker, who openly appealed to 
segregationists and the Wallace supporters. Parker's 
attempts to tie Hollings to the liberal Democratic 
presidential ticket also backfired among white conservatives 
and blacks as well. 330 This attempt by the only state-wide 
Republican candida-te running in the 1968 sent out a mixed 
message to South Carolina voters: a Republican senatorial 
candidate attempted to garner both GOP and Wallace 
supporters. With the ire that independents felt towards 
Thurmond for abandoning their cause, the Parker strategy only 
ended in defeat for the Republican Party. 
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CONCLUSION 
When told that 1,123 votes out of 50,131 cast in the 
state went to Republican Calvin Coolidge in 1924's 
presidential election, South Carolina's Democratic U.S. 
Senator Coleman Elease expressed shock and dismay that 
Republicans had not only garnered votes in the Palmetto 
state, but that the state officials had actually counted 
these ballots. 33 1 For South Carolinians up to 1947, the idea 
of voting for a member of the GOP met with disdain. One 
dared not admit that he professed to voting Republican 
without fear of economic and social scorning and retribution. 
The dominance of the Democratic Party, as v. o. Key 
theorized, rested on the suppression of the southern black, 
and the racist policies of the Palmetto Democratic Party held 
sway for nearly a century following the Civil War. 
Then came the presidential election of 1948. That year, 
Democratic liberals made an open call for a progressive 
policy on civil rights at the Democratic National Convention 
in Philadelphia; along with that call came an outcry by 
Southern solons of "States' Rights,. and their fear of an 
unrestrained federal government meddling in their states' 
racial policies. With the loosening of blind obedience to 
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the Democratic Party during the 1948 presidential election, 
conservative southern segregationists sought a suitable party 
to vent their frustrations towards the liberal policies of 
the national Democratic Party. 
In 1952, with Dwight D. Eisenhower standing for #Dixie" 
and displaying a #consistent pattern of hesitancy and extreme 
political caution in def ending black legal rights, " some 
southerners began to envision the Republican Party not as the 
party of Abraham Lincoln, but a party they could mold to 
rebuke the growing influence of northern Democrats. 332 With 
their #inhibitions against bolting the Democrats" removed and 
"the candidacy of a 'nonpolitical' hero," South Carolinians 
demonstrated support for Eisenhower through the M South 
Carolina Independents-." 333 These #Independents" proved to be 
an intermediary group that eased the way for Palmetto 
conservatives, mostly segregationists, to support the 
Republican presidential nominee. However, with the 1954 and 
1955 Supreme Court rulings on school desegregation, the state 
Republican Party lost support among that key interest group 
in Eisenhower's 1956 bid for re-election, while gaining some 
support from the state's small black electorate. 
Nonetheless, Leon P. Crawford, the 1956 Republican senatorial 
candidate whose campaign centered on the evolving 
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segregationist code words of *States' Rights," made a 
respectable showing against the Democratic heavyweight Olin 
Johnston. Sensing the fear of being labeled a #black man's 
party" and seeing the attraction that Leon P. Crawford's 
platform of segregation received, state Republican leaders 
actively sought to incorporate the *Independents," i.e., the 
segregationists, into the GOP fold. This partnership between 
the Republicans and segregationists, and the party's 
subsequent reticence of support for black civil rights, set 
the GOP on a course that proved difficult to deviate from 
during the 19 60s, when more southern blacks were gaining 
political power. 
Yet along with *mad segregationist Democrats," Palmetto 
Republicans sought also to build a broader, albeit white and 
staunchly conservative, coalition. This coalition was made 
up of non-native born residents, of young professionals, of 
housewives, and to some extent the youth of the state. With 
a strong showing by the Republican presidential candidate in 
1960, Palmetto Republicans worked to expand this coalition in 
the state's 1962 U.S. Senate race, which pitted Republican 
Bill Workman against incumbent Democrat Olin Johnston. This 
race taught the Republicans that success in politics demanded 
organization of precinct clubs to support, from the grass-
roots level, Republican campaigns. Following the 1962 Senate 
race and the ascension of Drake Edens and his philosophy of 
grass-roots activism to the party leadership, Palmetto 
Republicans sought to bring more conservative-minded 
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individuals, who believed in free-market economics, limited 
government interference, ua minimum concern for poor people, 
and a genteel type of racism," into the party. 33 4 Although he 
joined years before, James Duffy was attracted early on by 
the need to use a second political party in the state not 
merely as a #white man's party," but as an attempt to force 
better government through political competition. Duffy's 
quest for better government through political competition was 
long and arduous at times. While voting for a Republican 
presidential candidate was considered acceptable by the early 
19 60s, the stigma toward local and state-wide Republican 
candidates weighed heavily against the GOP' s attempts to 
break the Democratic grip on South Carolina's political 
institutions. 
Although sporadic Republican victories on the state and 
local level gave hope to the party faithful in the early 
19 60s, the acceptance of Republicanism in South Carolina 
would only come about by an enormous shift in the 
philosophical foundation of the national party. This 
transformation occurred in 1964, with South Carolina 
Republicans at the vanguard of a conservative revolution in 
the party. With the increasing power of southern and western 
conservatives within the national party, Barry Goldwater and 
his brand on conservatism captured not only the ideological 
mainstream of the national Republican Party, but also made 
33 4Donald S. Strong, *Further Reflections on Southern Politics,• 
Journal of Politics, 33 (May 1971): 254. 
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Republicanism palatable to both factions of conservative 
South Carolinians. 
The nomination of Barry Goldwater and the takeover of 
the Republican Party by his followers provided the enticement 
for South Carolinians to actively support a candidate of the 
G.O.P. Even though they had held the party leadership in the 
state since 1959, these conservatives secured a larger 
following as a direct result of the capture of the national 
party by Goldwater Republicans. Even the negative spin of 
Goldwater's u extremism" by the Democrats failed to dissuade 
South Carolinians from voting for the Republican candidate. 
Yet in the rest of the nation, Republicans readily admitted 
their party's failure to counteract these charges, and 
Palmetto Republicans braced themselves for a huge defeat in 
the November 1964 election. Nonetheless, these conservatives 
had successfully captured not only the state organization, 
but the national party as well, and were in firm control. 
This domination of the South Carolina Republican Party 
by an ultra-conservative philosophy, however, created 
problems internally in the state party. With racial 
moderates leading the party in the early 19 60s, the pro-
segregationist forces within the party were a small, but at 
times vocal, minority. Coinciding with Goldwater's 
ascendancy in the national party, Strom Thurmond, the state's 
leading segregationist and political figure, entered the 
state Republican Party. Believing that a Goldwater 
Republican Party was the avenue to express their discontent 
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toward the federal government, Thurmond and his followers 
believed they could manipulate the party to their own use. 
However, the party's moderates, like Duffy, recognized this 
move early on, and at first defeated Thurmond's attempt to 
seize control of the party. Eventually, both Thurmond and 
the moderates realized that they needed each other to succeed 
in building a viable opposition to the state's Democratic 
Party. Thurmond did not follow through on his threat to 
leave the party and form his own re-election organization in 
19 66, and the moderates extended offers of reconciliation 
with the senator. This uneasy truce lasted only until 
Thurmond' s faction gained control of the state Republican 
Executive Committee. By the time moderates realized what had 
happened, it was too late. With the systematic acquisition 
of the grass-roots based executive committee, the Thurmond 
faction eventually captured the party's leadership, leaving 
moderates to wonder if their party was now the party of 
racists. 
With the Thurmond-backed leadership now in place and the 
1964 conservative influence still prevailing, Palmetto 
Republicans successfully capitalized on their traditionalist 
ideology during the 1966 state-wide elections. In addition 
to the successful re-election of Thurmond, Republicans 
actively contested all the major state political offices, and 
garnered respectable numbers of votes. Even though they 
succeeded in winning only one state-wide political off ice, 
Republicans did manage to capture a hand-full of seats in the 
General Assembly, and were 
governing body of the state. 
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now a vocal minority in the 
In addition to a Republican 
congressman from the state's Second Congressional District, 
Palmetto Republicans felt they were well on their way to 
creating a viable opposition party in South Carolina. Yet 
internal conflicts continued to plague the party, with 
Thurmond' s cohort Harry Dent attempting to redirect the 
philosophy of the state party from a grass-roots driven and 
locally-controlled organization to a candidate-driven and 
state-headquarters controlled organization. Yet this 
endeavor to control all the activities of the entire 
organization from party headquarters failed, due in part to 
the growth of the party itself. With the huge influx of 
supporters and potential candidates that came after the 1964 
election, Republicans found themselves swamped with demands 
of resources and aid from the numerous candidates carrying 
the G.O.P. banner into the 1966 election. Despite the 
strains on the organization, Republicans believed that they 
had finally come to the most important point in the 
development of a two-party system in South Carolina. 
The following election, however, demonstrated that the 
South Carolina Republican Party was not able to focus on the 
wider picture of electing both a president and state-wide 
leaders. Due principally to inter-party battles, Palmetto 
Republicans could not maintain the drive in 1968 for ultimate 
political superiority they yearned for when they first 
established the party. With Thurmond focused solely on 
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getting Richard Nixon elected, Republicans failed to 
adequately focus their attention on local and state 
Republican candidates. Thurmond believed that by 
concentrating on get ting Nixon into the White House, his 
influence could be used to control the federal government's 
intervention into the affairs of the states and reverse the 
federal government's integration policies. This strategy, 
however, cost Republican candidates on the state and local 
level. Even though party leaders seemed to Mtip-toew around 
the Wallace campaign, the 1968 Wallace candidacy ultimately 
took votes away from Nixon, primarily due to support for 
Wallace by blue-collar workers and devoted segregationists . 
While Thurmond was successful in securing the state for 
Nixon, the goal of other Republicans, like Duffy, was 
neglected, and thus the Republican effort on the local and 
state level suffered tremendously at the 1968 polls. 
The election of 19 68 demonstrated to the Republican 
Party the dilemma it faced in South Carolina. The G.O.P. 
could achieve success at the presidential level, their first 
goal when they set out to form a viable opposition party. 
Except for the 1976 presidential election, the state has been 
the Republicans' to lose in every contest for the White 
House. However, the success of state and local victories 
within the Palmetto state posed complications for the party. 
While they were able to elect Dr. James Edwards of Charleston 
governor of the state in 1974, it is only recently, in 1994, 
that Republicans have laid claim to the South Carolina 
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Governor's Mansion, half of the state's congressional seats, 
and a growing minority in the General Assembly. Republicans 
have had to endure over three decades of struggle since they 
began their historic quest to reshape Palmetto politics. 
APPENDICES 
Countv 
Abbeville 
Aiken 
Allendale 
BambetR 
Barnwell 
Beaufort 
Berkelev 
Calhoun 
Charleston 
Congressional 
District 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
Total 
Population 
1960 
21 ,417 
81,038 
11,362 
98,478 
16,274 
11,659 
44,187 
38,196 
12,256 
216,382 
Percent of 
Pop\!lation 
21+ Years Old 
1960 
55.80% 
53.90% 
50.50% 
58.00% 
50.30% 
50.40% 
43.80% 
46.40% 
48.50% 
52.40% 
Estimate of 
1960 Voting 
ARC Population 
11 ,951 
43,679 
5,738 
57,117 
8,186 
8,900 
19,354 
17,723 
5,944 
113,384 
White 
Population 
1960 
14,557 
59,700 
4 ,178 
79,223 
7,187 
10,004 
27,053 
19,233 
4 ,058 
137,449 
Percent of 
Total 
Population 
That is White 
68% 
74% 
37% 
80% 
44% 
51% 
61% 
50% 
33% 
64% 
Nonwhite 
Population 
1960 
6,860 
21 ,338 
7 ,184 
19,245 
9 ,087 
1,655 
17,104 
18,963 
8,198 
78,993 
rr rr=·=· -=-=·:·:-=-=·· 
Cherokee 5 35,205 55.10% 19,398 27,735 19% 
Chester 5 30,888 54.50% 16,834 18,560 
Chesterfield 5 33,717 51.40% 17,331 21 ,210 63% 
Clarendon 29,490 43.90% 12,946 9 ,360 32% 
Colleton 27,816 51.70% 14,381 13,589 49% 
DarlinRton 6 52,928 50.30% 26,623 28,420 54% 
Dillon 6 30,584 46.60% 14,252 16,355 53% 
Dorchester 24,383 51.20% 12,484 12,480 51% 
EdRefield 3 15,735 50.00% 7,868 6,581 42% 
Fairfield 5 20,713 
Florence 6 84,438 50.90% 42,979 47,934 51% 
GeorRetown 6 34,798 46.10% 16,042 16,552 48% 
Greenville 4 209,776 57.70% 121 ,041 172,823 82% 
Greenwood 3 44,346 58.60% 25,987 31,211 70% 
Hamnton 17,425 50.30% 8,765 8,038 46% 
HOITY 6 68,247 51.20% 34,942 50,005 73% 
JasDCr I 12,237 49.20% 6,021 4 ,619 38% 
Ken.haw 5 33,585 51.10% 17,162 20,222 60% 
Lancaster 5 39,352 53.30% 20,975 28,735 73% 
Laurens 4 47,609 55.90% 26,613 33,535 70% 
Source: Census of Population: 1960, vol. 1, part42 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Services, 1963), 50. 
Column entitled "Percent of Population 21+ Years 1960" is liom table published in the County and City Data Book - 1962, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D .C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, pg. 322. 
Column entitled "Natural % Increase 1965" is from table published in the County and City Data Book - 1967, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, pg. 312 & 322. 
7,470 
12,328 
12,507 
20,130 
14.227 
23,508 
14,229 
11,903 
9 ,154 
36,504 
18,146 
36,953 
18,242 
7,618 
13,363 
10,617 
14,074 
Percent of 
Total 
Population Natural% 
Tbatls Non- Increase 
White 1965 
32% 4.90% 
26% 7.10% 
63% 5.60% 
20% 6.20% 
56% 6.20% 
43% 1.60% 
39% 5.20% 
50% 9.40% 
61% 6.80% 
37% 11.40% 
:::::::;:::: 
21% 6.70% 
40% 6.80% 
37% 7.50% 
68% 7.90% 
51% 7.10% 
44% 7.80% 
47% 9.70% 
49% 8.60% 
58% 6.30% 
43% 7.40% 
52% 8.70% 
18% 8.10% 
27% 9.70% 
62% 6.10% 
40% 6.20% 
27% 7.40% 
30% 5.50% 
:-:=: · 
Estimated 
1965 
Total 
Po1>ulation 
22,466 
86,792 
11,998 
104,584 
17,283 
19,001 
46,485 
41,786 
13,089 
241,050 
37,564 
32,988 
36,246 
31,820 
29,791 
57,056 
33,551 
26,480 
16,726 
90.686 
37,825 
226,768 
74,867 
12,983 
35,667 
42,264 
50,227 
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\D 
CT\ 
0 
'U 
0 
'd 
C 
1--' 
11> 
rt 
t--' · 
0 
::i 
z 
Hl C 8 0 tJ' Ii Cl) 
(/} Ii ? 0 Cl) 
C 11> 'd rt ::i Cl) ::r' p.. ::i p.. 
n ....., t--' · 
11> \D X Ii CT\ 0 U1 :i:,, 1--' 
t--'· 
'U ::i 0 11> 
'd 
C 
1--' 
PJ 
rt 
t--'· 
0 
::i 
f:ll 
Cl) 
rt 
t--'· 
8 
11> 
rt 
Cl) 
Cl) 
Total 
Congressional Population 
County Dislrict 1960 
Lee 6 21,832 
Lexin~ton 2 60,726 
Marion 6 . 32,014 
Marlboro 6 28,529 
McCormick 3 8,629 
Newbttrv 3 
Oconee 3 40.204 
Oranllebunr 2 68,559 
Pickens 3 46,030 
Richland 2 200,102 
Saluda 3 14,554 
4 156,830 
Sumter 2 74,941 
Union 5 30,015 
Williamsburg 6 40,932 
York 
:::::::=::::,:,:-.•,•,·.·-···--:·::-:-· 
Percent of 
Population Estimate of 
21+ Years Old 1960 Voling 
1960 A2e Population 
45.10% 9,846 
55.30% 33,581 
49.30% 15,783 
49.60% 14.150 
48.20% 4.159 
54.70% 21,992 
49.20% 33,731 
57.30% 26,375 
55.80% 111,657 
54.30% 7,903 
57.60% 90,334 
49.90% 37,396 
16,958 
44.20% 18092 
White 
Population 
1960 
7 ,459 
50,260 
14,415 
14,608 
3,311 
35,903 
27,367 
41 ,400 
134,930 
9,222 
122,145 
39,846 
21,123 
13,716 
Percent of 
Total 
Population 
lbat is White 
34% 
83% 
45% 
51% 
38% 
89% 
67% 
63% 
78% 
53% 
70% 
34% 
TOTALS: 2,384,554 53.10% 1,266,198 1,551 ,842 65% 
Source: Census of Population: 1960, vol. 1, part 42 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Services, 1963), 50. 
Colwnn entitled "Percent of Population 21+ Years 1960" ill from table published in the Cowity and City Data Book - 1962, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, pg. 322. 
Colwnn entitled "Natural% Increase 1965" is from table published in the County and City Data Book - 1967, 
U .S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, pg. 312 & 322. 
Nonwhite 
Population 
1960 
14,373 
10,466 
17,599 
13,921 
5,318 
4,301 
41,192 
4,630 
65,172 
5,332 
34,685 
35,095 
8,892 
27,216 
833 ,592 
Percent of 
Total 
Population 
lbatls Non-
White 
66% 
17% 
55% 
49% 
62% 
11% 
10% 
33% 
37% 
22% 
47% 
66% 
35% 
Natural% 
Increase 
1965 
8.10% 
8.20% 
8.30% 
6.80% 
5.90% 
6.90% 
8.00% 
7.70% 
8.10% 
5.50% 
6.70% 
11.40% 
6.70% 
7.60% 
7.80% 
Estimated 
1965 
Total 
P<>t>ulation 
23.600 
65,706 
34,671 
30,469 
9,138 
42,978 
74,044 
49,574 
216,310 
15,354 
167,338 
83,484 
32,026 
44,043 
84,903 
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Estimated 1965 Total % of Population White % ofTotal Reg Black % of Total Reg Oriental % of Total Reg Indian % of Total Reg 
Count Po ulation Re istered Re istered Re istered That is White Re istered That is Black Re istered That is Orient Re istered That is Indian 
Abbeville 22,466 7,333 32.64% 6,697 91.33% 636 8.67% 2 0.03% 0 0.00% 
Aiken 86,792 39,947 46.03% 31 ,937 79.95% 8,010 20.05% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Allendale 11 ,998 3,452 28.77% 2,898 83.95% 554 16.05% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
92.13% 2,616 7.87% 0 0.00% I 0.00% 
79.20% 1,116 20.80% 0 0.00% 0 
~ 
Barnwell 19,001 7,655 40.29% 6,785 88.63% 870 11.37% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% \.0 
Beaufort 46,485 8,792 18.91% 5,910 67.22% 2,882 32.78% 5 0.06% 0\ 0 0.00% V1 
Berkele 41 ,786 14,302 34.23% 10,157 71.02% 4,141 28.95% 4 0.03% 0.01% 
< Calhoun 13,089 3,018 23.06% 2,528 83.76% 490 16.24% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 
Owleston 241,0SO 64,485 26.75% 50,425 78.20% 14,060 21.80% 12 0.02% 
Hi (T 0.00% 0 
Ii (1) Ii 
Oierokee 37,564 15,692 41.77% 14,243 90.77% 1,449 9.23% 0.01% 2 0.01% Cl) :::u >' Oiester 32,988 13,005 39.42% 10,725 82.47% 2,280 17.53% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 (1) 'O 
Oiesterfield 36,246 13,366 36.88% 9,866 73.81 % 3,500 26.19% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% C lQ 'O (T (1) 
::,-' 
I-' · ::, Qarendon 31,820 5,191 16.31% 4,532 87.30% 659 12.70% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% (/l 
Colleton 32.74% 80.33% 19.67% 0 0.00% 2 0.02% (T 
p, 
() Ii I-'· Ill >< Ill 
19.34% 0 0.00% 
Ii (T 0 0.00% 0 I-'· to 
9,031 26.92% 6,910 76.51% 2,116 23.43% I 0.01% 19 0.21% I-' 0 I-' · 
Dorchester 9,657 36.47% 7,901 81.82% 1,756 18.18% 0 0.00% I 0.01% ::, ::, 
Ed efield 16,726 4,659 27.85% 4,013 86.13% 646 13.87% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% Ill '1j 
Fairfield 22,287 6,613 29.67% 4,711 71.24% 1,902 28.76% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% I-'· lQ 
C 
Ii 
(1) 
30.97% 0 0.00% 0.00% (/l 
I 1.25% 2 0.00% 2 0.00% 
13.86% 0.01% 0 0.00% 
19.50% 0.02% 0 0.00% 
Source: Supplemental RepOl't by the Secretary of Stale to the General Assembly of South Carolina, 
(Columbia, S.C.: State Budget and Control Board, 1965), 333. 
Column entitled "Estimated 1965 Population" from Table I. 
~ 
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County Estimated 196.5 Tow % of Population White % of Total Reg Black 
Po ulation Re istered Re istered Re istered That is White Re istered 
Ho 74,867 22,411 29.93% 19,923 88.90% 2,488 
Jas 12,983 3,989 30.72% 2,684 67.29% 1,30.5 
Kershaw 3.5,667 13,142 36.8.5% 10,868 82.70% 2,274 
Lancaster 42,264 18,339 43.39% 16,.572 90.36% 1,767 
Laurens S0,227 16,794 33.44% 10,660 63.48% 6,134 
Lexin ton 6.5,706 
Marion 34,671 
Marlboro 30,469 
McCormick 9,138 2,301 
12,1.56 39.43% 10,471 86.14% 1,6.58 
14,S.52 33.86% 13,3.56 91.78% 1,196 
22,102 29.8.5% IS,619 70.67% 6,483 
Pickens 49,.574 17,.569 3.5.44% 16,640 94.71% 929 
Richland 216,310 69,617 32.18% .52,661 7.5.64% 16,9.56 
828 
7,216 
4,179 
1,442 
Source: Supplemental Report by the Secretary of State to the General Assembly of South Carolina, 
(Columbia, S.C.: State Budget and Control Board. 196.5), 333. 
Colurm entitled "Estimated 196.5 Population" from Table I. 
% of Total Reg Oriental % of Total Reg Indian 
That is Black Re istered That is Orient Re istered 
11.10% 0 0.00% I 
32.71% 0 0.00% 0 
17.30% 0 0.00% 
9.64% 0 0.00% 0 
36 . .52% 0 0.00% 0 
0 
0 0.00% 6 
0 0.00% 1 
0.04% 0 
13.64% 0 0.00% 
8.22% 2 0.01% 0 
29.33% 0.00% 3 
S.29% 2 0.01% 0 
24.36% 20 0.03% 4 
13.3.5% 0 0.00% 
11.30% 3 0.00% 
24.50% 3 0.02% 
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Couotv 
Abbeville 
Alton 
Allendale 
Bamber• 
B1n1well 
Beaafort 
Closierfleld 
CollelDD 
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Ollllnttoo 
DU1011 
Pd•fleld 
Paidleld 
O...,ovllle 
O...,owood 
HumllOO 
Kenbaw 
Lee 
Ledn•t011 
Marl011 
M11lboro 
McComick 
Total Total 
Registered Regls-d Perceotage 
Inause 512A/68 I O/S/68 
6,736 7,229 7.32% 
24,930 31.898 27.95% 
3,578 4,131 
25,064 29,186 16.45% 
S,542 S,944 7.25% 
7,326 7,776 · 6.14% 
9,640 10,214 S.95% 
15362 17.522 14.06% 
3.617 4.66% 
70.321 S2.S2% 
12.SS2 13.857 10.40% 
10,491 11,120 6.00% 
13,068 14.389 10.11% 
9,786 9,993 212% 
JO.SOI 10,772 258% 
16,471 18,270 10.92% 
9,272 9,488 233% 
12.Sal 13.577 6.00'I> 
4,432 4,745 7.06'ili 
7,147 7,790 9.00'I> 
28,645 32,460 13.32% 
11.301 12.337 9.17% 
63.865 n ,681 15.37% 
lS,776 17.591 II.SO% 
6,365 6,6\S 3.93% 
22,692 7.58% 
3,741 4.53% 
10,905 12,700 16.46% 
IS,925 16,166 5.28% 
14.228 lS,540 9.22% 
6,570 6.824 3.87% 
24.397 29,624 21.42% 
9,041 9,533 5.44% 
9,969 10.252 284% 
2,826 2,885 2 @% 
Sowa,: Suppemenlal Repttt of tbe Seaetary of State to Ille 
White White 
Registened Regis-d Pctoenuge 
lnaeue 512A/68 I O/S/68 
S,549 S,998 8,0')% 
20,947 26,1(1} 27.79'fo 
2.001 2.222 11.04% 
22,397 26,189 16.93% 
3,609 3,(1)8 247% 
S,225 S,542 6,(11% 
S,374 S,850 8.86% 
9,838 11,451 16.40% 
2.049 2.166 S.71% 
32,433 Sl,748 S9.SS% 
10.810 12,037 l\.3S'll, 
7,476 8,068 7.92% 
9,873 I 0,944 I 0.85% 
S,193 S,316 237% 
6,994 7,220 3.23% 
11.818 13,167 11.41% 
6,604 6,773 256% 
8,385 9,019 7.56% 
3,366 3,538 S.11% 
3,930 4,163 S.93% 
20,362 22,910 12.51% 
7,118 7,743 8.78% 
SS,560 64,793 16.62% 
13.217 14,648 10.83% 
4,059 4,223 4.04% 
17,438 18,8(1} 8.21% 
2.006 2.131 4.67% 
8,498 10.070 18.50% 
13,359 14,097 S.S2% 
lt.443 9.84% 
3,939 4,045 2(1)% 
21.SII 26,481 23.10% 
S,448 S,868 7.71% 
6,9(11 7,146 3.46% 
1,714 1,748 1.98% 
Generu Assembly of Sooth Carolina, (Columbia, S.C.: State Budget and Control Board, 1968), 61 ~2 
Blade Black 
Registened Regis-d Peroewge 
lnrnuc 512A/68 I O/S/68 
1,185 1,229 3.71% 
3,983 S,129 28.77% 
1.S77 1,909 21.05% 
2.666 2,996 12.38'1> 
1,933 2,246 16.l'J'fo 
2.101 2.234 6.33% 
4,261 4,359 23()'1, 
S,520 6,0')6 10.0% 
1.407 1,451 3.13% 
13,667 18.560 35.80% 
1,740 1,817 4.43% 
3,0IS 3,052 1.23% 
3,195 3,445 7.82% 
4,593 4,617 1.83% 
3,SOS 3,SSO 1.28% 
4,653 S,103 9.67% 
2.648 2,(f}S 1.77% 
4,422 4,SS7 3.05% 
1,066 1,207 13.23'1> 
3.217 3,627 12.74% 
8,282 9,549 IS.JO% 
4,183 4,594 9.83% 
8,302 8,884 7.01% 
2.SS8 2.942 IS.01% 
2,305 2.391 3.73% 
3,654 3,822 4,60'ill, 
1,543 1,610 4.34% 
2.406 2.629 9.27% 
2.566 2,669 4.01% 
2.785 2.971 6.68% 
2.630 2.778 S.63% 
2.885 3,142 8.91% 
3,587 3,659 201% 
3,061 3,I0S 1.44% 
1,111 1,136 225% 
Oriental Oriental 
Registered Registered Pctoenuge 
Increase 512A/68 I O/S/68 
0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0.()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 
4 33.33'1> 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
4 12 200.()()'ll, 
0.00% 
0 0 0.00% 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0.00% 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0.00% 
0 0 0.00% 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0.00'I> 
2 100.00'I> 
O.OO'I> 
0,()()'ll, 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 0.00'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
O.OO'I> 
Indian Indian 
Registered Registered Pctoelllage 
lnaeuc 512A/68 10/5168 
0 0 0.()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
0,()()'ll, 
0 0 0,()()'ll, 
O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
O.OO'I> 
2 100.00'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 0.00'I> 
0 0 0.00'I> 
2 2 O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
19 19 0.00'I> 
O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
O.OO'I> 
0 0 0.00'I> 
2 O.OO'I> 
0 0 0.00'4 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
1 O.OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
0 0 0.00'I> 
O.OO'I> 
0.00'I> 
6 6 0.00'I> 
O,OO'I> 
0 0 O.OO'I> 
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Pickel» 
Rlcbland 
Saluda 
smr.-1 
Sumler 
Uoioo 
WiWIIJllbura 
TOTALS: 
TOia! 
Reglslerod 
5124168 
11,113 
12,840 
25,320 
14,768 
61,183 
5,857 
55,031 
18,333 
12,609 
11 ,266 
Total 
Regislercd 
10/5168 
12,257 
13,SSl 
27,337 
16,834 
71,984 
Perceotage 
lnaeue 
10.29'ili 
5.S4'll; 
7.97'll; 
13.99111, 
11.6S'll; 
6,169 ·5.331\ 
59,657 8.41 I\ 
20,192 10.141\ 
13,028 3.32' 
13,246 17.581\ 
748,891 853,014 13.90\\ 
Source: Supplemenlal Rtport o( the Seaewy of Stale to the 
While While 
Regislercd Regislerod Percewge 
5124168 10/5168 lnaeue 
9,037 10,030 10.99'i1, 
11,730 12,430 5.9791, 
13,715 15,121 10.2591, 
13,690 15,716 14.80'll, 
42,853 52,137 21.66'll> 
4,553 4,790 5.211\ 
52,374 8.551\ 
10.89' 12,523 14.95'll; 
10,605 10,958 3.33'll; 
6,011 6.nt 11.421\ 
566,271 652,096 15.1691, 
Genenl "-tnbly o( Swlll Carollnl, (Columbia, S.C.: Stale BudFt and Cootrol Boord, 1968), 61-62. 
Black Black 
Regislerod Regislerod 
5124168 10/5168 
2,015 2,226 7.281\ 
1,108 1,119 0.991\ 
11,603 12.212 5.251\ 
1,078 1,116 3.531\ 
18,320 19,823 8.20\\ 
1,304 1,379 5.751\ 
6,n6 7,277 7.391\ 
7,436 7,663 3.0S'll; 
2,004 2,070 3.291\ 
5,189 6.475 24.781\ 
t82,s14 200,n8 10.011\ 
Oriental Oriental 
Regjslercd Regjslercd Percewge 
Inaeue 5124168 I 0/5168 
0 0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
35 
2 0.OO'll, 
I 0.OO'll, 
2 0.OO'll> 
20 150.00'll> 
•:•:•:•:•:-:-:-:-:-
:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•: 
0 0.00'll, 
3 50.00'll> 
3 200.00'll, 
0 0.OO'll> 
0 0.OO'll> 
62 n.t4\\ 
Indian Indian 
Reglslerod Regls1ercd 
5124168 10/5168 
I 
0 0 
I 3 
0 0 
2 4 
0 0 
3 3 
2 3 
0 0 
0 0 
71 78 
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0.OO'll> 
0.OO'll> 
200.00'll> 
0.OO'll> 
100.00'll> 
0.OO'll> 
0.00'll, 
50.00'll> 
0.OO'll, 
0.OO'll> Hl ...... I.D 0 
°' Ii (X) 
9.861\ (/) < 0 
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1--'· rt p. 
:::l Ii 1--'· Pl Pl X 
rt n 1--' · n 0 0 :::l :::l 
rt 1-r:J 1--'· 1--'· 
:::l lQ C C (D Ii p. (D 
{/) 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
Duffy, James Evan. In G.O.P. We Trust. Unpublished 
Manuscript. Clemson University, S.C.: Special 
Collections, Robert Muldrow Cooper Library. 
152 
Papers of James Evan Duffy, 1960-1973. Clemson 
University, S.C.: Special Collections, Robert Muldrow 
Cooper Library. 
Thurmond, Strom. 
University: 
Strom Thurmond Collection, 1919-. Clemson 
Special Collections, Robert Muldrow Cooper 
Library. 
The Faith We Have Not Kept. San Diego, CA: 
Viewpoint Books, 1968. 
Newspapers & Magazines 
Anderson Independent. 
New South. 
The Anderson Free Press. 
The Charleston News & Courier. 
The Columbia Record. 
The New York Times. 
The Greenville, s.c. News. 
The Columbia, s.c. State. 
Secondary Sources 
Ader, Emily B. The Dixiecrat Movement: 
Party Politics. Washington, D.C.: 
Press, 1955. 
Its Role in Third 
Public Affairs 
Banks, James. Strom Thurmond and the Revolt against 
Modernity. Dissertation. Kent University, 1970. 
. · 
. 
: 
. 
< 
' 
: 
·, 
: 
,; 
' 
, 
' 
; 
1 53 
Bartley, Numan V. The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and 
Politics in the South During the 1950s. Baton Rouge, 
La: Louisiana State University, 1969 . 
Bartley, Numan V. and Hugh D. Graham. Southern Elections: 
County and Precinct Data, 1950-1972. Baton Rouge, La: 
Louisiana State University, 1978 . 
Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 
Bass, Jack. The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social 
Change and Political Consequence Since 1945. New York: 
Basic Books, 1976. 
Billington, Monroe Lee. 
Centuzy. New York: 
The Political South in the Twentieth 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975. 
Black, Earl and Merle Black. Politics and Society in the 
South. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1987. 
The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
Burk, Robert F. The Eisenhower Administration and Black 
Civil Rights. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee 
Press, 1984. 
Burke, Peter. New Perspectives on Historical Writing. 
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1991. 
Campbell, Angus et al., ed. Elections and the Political 
Order. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967. 
Cohodas, Nadine. Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern 
Change. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 
Dent, Harry S. The Prodigal South Returns to Power. New 
York: Wiley, 1978. 
Fowler, Donald. Presidential Voting in South Carolina, 1948-
64. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, 
1966. 
French, Ralph William. The Change in Southern Congressional 
Voting Patterns, 1945-68 . Thesis. Clemson University, 
s.c., 1970. 
Goldfield, David R. Black, White, and Southern: Race 
Relations and Southern Culture, 1940 to the Present. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990. 
,-
• 
.. 
•'· 
• 
~-
I• 
'· 
154 
Grantham, Dewey W. The Democratic South. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1963. 
The Life and Death of the Solid South: A 
Political History. Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1988. 
Havard, William C., editor. The Changing Politics of the 
South. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1972. 
Heard, Alexander. A Two-Party South? Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1952. 
Hero, Alfred 0. 
Rouge, La.: 
The Southerner and World Affairs. Baton 
Louisiana State University Press, 1965. 
Kessel, John H. The Goldwater Coalition; Republican 
Strategies in 1964. Indianapolis, In: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1968. 
Key! V.O. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. 
Lachicotte, Alberta Morel. Rebel Senator: Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1966. 
Lamis, Alexander P. The Two-Party South. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984. 
Lawson, Steven F. Black Ballots: 
South, 1944-1969. New York: 
1976 . 
Voting Rights in the 
Columbia University Press, 
In Pursuit of Power: Southern Blacks and 
Electoral Politics, 1965-82. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985. 
Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black 
Politics in America Since 1941. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc., 1991. 
Lea, James F., editor. 
Baton Rouge, La: 
1988. 
Contemporary Southern Politics. 
Louisiana State University Press, 
Leiserson, Avery, editor. The American South in the 1960's. 
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 
Lubell, Samuel. The Hidden Crisis in American Politics. New 
York: Norton, 1970. 
155 
Matthews, Donald R. Negroes and the New Southern Politics. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. 
McMillen, Neil R. The Citizens' Council: Organized 
Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64. 
Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1971. 
Moreland, Laurence W. et al, editors. 
Political Attitudes and Behavior. 
1982. 
Contemporary Southern 
New York: Praeger, 
Murphy, Reg. The Southern Strategy. New York: Scribner, 
1971. 
Nieman, Donald G. Promises to Keep: African-Americans and 
the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Nobel, Donald R. and Joab L. Thomas. The Rising South. 
University, Al.: University of Alabama Press, 1976. 
Peirce, Neal R. The Deep South States of America: People, 
Politics, and Power in the Seven Deep South States. New 
York: Norton, 1974. 
Phillips, Kevin. The Emerging Republican Majority. New 
Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969. 
Porter, Kirk Harold, and Donald Bruce Johnson, editors. 
National Party Platforms, 1840-1968. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1972. 
Safire, William. Satire's Political Dictionary. New York: 
Random House, 1978. 
Scammon, Richard 
Handbook of 
1920-1964. 
1965. 
M., editor. America At The Polls: A 
American Presidential Election Statistics, 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
America Votes. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly, multi-volume set. 
Scher, Richard K. Politics in the New South: Republicanism, 
Race, and Leadership in the Twentieth Century. New 
York: Paragon House, 1992. 
Seagull, Louis M. Southern Republicanism. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Schenkman Pub. Co., 1975. 
Sherrill, Robert. Gothic Politics in the Deep South: Stars 
of the New Confederacy. New York: Grossman Publishers, 
1968. 
Steed, Robert P. et al, editors. 
South. New York: Praeger, 
Party Politics in the 
1980. 
156 
Swansbrough, Robert H. and David M. Brodsky. The South's New 
Politics: Realignment and Dealignment. Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1988. 
Tawney, R.H. History and Society. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978. 
Tindall, George Brown. The Disruption of the Solid South. 
Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1972. 
The Persistent Tradition in New South Politics. 
Baton Rouge, La: Louisiana State University Press, 
1975. 
Topping, John C., Jr. John R. Lazarek, William H. Linder. 
Southern Republicanism and the New South. Cambridge, 
MA: Undated. Located in the James E. Duffy Papers, Mss 
69: Folder 200, Special Collections, R. M. Cooper 
Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C. 
Tosh, John. The Pursuit of History. Second Edition. New 
York: Longman, 1991. 
White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1960. New 
York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961. 
The Making of the President, 1964. New York: 
Atheneum Publishers, 1965. 
The Making of the President, 1968. New York: 
Atheneum Publishers, 1969. 
Workman, William D. The Case for the South. New York: 
Devin-Adair Co., 1960. 
Woodward, C. Vann. The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 
Journal Articles 
Black, Earl. usouthern Governors and Political Change: 
Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic 
Development, 1950-1969." In The Journal of Politics. 
Vol. 33, No. 3. Gainesville, FL: The Southern 
Political Science Assocation and the University of 
Florida, 1971. 
157 
Burnham, Walter Dean. uThe Alabama Senatorial Election of 
1962: Return of Inter-Party Competition.• In The 
Journal of Politics. Vol. 26, No. 4. Gainesville, FL: 
Convention Press, 1964. 
Cosman, Bernard. #Presidential Republicanism in the South, 
1960.u In The Journal of Politics. Vol. 24, No. 2. 
Jacksonville, FL: Convention Press, 1962. 
Dunbar, Leslie W. #The Changing Mind of the South: The 
Exposed Nerve.# In The Journal of Politics. Vol. 26, 
No. 1. Jacksonville, FL: Convention Press, 1964. 
Key, V.O. uA Theory of Critical Elections.• In The Journal 
of Politics. Vol. 17, No. 1. Jacksonville, FL: 
Convention Press, 1955. 
usecular Realignment and the Party System.• In 
The Journal of Politics. Vol. 21, No. 2. Jacksonville, 
FL: Convention Press, 1959. 
Orum, Anthony M. and Edward W. Mccranie. uclass, Tradition, 
and Partisan Alignments in a Southern Urban Electorate.• 
In The Journal of Politics. Vol. 32, No. 1. 
Gainesville, FL: The Southern Political Science 
Association and the University of Florida, 1970. 
Prothro, James W., Ernest Q .· Campbell, and Charles M. Grigg. 
uTwo-Party Voting in the South: Class vs. Party 
Identification.• In The American Political Science 
Review. Vol . LII, No. 1. Menasha, Wisconsin: The 
American Political Science Association, 1958. 
Strong, Donald S. #The Presidential Election in the South, 
1952.• In The Journal of Politics. Vol. 27, No. 3 . 
Jacksonville, FL: Convention Press, 1955. 
·Further Reflections on Southern Politics.# In 
The Journal of Politics. Vol. 33, No. 2. Gainesville, 
FL: Convention Press, 1971. 
Weeks, O. Douglas. uThe South in National Politics." In The 
Journal of Politics. Vol. 26, No. 1. Gainesville, FL: 
Convention Press, 1964. 
